OBVIOUSLY A PROVOCATION OF THE GOVERNMENT by Mikhail Tsovma Two days after the succesful storm of the parliament in Moscow gunshots are still to be heard around Moscow and this "obvious fact" of the existence of Communist fighters and "snipers" pushes people to embrace the martial law, the curfew and police and military troops loyal to president Yeltsin as the saviors of peace and calmness of Muscovites. This situation, of course, is exactly what Yeltsin was looking for when he started his coup d'etat on September 21st and there are clear signs that he or at least somebody from his team were the people who worked hard to reach this result. Communist fighters and "snipers" somehow leaked through the lines of police and troops surrounding the White House on the day that the troops started the storm of the parliament and caused many deaths among the government troops and civilians, the media reports. Gunfire is heard in various districts of Moscow, but it is quite likely that, like in Moscow's northern suburb of Otradnoye (in the evening of October 5), policemen are just firing machine guns into the air. What is it if not an outright provocation designed to make people believe they need more law and order. Even the Moscow-based English-language periodical Moscow Tribune which seems to undoubtedly believe in the stories about Communist snipers published several materials revealing how the forces of law and order were too reluctant when dealing with the rioters on Sunday, October 3 during the clashes on Oktyabrskaya and Smolenskaya Square. "we've got other goals. We have other orders", - a police officer is reported to say when asked why the police, at least 120 strong, had acted slowly and done so little to stop 40 rioters, when the clashes were just beginning. (John Helmer, Moscow Crisis: The First Spark, Moscow Tribune, Oct.5.) Sometime after when the riot was gathering its strength Muscovites witnessed demonstrators forcing police to retreat, attacking them with their own equipment and fighting their way over the Moscow river and across the Ring Road to parliament. (Reuters, Oct.3, 14:54.) The police troops that were blocking the bridge across the Moscow River were rather poorly equiped (helmets, shields and rubber batons only) and stood in the line one-man thick only. It's worth mentioning that during less dramatic oppositional demonstrations in Moscow police forces were much broader represented and were acting much more fearlessly, managing to stop the demonstrators where and when needed. An hour and a half after the beginning of the demonstration (time that is usually more than enough for the police to predict the movement of the demonstrators and block the streets where needed) police troops once again were defeated on Smolenskaya Square not far from the White House. These victories inspired the opposition to storm the TV centre later in the evening, which somehow appeared to be unprotected. Soon after the beginning of the storm Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in Moscow, the government declared that it has been forced to use force "to end the actions of political adventurists an IS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVERT MASS BLOODSHED". (Reuters, Oct.3, 17:51 and 19:04). At 19:56 Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov blamed "bandits" for the deaths of two policemen and two interior ministry soldiers and the media reported that troops loyal to president were brought to Moscow. WHO WERE THE SNIPERS? One of the keystones of the media campaign on October 4 were "the snipers", that is armed putchists who spread all over the city and whose numbers it was impossible to guess. One of the doctors who was evacuating the injured from the parliament was interviewed by Russian TV and said that there was a considerable number of people shot near the White House in the morning and during the day right in their hearts, necks and heads. This was presented by the media as the evidence of the crimes of the putschists. In fact it is, but it appears more grounded to say that these were the people killed by the KGB and special police troops loyal to the government. Though there were quite a lot of arms in the White House there were hardly any "snipers", that is people specially trained in shooting, among its defenders. It is more probable that those who were shot were shot by the snipers of KGB. (During the August 1991 coup there were much worries about whether these special KGB troops will take the side of Yeltsin or not.) Since none of these special troops declared their loyalty to the parliament, it's hardly so that the Communist "snipers" killed people in dozens around the parliament. Witnesses that were among the spectators of the storm of the White House on Oct.4 report that there were government snipers who were shooting "in all directions" (Moscow Tribune, Oct.5) and particularly civilians. October 6 issue of Izvestiya, Russia's biggest newspaper, features a story "Troops Near The White House Shot Everything That Moves" describing how the soldiers started shooting at the windows and roofs of buildings around the parliament if they saw anybody moving there. This went on for about two days and none of the specially trained anti-terrorist detachments of KGB were involved in the fight against the mythical snipers. During the "sniper incident" on Novy Arbat (the only one described in the media as far as I know) soldiers from APCs shot in various directions, including the house on the embankment of the Moscow River near the parliament where dozens of people and TV crews gathered to see the fight. After the people on Novy Arbat tried to escape into one of the courtyards they were met by gunshots from the neighboring streets and the windows of the houses that composed the courtyard - the area was totally in control of the police troops and there were no "Communist fighters" there. It is also interesting to learn how it happened that considerable numbers of armed people leaked from the White House and spread around the city. The parliament was blocked from all sides and since its defenders didn't have tanks it was almost impossible for them to get out... until they were let out by the government. The story about "unprofessional actions of the police and the military" is an old one and it is usually used by the authorities to justify more repression and the use of more troops. This is what happened during the clash between communists and the police on the 1st of May this year. This is what happened on October 3 when the authorities let the opposition "defeat" special police troops on the streets of Moscow. This is probably how they provoked more violence during the storm of the White House. Currently the media reports dozens of cases when journalists were arrested by the forces of law and order, severely beaten up, held in Lefortovo KGB prison (together with the leaders of parliament and dozens of civilians, including children), their films exposed. (Izvestiya, October 6.) I doubt that any of the policemen or military will be punished for these actions - they feel that this is their time and that they can do whatever they want without being punished or anything like that. This is what they were doing for years, but what's going on now is just outrageous. And it's not just the police and the military since every other high- rank "democrat" is trying to make revenge on his opponents. Yeltsin had his fun destroying the paliament, Moscow's mayor Luzhkov gladly witnessed (and sanctioned, I'm sure) arrests and beatings of Moscow City Soviet deputees that bothered him a lot about the legal grounds of his multiple political and business activities. Heads of local administrations are disbanding troublesome Soviets in their regions. In the situation where there are virtually no political organizations that really represent the interests of different social groups, Soviets were almost the only opposition to the governmental course (though the one that can be called the real opposition), but with them being disbanded, oppositional organizations and papers closed, and martial law and censorship introduced, the road for Yeltsin's triumphant elections is clean. Long live the real freedom of choice, the choice between the Big Brother and yourself! POSTSCRIPT Vecherniya Moskva, Moscow evening paper on October 6, reported that none of president's decrees implemented censorship and that the censorship that existed was dictated by the needs of the moment and that they won't work anymore. Nezavisimaya gazeta, one of the pro- democratic, pro-Yeltsin papers appeared on that day with about half a page of blank space plus some published informations lacking the starting sentences. The editor-in-chief of histerically pro- governmental Moskovsky Komsomolets said on TV that blank spaces in some of the papers is he fault of the editors. He also went as far as to declare that there will be no blank spaces in his paper because they publish the truth and nothing else but the truth and the rtuth can't be censored. Do you love me, Moskovsky Komsomolets? Yes, I love you, Big Brother! ------- End of Forwarded Message Russian Labor Review Has A New Address November 16, 1993 Dear Friends, Russian Labor Review has experienced some problems in distribution of its first two issues, but has reorganized its distribution system to overcome these. For any of you who may have experienced delays in delivery or non-delivery, we apologize. If you have experienced any difficulty in your subscription, or have any other questions, please write or email to the new U.S. address below. PLEASE USE THIS NEW ADDRESS, and change your address books accordingly. The new address for international subscriptions is: Russian Labor Review, P.O. Box 8461, Berkeley, CA 94707; Tel: 510-489-8554; Fax: 510-471-4454; Email:rlrsf@igc.apc.org. This address should be used for all international correspondence and subscriptions. For those of you unfamiliar with Russian Labor Review (RLR), it is an attractive new quarterly English language magazine, published in Moscow by the KAS-KOR Labor Information Center, covering the events and debates in the workers' movement throughout the ex-USSR in a comprehensive way. RLR is thoroughly non-sectarian, with articles from a wide variety of viewpoints. For any one at all interested in the ex-USSR or the international labor movement, it's a must. I reproduce a subscription blurb below. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Subscribe to Russian Labor Review! Help the workers' movement in the ex-USSR and keep up with the events and debates in the Russian workers' movement by subscribing to Russian Labor Review. Subscriptions for North America, Europe and the CIS are $30/yr.(4 issues), $50/2 yrs.(8 issues) for individuals; $50/yr., $90/2/yrs. for organizations/high income. For Australia, Asia, Africa, and South America the rates are $40/yr., $70/2 yrs. for individuals; $60/yr., $110/2 yrs. organizational/high income. All amounts in U.S. dollars. Special sponsoring subscriptions are available at $100/yr. Sponsors names are printed in a special section of RLR unless otherwise requested. RLR is also looking for library subscriptions, as well as distribution help, in various areas of the U.S. and internationally. Contact Alex Chis at the address printed above if you have any ideas. Thank you. Alex Chis International Coordinator Russian Labor Review Addendum: The Russian address is still current: Russian Labor Review, P.O. Box 16, 129642 Moscow, Russia/CIS; Tel:(095) 921-0655; Email:krazchenko@glas.apc.org The French address printed in previous issues of the magazine should be used for France only and the old U.S. address should NOT be used. /* Written 6:39 pm Feb 3, 1994 by glas:kaskor in web:glasnost.news */ /* ---------- "Unemploument in Russia" ---------- */ From: kaskor (Cyrill A. Buketov) Subject: Unemploument in Russia /* Written 6:38 pm Feb 3, 1994 by kaskor@glas.apc.org in glas:labr.cis */ /* ---------- "Unemploument in Russia" ---------- */ #UNEMPLOYMENT IN RUSSIA: OFFICIALS HIDE THE REALITY #By Jane Dillendorf #MOSCOW -- "The problem of unemployment in Russia is no big deal!" This is the conclusion you might draw if you were to look no further than the official figures. According to statistics issued by the Russian Federal Employment Service at the end of January, there are now only 835,000 jobless people in the country -- barely 1 per cent of the workforce. #However, statistics can be made to hide reality as well as to reveal it. In this case, the official statisticians have performed a masterwork, reducing the country's unemployment rate to around a tenth of its probable level. #Russia today is one of the world's centres of concealed unemployment. The mechanisms involved in this phenomenon are simple. Enterprises which cannot maintain production at previous levels pay their employees a fraction of their usual wages and send them on forced vacations. The length of the stand-down and the payment made are totally up to the enterprise management. #There are other types of concealed unemployment as well: shortened workweeks or workdays, or keeping employees at their workplaces but giving them almost nothing to do. #For the workers involved, this ``pseudo-employment'' is obviously better than outright joblessness. But the situation has a disturbing side, since it mystifies the reality and allows workers to avoid taking action to force changes. #Providing a firm estimate of the extent of concealed unemployment is difficult. The Russian State Committee on Statistics, however, cites a figure of "up to 12 million", which together with the officially registered unemployed suggests a total of about 13 million workers who do not have real full-time jobs. #This is about 18 per cent of the Russian workforce -- closer to what you would expect in a country gripped by catastrophic depression. The only reason the figure is not far higher is the continuing support of state and many privatised enterprises by the government. Cheap state credits are the only thing saving many firms from bankruptcy. #Of the people who lose their jobs, large numbers never register with an employment bureau. Part of the reason is suspiciousness of the new structures. In the ``good old days'' the system of labour bureaus provided something closer to compulsion than help. In the city of Saratov on the Volga, for example, two-thirds of unemployed women refused the help of the service's psychologists. #Many Russians simply do not know what employment services do, or where to find them. People are ignorant of their rights, set out in the Law on Employment of 1991, and often have no idea that this law exists. #The employment bureaus very often lack the money to pay all the registered jobless the tiny benefits that are available. For people who cannot survive without these sums, the situation means hours of standing in line, frequently in snow or rain. In these circumstances, it is difficult for people to have faith in the system. #Of the registered unemployed, no fewer than 75 per cent are women, more than half of them with higher education. People aged from 16 to 29 make up 30 per cent of the total jobless. Among unemployed youth, almost every third person has just graduated from an institution of higher or special education. Despite alarming forecasts, former military personnel and immigrants -- often refugees from other countries of the former Soviet Union -- have not made a major impact on the jobless figures. #The economic reasons underlying job cuts vary from region to region. The conversion of military to civilian production has been a major factor in the north-west of Russia and in the Urals. The severance of ties between former Soviet republics has had a drastic effect in central European Russia and in the North Caucasus. #The future prospects for employment depend heavily on the economic policies followed by the new government. Today as in the past the authorities have two choices. Should they keep aiding unprofitable enterprises, artificially increasing the amount of pseudo-employment? Or should they proceed to a new stage of reforms even if this creates a whole constellation of problems? #If the second option is chosen, the Federal Employment Service predicts that open unemployment will reach at least five million by the end of 1994. Until now only a handful of enterprises have been declared bankrupt, but economists are predicting that use of the bankruptcy legislation will become commonplace in the next six months. #If, as now seems likely, the new Russian government continues providing cheap credits to cash-strapped industries, the rise in the number of jobless will not be so rapid. But the increase is unlikely to be halted; the steady worsening of the employment situation seen during 1993 can be expected to continue. #Another feature of the Russian labour market in future years will be large numbers of chronically unemployed people. This reflects the striking discrepancy between the skills of job seekers and the type of jobs on offer. Ninety per cent of vacancies today are for unskilled manual labour, while around half the unemployed have higher or specialised secondary education. #The peculiarities of the Russian ``propiska'' (residence permit) system make it difficult for people who are looking for jobs to move to other cities. Also, Russia suffers from an acute housing shortage, meaning that migrant job seekers often have no chance of finding accommodation. #Until now, many newly jobless people have been able to find employment -- often highly unstable -- in the new sector of private trade. But new taxes introduced in 1994 are expected to make a great deal of this activity unprofitable. #It is hard even to imagine what the employment services could do if they were faced with a 13-million-strong army of jobless. In 1993 they managed to help only 840,000 Russians. #Meanwhile, the official figure of ``one per cent unemployed'' stands as a symbol of the way the Russian authorities prefer to deny the problem rather than to seek ways of counteracting it. ===================================================== Spread by KAS-KOR Labour Information, Education & Research Centre Moscow, 01/01/1994. Ph: 7-095-9210655 E-mail: kaskor@glas.apc.org