From kls Fri Nov 13 22:47:31 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: Karl Swartz Subject: Welcome to sci.aeronautics.airliners! Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Original-Message-Id: Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Fri, 13 Nov 92 22:45:11 PST Welcome to sci.aeronautics.airliners! This is a moderated newsgroup for the discussion of airliners. More precisely, the charter, taken from the CFV, is as follows: A moderated discussion group on airliner technology: the design, construction, performance, human factors, operation, and histories of transport-category airplanes. MODERATION POLICY ---------- ------ The moderation policy will in general be to post most articles as they are submitted, rejecting articles only if they are redundant or mostly content-free (a flood of random conjecture after a crash, for example) or inappropriate to the charter of the group. I expect to process new submissions at least once per day, except occasional weekends and major holidays. If I anticipate longer delays I'll send a note to the group and, when appropriate, arrange a backup moderator. SUBMISSIONS ----------- Submissions for the newsgroup should be sent to airliners@chicago.com If your newsreader properly supports posting to moderated newsgroups (and your mailpaths file is correctly configured) you may prefer to post articles -- this should have the same effect as sending mail to the above address, with the added benefit of preserving some of the reference information for those using threaded newsreaders. Administrative questions pertaining to the group should be sent to airliners-admin@chicago.com ARCHIVES -------- Several archives will be maintained and made available for anonymous ftp. Further details will be posted within the next few weeks. MAILING LIST ------- ---- A mailing list form of the group is also being considered for people lacking access to Usenet. As with the archives, details will be posted when they are available. CREDITS ------- Many thanks are due to Robert Dorsett, who organized and ran the vote and without whose perseverence this group would probably still be a topic for idle dinner e-mail. Thanks, too, to the 168 people who voted fror the group. (I'll refrain from any Bronx cheer to the 26 naysayers -- at least they voted!) And thanks in advance to all of you eager contributors -- I'm eagerly awaiting the first article! -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls QUAYLE IS A BOZOE |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA "I never vote for anyone. I always vote against." (W. C. Fields) From kls Tue Nov 17 03:10:31 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: bowen@comlab.oxford.ac.uk (Jonathan Bowen) Subject: TV programme on 777 Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: Jonathan.Bowen@prg.oxford.ac.uk (Jonathan Bowen) Organization: Programming Research Group, Oxford University, UK X-Original-Message-Id: <1992Nov16.121654.13087@topaz.comlab.ox.ac.uk> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 12:16:54 GMT Last night (Sunday 15 Nov), Channel 4 broadcast a TV programme on the production of the new Boeing 777 airplane in the Equinox series in the UK. Unfortunately I only saw the last 5 minutes of the programme. Would anyone who saw the whole programme like to provide a summary in this forum? In particular, I would be interested to hear if any mention was made of the fly-by-wire and safety aspects of the plane. -- Jonathan Bowen, Oxford University Computing Laboratory. From kls Wed Nov 18 00:26:01 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: cid@athena.mit.edu (Derek H Cedillo) Subject: 747 engine mounts Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology X-Original-Message-Id: <1992Nov16.042657.19926@athena.mit.edu> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 04:26:57 GMT I would like to merely offer up a first topic for discussion. Boeing and the FAA have conducted fuse pin inspections on the 747 fleet. A few of these inspections found cracked pins, and quite a few found a large amount of corrosion. Inspections have been expanded to include the engine mount pylons. What Im looking for is some specs on the shear yeilding of these pins and and the stuctural integrity of the pylons. Thanks a bunch, Derek --------------------------------------------------------------------------- "There Are Two Great Tragedies In Life, One Is Not To Get Your Heart's Desire. The Other Is To Get It. -Bernard Shaw --[20968]-- From kls Wed Nov 18 00:26:05 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: jerry@telecom.ksu.edu (Jerry Anderson) Subject: Boeing 747-300 Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Original-Message-Id: <9211171641.AA06619@pawnee.telecom.ksu.edu> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Tue, 17 Nov 92 10:41:51 CST Is the Boeing 747-300 the largest commercial passenger aircraft in the world? Is the -300 the latest version, or are there newer, possibly larger stretched versions of the 747? I've heard Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Airbus all have plans in the works for Really Big Planes in the 600-700 passenger, 7500-8000 mile range. Does anyone know if these planes are really going to get built, or is this the usual "if we can pre-sell a couple of hundred, maybe we'll really build it?" Does anyone have model numbers, specs (passengers, range), or projected delivery dates? These numbers come from memory, and I have no faith in them at all: Company Model Delivery ------- ------ -------- McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 1993 Airbus AE-400 1994 Boeing 777 1995-6 -- jerry@telecom.ksu.edu Jerry Anderson Kansas State University vox: (913) 532-6936 Telecommunications fax: (913) 532-7114 Manhattan KS 66506 From kls Wed Nov 18 01:42:59 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov18.094020.12550@ohare.Chicago.COM> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 09:40:20 GMT In article jerry@telecom.ksu.edu (Jerry Anderson) writes: >Is the Boeing 747-300 the largest commercial passenger aircraft >in the world? Is the -300 the latest version, or are there >newer, possibly larger stretched versions of the 747? The 747-300 is simply a -200 with an Extended Upper Deck, which allows greater seating. The only 747 model currently being produced is the 747-400, which shares the same fuselage dimensions as the -300 version and visually is quite similar, the most noticeable difference being winglets at the wingtips and subtle engine differences. Internally, the -400 is a *very* different aircraft, including a two-person cockpit and new, more powerful, and more fuel efficient engines. MGTOW is up to at least 870,000 from 833,000 for the -200/-300 models and range is substantially increased as well. Unless the Russians have something which I've missed, the 747-400 is easily the largest commercial passenger aircraft in terms of number of seats and payload. Its range is also the greatest of anything now in service, though the Airbus A340 will exceed it once it enters service next year. >I've heard Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Airbus all have plans >in the works for Really Big Planes in the 600-700 passenger, >7500-8000 mile range. Does anyone know if these planes are >really going to get built, or is this the usual "if we can >pre-sell a couple of hundred, maybe we'll really build it?" No manufacturer (well, except for Airbus) would build a new aircraft just for grins. If they have tangible demand in the form of orders they'll build it, if not, they won't. Given the current state of the airline industry major new orders aren't likely in the near future. > McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 1993 > Airbus AE-400 1994 > Boeing 777 1995-6 All three of these are much smaller than what you're thinking of. Here are the important parameters for these three plus the 747-400 for comparison. Seating is for a "typical" three-class cabin and service is the date of first service; MGTOW is in US pounds. Mfr. Type MGTOW seating service Boeing 747-400 870,000 430 1989 MacDAC MD-11 618,000 250 1991 Airbus A-340 559,000 230 1993 Boeing 777 515,000 ~220 1995 In the 600+ passenger market, Boeing has talked about both further stretches of the 747 and an entirely new aircraft, sometimes using the N650 moniker. McDonnell-Douglas has most recently talked about the MD-12 -- once yet another stretch of the MD-11 -- as a new and much larger aircraft, also in the 600+ passenger category. Airbus has said that if there is demand and/or if Boeing builds such an aircraft, Airbus will build one too. The name A600 or maybe A2000 seems vaguely familiar though I can't locate any references. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls QUAYLE IS A BOZOE |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA "I never vote for anyone. I always vote against." (W. C. Fields) From kls Wed Nov 18 10:21:47 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: sdl@linus.mitre.org Subject: hydraulic problems with DC-10's?? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Original-Message-Id: <9211181502.AA03545@rigel.mitre.org> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Wed, 18 Nov 92 10:02:08 -0500 Great new newsgroup! Perhaps now I can get a more definitive answer to the following: Some of my pilot friends have accused the DC-10 as having a particularly bad history of hydraulic problems (which have contributed to a few crashes). But do the statistics really support the notion that the DC-10 really has a significantly worse safety record than other wide-body jets, or is this just a myth? Also, have all these hydraulic problems been corrected, or does the DC-10 still suffer from hydraulic problems even today? From kls Wed Nov 18 22:58:13 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: lomasm@t9.cs.man.ac.uk (Martin Lomas) Subject: Re: TV programme on 777 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Original-Message-Id: Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 18 Nov 92 19:39:39 GMT In bowen@comlab.oxford.ac.uk (Jonathan Bowen) writes: >Last night (Sunday 15 Nov), Channel 4 broadcast a TV programme on the >production of the new Boeing 777 airplane in the Equinox series in the >UK. Unfortunately I only saw the last 5 minutes of the programme. Would >anyone who saw the whole programme like to provide a summary in this >forum? In particular, I would be interested to hear if any mention was >made of the fly-by-wire and safety aspects of the plane. >-- >Jonathan Bowen, >Oxford University Computing Laboratory. OK, here goes (and without the aid of a video recorder! :-): New Boeing 777 and its design. The program concentrated on the general aspects of how the whole thing is put together - ie: need, management, tools used, some financial. Hard technical details were scant. Boeing need a plane that is bigger than their 757 and 767 yet smaller than the 747. With latest design, the 777 will be smaller than the 747 yet carry nearly the same number of passengers. Pressure from customers and competition from Airbus and McDonnald Douglas. Large order from American Airlines and others prompted the design start. Production aircraft by 1995(?). Large mainframe cluster (IBM!) being used for all drawings (CAD) work with stress analysis to let engineers reduce component weight ('safely') where possible. A full size mockup to test whether all components will fit together will not be needed (as made for previous planes) due to computer design checks. (Component clashes checked and highlighted.) International manufacturing: Electronics from UK, rudder from Australia, various (large) sections from Europe, and all assembled at Boeing's now being built plant in America. Some design decisions shown: Use of Aluminium-Lithium alloy -- strong and light but cracks when drilled. However, the cracks don't propagate and so are safe. Reluctantly rejected due to engineers' fears of cracks and possible confusion over what parts must be crack free and where cracks are 'ok'. Safety: Issue of doors mentioned -- trade many doors against plane too heavy, so compromise. Doors must open even with quarter inch ice sealing them shut. Good demonstration showing their intended design works. (Big freezer, idiot in there sprays on water, big party next day to see the door break open.) Cost compromises: None made where the plane's flyability is concerned, possible compromises for such as crash survivabilty and other cases. Concentrate efforts to AVOID crashes. Anyway, bad for business if your plane falls out of the sky! Fly by wire briefly explained. Safety issues NOT covered. Only advantages of better fuel economy and smoother flight mentioned. Implied weight savings due to easier mechanics. Intended fly-by-wire system currently being tested on a 757 with dual control systems (mechanical and the FBW). Hundreds of real flights being performed. Some mention given to making the controls similar to existing planes so the pilots can be easily trained for the plane. Control ergonomics reviewed by test pilots to great detail (focus in on 'that knob doesn't click nicely when switching between settings -- make it click better...'). Two engines only on the plane -- one adequate for flight across the Atlantic. Engine reliabilty relied upon. Customer engineers allowed to review the new engines for servicing and to make mods. Customers allowed into (some) of the Boeing meetings to discuss the 777's design and to suggest mods. 'Open management' strategy. Main thrust of the program was the huge cost and complexity of the task of producing a new aircraft to tight schedules. Management style/issues covered much more than the technical issues. Good documentary very much in the 'Skyscraper' style that this film company first produced. Any other critics out there? Martin. From kls Wed Nov 18 22:58:17 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's?? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov18.205005.13733@ohare.Chicago.COM> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 20:50:05 GMT In article sdl@linus.mitre.org writes: >Some of my pilot friends have accused the DC-10 as having a >particularly bad history of hydraulic problems (which have >contributed to a few crashes). Two, at least. AA 191 at Chicago/O'Hare on May 25, 1979, and UA 232 at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989. The Turkish Airlines crash near Paris on March 3, 1974 helped set up UA 232 though I'm never seen any reference to the hydraulics as being contributory to that crash. >But do the statistics really support the notion that the DC-10 really >has a significantly worse safety record than other wide-body jets, or >is this just a myth? After the A320 crash at Strasbourg early this year I saw something that said the A320 had overtaken the DC-10 as having the worst safety record of any large jetliner and that both were an order of magnitude worse than the third-place contender. I really wish I could find the reference, but alas, I can't. I don't recall the metrics used, and one could certainly debate the statistical validity given the small samples involved. Another view is to look at the number of airworthiness directives (AD) issued by the FAA in the US for the DC-10 versus its contemporaries. As of January 1, 1982, the DC-10 had 148, far ahead of Boeing's 747 with 57 and Lockheed's L-1011 with 51. The FAA clearly found a lot more to worry about in the DC-10. Probably the best general interest discussion of the DC-10 and all its problems is in The Sporty Game, by John Newhouse (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1982). Chapter 5 in particular goes into great detail, though it of course predates the Sioux City crash. >Also, have all these hydraulic problems been corrected, or does the >DC-10 still suffer from hydraulic problems even today? The DC-10 (and the MD-11) haven't "suffered" from them recently, though the problems still exist. Fundamentally, the DC-10's hydraulic system shortcomings as compared to the 747 and L-1011 are that there are only three, instead of four, giving less redundancy, and they tend to be routed together so that something which affect one probably will affect all three. Boeing and Lockheed (and I believe Airbus) used three hydraulic systems in any one area of the plane, providing the mandated redundancy, but used four overall so that a problem which caused the failure of all three systems in one part of the aircraft would still leave control in other areas via the intact fourth system. They also chose to route the three systems independently, again to minimize the possibility of complete failure. As mentioned, I don't believe the Paris crash involved the hydraulics, but it did lead McDonnell-Douglas to relocate the control cables and hydraulics from under the cabin floor, where the cables had been severed by a collapsing floor, to the top of the cabin. This simply left them vulnerable to a different failure mode -- demonstrated 15 years later when the fan on UA 232's #2 engine disintigrated and sent shrapnel through the top of the aft fuselage, including all three of those hydraulic lines. Clearly a more reasonable solution would have been to move only *some* of the lines after the Paris crash, but this was not done and has not been done since, though some check valves were added to minimize the impact. The vulnerable location of the hydraulics at the leading edge of the wing, instead of a mid-wing and/or trailing edge location as used by other manufacturers, precipitated the Chicago crash, and the lack of any mechanical locking mechanism to prevent uncommanded flap retrac- tion also played a significant part. (The largest blame was placed on American Airlines for improper maintenance practices, though the airframe certainly received its share of blame.) While I believe the locking mechanism was later added, nothing was done about the routing of the hydraulics. Indeed, American requested a modification kit to move the hydraulics and was willing to pay for it, but McDonnell- Douglas refused. I'll leave you to draw your own conclusions, but I certainly do not feel comfortable flying on the DC-10, even though I've flown on them many times. I fly SFO-ORD somewhat often and do my best to catch one of the 747 flights United offers or a 757. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Wed Nov 18 22:58:17 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: Helen Trillian Rose Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Original-Message-Id: <199211182226.AA03203@rocza.eff.org> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 17:26:36 -0500 Karl> == Karl Swartz [....] Karl> Mfr. Type MGTOW seating service Karl> Boeing 747-400 870,000 430 1989 Karl> MacDAC MD-11 618,000 250 1991 Karl> Airbus A-340 559,000 230 1993 Karl> Boeing 777 515,000 ~220 1995 I hadn't thought the B777 was going to be in between the 757 (~200) and 767 (~250) passengers. I thought it was going to fill the niche between the 767 and the 747 -- about the size of the old 747SP in number of seats. The 777 is a widebody as wide as the 747's (3-4-3 seating in economy) and was meant to fill the market left wide open by the L-1011 and DC-10 trijets (one big reason why it has optional folding wingtips: to fit into a DC-10 gate). Karl> In the 600+ passenger market, Boeing has talked about both Karl> further stretches of the 747 and an entirely new aircraft, Karl> sometimes using the N650 moniker. McDonnell-Douglas has most Karl> recently talked about the MD-12 -- once yet another stretch of Karl> the MD-11 -- as a new and much larger aircraft, also in the 600+ Karl> passenger category. McDonnell Douglas has put a hold on the MD-12 for lack of financing (lets face it, would *you* get into bed with a company that produced the DC-10?). Karl> Airbus has said that if there is demand and/or if Boeing builds Karl> such an aircraft, Airbus will build one too. The name A600 or Karl> maybe A2000 seems vaguely familiar though I can't locate any Karl> references. Only Airbus would create a plane just to compete with Boeing. Just imagine, Europe, your tax money is going to support the egos of a bunch of political types. And inciting fear in any airliner fan. What a worthwhile task. --Helen -- Helen Trillian Rose Electronic Frontier Foundation email eff@eff.org for EFF Info Kapor Enterprises, Inc. Flames to: Systems and Networks Administration women-not-to-be-messed-with@eff.org From kls Wed Nov 18 23:21:58 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov19.072012.14608@ohare.Chicago.COM> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 07:20:12 GMT In article Helen Trillian Rose writes: Karl> == Karl Swartz Karl> Mfr. Type MGTOW seating service Karl> Boeing 747-400 870,000 430 1989 Karl> MacDAC MD-11 618,000 250 1991 Karl> Airbus A-340 559,000 230 1993 Karl> Boeing 777 515,000 ~220 1995 >I hadn't thought the B777 was going to be in between the 757 (~200) and >767 (~250) passengers. I thought it was going to fill the niche between >the 767 and the 747 -- about the size of the old 747SP in number of >seats. Sorry, that was a typo. The correct number should be 290. Note, though, that I said a *three* class configuration, since the topic was long-range aircraft. A 757 is in the 185 to 195 range with only two classes; 250 is the right ballpark for a two class 767-300. The smaller 767-200 is just over 200 with two classes, not much bigger than the 757. With three classes, a 767-200 is aroung 165 to 170 while the 767-300 is about 210 to 220. In the case of the 777, the only numbers I have handy are for United's two class configuration, which has 38+325 for a total of 363 seats. I tried to extrapolate from that number and the ratio of seats on United's two and three class 767-200s. >The 777 ... was meant to fill the market left wide open by the L-1011 >and DC-10 trijets (one big reason why it has optional folding wingtips: >to fit into a DC-10 gate). True, though it ended up significantly larger than either. (Using the United configs again, 363 seats vs. 298 on a DC-10-30 with a below-deck galley.) As for the foldings wingtips, nobody has yet ordered them. I wonder just what they intend to do with all those not-quite-big-enough gates?! >McDonnell Douglas has put a hold on the MD-12 for lack of financing >(lets face it, would *you* get into bed with a company that produced the >DC-10?). I doubt the DC-10 has much to do with it, since the MD-11 has been selling well enough. They simply found themselves in a Catch-22: they couldn't raise the cash without any firm orders and couldn't get any firm orders without a reasonable expectation of the financing falling into place. Their poor financial condition of course means they can't finance it themselves as Boeing could, which greatly complicates the whole matter. Actually, even if they had the financing they probably couldn't get the orders given the current economic situation, and this is exactly what they've said in their announcement of delaying the MD-12. >Only Airbus would create a plane just to compete with Boeing. Hmmm ... seems to me McDonnell-Douglas with the DC-10 and Lockheed with the L-1011 were pretty bullheaded about going ahead simply to compete with each other, knowing full well that with the orders split neither one could really succeed! 8-) -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Thu Nov 19 03:44:49 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Boeing X-Original-Message-Id: <9211190615.AA02738@bcstec.ca.boeing.com> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Wed, 18 Nov 92 22:15:02 PST In article jerry@telecom.ksu.edu (Jerry And erson) writes: >Is the Boeing 747-300 the largest commercial passenger aircraft >in the world? Is the -300 the latest version, or are there >newer, possibly larger stretched versions of the 747? No, actually, I believe the 747-400 is currently the largest production passenger aircraft in the world. Wingspan of 211' and max takeoff weight of 870,000lb, I believe. Not that I do Everett products... :-) >I've heard Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Airbus all have plans >in the works for Really Big Planes in the 600-700 passenger, >7500-8000 mile range. Does anyone know if these planes are >really going to get built, or is this the usual "if we can >pre-sell a couple of hundred, maybe we'll really build it?" >Does anyone have model numbers, specs (passengers, range), or >projected delivery dates? The Boeing and the Airbus offerings in this market seem to both hover around 600 seats and 7,000 mile range. Takeoff weights in the million pound plus range. The anticipated market, as described by John Hayhurst, Director of New Large Airplane Division, is only a couple hundred airplanes TOTAL. From my knothole, it looks like a prestige fight. But there are a lot of interesting questions that must be answered before anyone will build one of these monsters. > These numbers come from memory, and >I have no faith in them at all: Rightly so. :-) > Company Model Delivery > ------- ------ -------- > McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 1993 I think you'll find that the MD-11 has been delivering since 1990. Very nice airplane overall. My writer flew on one to Europe, he liked it better than the 767. :-) It is probably the MD-12 that you have in mind. It is on hold until somebody comes up with $2Begabucks to finance the development. > Airbus AE-400 1994 You may be thinking of the A-340, which should certainly be delivering by then. I think it is the A-350 that is the number being kicked about for their UHCA (Ultra High Capacity Aircraft). > Boeing 777 1995-6 Pretty close. March '95 sticks in my mind for some reason, but I'm not that familiar with the 777's schedule. My wife probably knows... :-) Terry drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com From kls Thu Nov 19 21:46:59 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: Pete Mellor Subject: Re: TV programme on 777 Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Original-Message-Id: <3891.9211191222@csrsun8.cs.city.ac.uk> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Thu, 19 Nov 92 12:22:53 GMT Jonathan, > Would anyone who saw the whole programme like to provide a > brief summary in this forum? (A slightly more temperate response to your question! :-) The programme concentrated mainly on the design of the airframe, and the use of CAD systems to do this. It described how the structural calculations and spatial arrangement of components could be handled using 3-D movable graphics. The design system was intended to be "paperless", with electronic transfer of designs between engineers' workstations, instead of blue-prints being dropped in in-trays. Examples of the sort of problems they were shown tackling were "What weight of metal can we drill out of this structure and still leave it strong enough to bear the stress?", and "When the kitchen door opens, does it hit the knees of the first-cklass passengers?". There was quite a bit of time devoted to the design of the doors, with a management requirement to have them all identical to cut production costs, and the design problems this entailed. The poor old designer took three months to solve this one first time round, under pressure from what the manager described as a "management ploy". ("Well, if *you* can't do it, which consultant do you suggest we bring in to solve it for you?") On the second version of the design, the problem of door uniformity was solved in a few weeks, and by the third iteration it was down to a few days. It definitely did have the feel of a "Boeing commercial" about it, with lots of "gee-whizz" shots of designers manipulating computer graphics, and anecdotes of the "Yes, of course we had problems, but just look how we learned to overcome them!" variety. (See the door problem above.) It was an interesting programme, but I was disappointed to find only one passing reference to the flight control systems, having originally watched it in the hope of learning about Boeing's approach to fly-by-computer. Pete ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Thu Nov 19 21:47:01 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: hoyme@src.honeywell.com (Ken Hoyme) Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Honeywell Systems & Research Center, Mpls. MN, USA. X-Original-Message-Id: Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 15:35:39 GMT (I posted this yesterday, but our mailer had problems with finding where to send for this moderated newsgroup. I have been told this has been fixed. I see that other follow-ups have occured as well, but there is some information in here that wasn't covered. Rather than editing this, I am sending it on as originally written.) In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: > In article jerry@telecom.ksu.edu (Jerry Anderson) writes: > Unless the Russians have something which I've missed, the 747-400 is > easily the largest commercial passenger aircraft in terms of number of > seats and payload. Its range is also the greatest of anything now in > service, though the Airbus A340 will exceed it once it enters service > next year. According to the "Commercial Airliners of the World" section of the 21-27 October 1992 issue of Flight International, the largest Russian transport is the Ilyushin II-86 Camber with a maximum seating of 350. I noticed that the max. seating estimates for the other airplanes were for sardine configurations, so I have to assume that this is not a 3-class estimate. (Ex: 747-400 with max seating of 660?? That's cramped!) >> McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 1993 >> Airbus AE-400 1994 >> Boeing 777 1995-6 > All three of these are much smaller than what you're thinking of. > Here are the important parameters for these three plus the 747-400 > for comparison. Seating is for a "typical" three-class cabin and > service is the date of first service; MGTOW is in US pounds. > Mfr. Type MGTOW seating service > Boeing 747-400 870,000 430 1989 > MacDAC MD-11 618,000 250 1991 > Airbus A-340 559,000 230 1993 > Boeing 777 515,000 ~220 1995 My data for the 777-200 is 3-class seating of 320, with a stretch version planned with 3-class seating in the 360-390 range. United ordered the 320 seat version according to AvWeek Oct. 22, 1990. According to AvWeek Nov. 4, 1991, the A-340-300 will have a 3-class seating configuration of 295, and the A340-200 will be shorter with 262 seats. > In the 600+ passenger market, Boeing has talked about both further > stretches of the 747 and an entirely new aircraft, sometimes using > the N650 moniker. McDonnell-Douglas has most recently talked about > the MD-12 -- once yet another stretch of the MD-11 -- as a new and > much larger aircraft, also in the 600+ passenger category. Airbus > has said that if there is demand and/or if Boeing builds such an > aircraft, Airbus will build one too. The name A600 or maybe A2000 > seems vaguely familiar though I can't locate any references. Boeing is considering three configurations for their "New Large Airplane (NLA)" A 747 stretch, a double deck 747 and a totally new double decker. 3 class seats range from 484-612. See AvWeek Jan 6, 1992 for a description of these options. An Oct. 28, 1991 AvWeek article covers Airbus's studies on large airplane configurations. That article confusingly talks about the ASX-700, but shows an artists concept with an A2000 on the tail. 600 3-class seats in a double deck configuration. I have also heard that Boeing will build theirs if Airbus launches. I suspect both are eying the market and hoping to delay the investment as long as possible, given the current economic climate. If one decides the go-ahead, the other will have to launch defensively to prevent the other from capturing the market. I hope this won't be another fiasco like the DC-10/L-1011 developments, where each captured enough of the market to keep the other from making any money. Lockheed got out of the business, and some have questioned whether MDAC has ever really recovered from that. Ken --- Ken Hoyme Honeywell Systems and Research Center (612)951-7354 3660 Technology Dr., Minneapolis, MN 55418 Internet: hoyme@src.honeywell.com From kls Thu Nov 19 21:47:01 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: bentson@CS.ColoState.EDU (Randolph Bentson) Subject: Re: TV programme on 777 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Colorado State University, Computer Science Department X-Original-Message-ID: Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 16:30:31 GMT In article lomasm@t9.cs.man.ac.uk (Martin Lomas) writes: >... >Fly by wire briefly explained. >... >Any other critics out there? > > >Martin. > -NOT FROM THE SHOW- Boeing is _very_ reluctant to use fly-by-wire. Management trusts computer solutions no more than members of this forum. I got the impression that this system has a pilot override as part of it's basic design. (A sort of "do what I say, not what you think I want" mode.) One interesting feature is the networking of non-flight related computers. Planes will have an internet that will also link link to ground stations, satellites, and other planes. They will have the ability to do significant book-work while in the air. Flight crews will be able to order maintenance and consumables, weather and traffic information can be exchanged, etc. It's likely there will be a network for passangers-- a big step forward from airphone. Boeing recently moved a great number of folks (on the order of 5000) that were scattered south of Seattle to a new facility in Everett, Washington (about 50 miles north). They did it on the week-end so as not to disrupt anybody's work. They figure this will enhance communication among folks working. -- Randolph Bentson Colorado State University bentson@CS.ColoState.Edu Computer Science Department 303/491-5792 Ft. Collins, CO 80523 From kls Thu Nov 19 22:46:21 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: Christopher Davis Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's?? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Original-Message-Id: <199211200503.AA03970@loiosh.eff.org> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 00:03:12 -0500 Karl> == Karl Swartz Karl> Probably the best general interest discussion of the DC-10 and Karl> all its problems is in The Sporty Game, by John Newhouse (Alfred Karl> A. Knopf, New York, 1982). Chapter 5 in particular goes into Karl> great detail, though it of course predates the Sioux City crash. Other good books on the subject include Moira Johnston's _The Last Nine Minutes_ (which, being 1976, only discusses the Turkish Airlines Ermenonville crash and the Windsor "incident" which foreshadowed it) and John Nance's _Blind Trust_ (1986, also predating Sioux City). (The latter discusses many other air safety issues and incidents, including the Air Florida crash in Washington, DC in 1982.) _The Sporty Game_ tends to show its age in other areas as well; the dire predictions of market failure for the 747, 757, and 767 have not quite been borne out by intervening events :) From kls Fri Nov 20 02:04:38 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: Chijioke.Anyanwu@brunel.ac.uk (Chijioke D Anyanwu) Subject: Re: TV programme on 777 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Brunel University, West London, UK X-Original-Message-Id: <2666.9211200818@gassendi.brunel.ac.uk> X-Original-Message-ID: Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 08:17:55 GMT In article , lomasm@t9.cs.man.ac.uk (Martin Lomas) gives an excellent summary of last Sunday's Equinox on the 777 - I definitely couldn't have done better. He says >Customers allowed into (some) of the Boeing meetings to discuss the >777's design and to suggest mods. 'Open management' strategy. Specifically Lord King: BA will be a launch customer as will Emirates which is already advertising the fact. One thing which he omitted and which I found quite interesting was the amount of attention paid to the design of the toilet. Apparently, banging toilet seats tend to cause some passengers some amount of distress (thoughts of bombs going off?) and so a virtually noiseless toilet seat and cover were designed. Although as Martin pointed out FBW safety issues were not covered (something which I had rather expected in view of all the controversy surrounding the A320), the programme really was a fascinating insight into modern aircraft design and development. Chijioke. From kls Sat Nov 21 03:55:53 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: Mohamed Ishaq Subject: Info on the El-Al Plane crash Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: Mohamed Ishaq X-Original-Message-Id: Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 12:50:48 -0600 (CST) I am looking for information on the El-Al 747-200 plane crash in the Netherlands on Oct 4, 1992. I am planning on writing a report on the application of non-destructive testing to engine mount fuse pins and am analyzing the Boeing SB related to this crash and the China Airlines one earlier this year. I found your address on the user-net : sci.aeronautics.airliners. Once I complete my report I will be more than happy to post it the network. Thanks Mohamed Ishaq - mishaq@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu P.O. Box 8171 Austin, TX 78713-8171 Tel: 512-472-9290 P.S. I kind of need this info ASAP From kls Sat Nov 21 03:55:56 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: Robert Dorsett Subject: Re: TV programme on 777 Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu X-Original-Message-Id: Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Fri, 20 Nov 92 15:46:39 CST In article bentson@CS.ColoState.EDU (Randolph Bentson) writes: >Boeing is _very_ reluctant to use fly-by-wire. Management >trusts computer solutions no more than members of this forum. I >got the impression that this system has a pilot override as part >of it's basic design. (A sort of "do what I say, not what you >think I want" mode.) As I understand it, the FBW system is the only way the pilots can signal the actuators. Boeing is simply providing a "conventional" control law and interface, with "protections" that can be over-ridden by the pilot, if necessary. Redundancy/backup is at the hardware level, not in alternate select modes. So, rather than a simple joystick, Boeing's "simulating" a conventional interface, with feedback, in the cockpit cab: each control column inter- connected with the other, each providing tactile feedback. The FBW is there, one way or the other. On the other hand, I do think it's a positive step that Boeing's not "re- writing" the book by offering *artificial* control laws, as Airbus is doing. Thus, to override the protections, the pilots just need to push or pull *harder,* or click an overrride button: they don't have to deal with or anticipate the effects of *four* distinct control law modes, and the many permutations within each mode, depending upon system status, as is the case with the A3[2-4]0. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Sat Nov 21 03:55:57 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: sfg2483@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (sfg2483 ) Subject: Manufacturer responsibility? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana X-Original-Message-Id: Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Sat, 21 Nov 1992 04:24:47 GMT Does anyone know if a manufacturer (e.g., Boeing) is responsible financially for the results of an airplane crash if the crash is proven to be caused by a faulty part it made? (E.g., a bad design of pins in the 747). sfg2483@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu From kls Sat Nov 21 03:55:59 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu (Robert Dorsett) Subject: The DC-10 Case Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Original-Message-Id: <9211210611.AA25114@rascal.ics.utexas.edu> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Sat, 21 Nov 92 00:11:55 CST Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics,rec.travel.air From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: The DC-10 Case (non-review) Date: Fri, 9 Oct 1992 06:16:16 GMT Ran across this. It looks like a nice little anthology, covering many aspects of the DC-10. Probably worth it for the NTSB reports alone ($20 each from NTIS). I haven't read the more "thematic" articles, though, and no endorsement is meant or implied. -------------------- Title: The DC-10 Case Subtitle: A study in applied ethics, technology, and society. Editors: John H. Fielder and Douglas Birsch Publisher: State University of New York Press Date: 1992 Pages: 346 ISBN: 0-7914-1087-0 (hardcover) 0-7914-1088-9 (paper) Illustrated. CONTENTS: Preface Introduction Ethical Analysis of Case Studies/John H. Fielder HISTORY AND EARLY WARNINGS 1. Regulatory and Institutional Framework 2. High Risks, Sinking Fortunes/John Newhouse 3. Floors, Doors, Latches and Locks/John Fielder 4. The 1970 Ground Testing Incident/Paul Eddy, Elaine Potter, Bruce Page 5. National Transportation Safety Board Report on the Windsor Incident 6. The Applegate Memorandum/Paul Eddy, Elaine Potter, Bruce Page 7. Fat, Dumb and Happy: The Failure of the FAA/Paul Eddy, Elaine Potter, Bruce Page 8. Compliance with Service Bulletin SB 52-37 9. Conclusions of the US Senate Oversight Hearings and Investigation of the DC-10 Aircraft THE 1974 PARIS CRASH 10. French Government Report on the 1974 Paris Crash 11. Engineers Who Kill: Professional Ethics and the Paramountcy of Public Safety/Kenneth Kipnis 12. Whistleblowing, Ethical Obligation, and the DC-10/Douglas Birsch 13. What is Hamlet to McDonnel Douglas or McDonnell Douglas to Hamlet?: DC-10/Peter French Commentary/Homer Stewell 14. Statement of John C. Brizendine, President, Douglas Aircraft Company, McDonnell Douglas Corporation THE 1979 CHICAGO CRASH 15. National Transportation Safety Board Report on the 1979 Chicago Crash 16. The DC-10: A Special Report/McDonnell Douglas 17. Two Models of Professional Responsibility/Martin Curd and Larry May THE 1989 SIOUX CITY CRASH 18. National Transportation Safety Board Report on the 1989 Sioux City Crash 19. The 1989 Sioux City Crash/John Fielder 20. Statement of Ralph Nader 21. Aviation Safety: Management Improvement Needed in FAA's Airworthiness Directive Program 22. The FAA, the Carriers, and Safety/Charles Perrow 23. International Airline Passengers Association Critique of the DC-10 24. Moral Responsibility for Engineers/Kenneth D. Alpern Commentary/Andrew Oldenquist Commentary/Samuel C. Florman Select Bibliography IEEE Code of Ethics Index Back Cover: "Designed as a textbook for courses in ethics, this book privdes the material needed to understand the accidents in which more than 700 people were killed-- accidents that many believe were the result of unethical actions and inactions by individuals, organizations, and government agencies. An introduction to ethical analysis and discussions of the ethical responsibilities involved are also provided. The case study offers material for a sustained inquiry into every level of ethical responsiblity reflecting the rich complexity of actual events. "_The DC-10 Case_ presents these issues through a collection of original and published articles, excerpts from official accident reports, congressional hearings, and other writings on the DC-10. The authors allow the readers to examine the ethical issues of airline safety as they actually occur, taking account of the circumstances in which they arise. "John H. Fielder is is Professor and Douglas Birsch is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Villanova University." --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Sun Nov 22 14:47:54 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: Pete Mellor Subject: Re: Airline Software-safety database (RISKS-14.08) Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Original-Message-Id: <4664.9211221721@csrsun8.cs.city.ac.uk> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Sun, 22 Nov 92 17:21:22 GMT Dave "Van Damme" Ratner writes in RISKS-14.08: > I am posting this for Robert Ratner, Ratner Associates Inc, which does > international consulting in air-traffic control and aviation safety issues. > He is looking for a public-accessible data base on software-related incidents > in this area. Email correspondence can be sent to me at ratner@cs.ucla.edu. > Thanks. Dave "Van Damme" Ratner ratner@cs.ucla.edu In my experience, all major manufacturers of software keep databases of incidents reported by users of their software and the faults ("bugs") which give rise to those incidents. I know for a fact that IBM, ICL, DEC, Unisys (or whatever it is now), and Sun all do this. Such a database is essential to their efforts to improve the quality of their software by identifying and fixing bugs, and to reduce their maintenance workload by informing customers about known problems so that repeated reports are suppressed. The interesting phrase is "public-accessible". If you are a customer of a large manufacturer of system or application software, you will almost certainly have access to the *relevant* parts of the database (those which concern the products you have bought). This will be provided either on-line, or as printed or micro-fiche extracts, updated on a regular basis. The other interesting phrase is "in this area" (i.e., of air-traffic control and aviation safety). The users of safety critical on-board avionics software are the companies that buy the aircraft. They are provided with regular information about all sorts of design glitches in the aircraft they have bought, including those in the software. Such information is provided in the form of "OEBs" (Operating Engineering Bulletins), which are distributed to the flight crews. Information about software faults in safety-critical avionics systems *must*, therefore, be kept on a database somewhere. These databases are public in the sense that any pilot on that type of aircraft would have access, but Joe Public (as far as I know) does not. Incidents in flight must (or should) be reported via offical channels by the crews. These reports drive the manufacturers' quality improvement programmes. After the fault which caused an incident has been diagnosed, it may result in an OEB or similar, and in a modification. Databases of such incident reports are not generally widely accessible. Published reports sometimes appear, however. In addition, there are channels for anonymous reporting of incidents. In the UK, "CHIRP" is such a forum. In the US, I believe the FAA used to run such a scheme, but it was compromised when the guarantee of anonymity was removed. For further information I suggest you contact ALPA. Given the increasing use of safety-critical software, a central database for each major application area would be highly desirable, to say the least. Obviously, sensitive issues of commercial confidentiality are involved. In particular, it may be difficult to obtain corresponding figures for the operating time so as to be able to estimate reliability, and it may be difficult to correlate incidents with faults, and so determine which incidents are due to software. I stand to be corrected if anyone *does* know of an official channel for public access to flight incident and system fault reports. Regarding ATC incidents, again I am certain that these are recorded, but access is not likely to be easy. Peter Mellor, Centre for Software Reliability, City University, Northampton Sq., London EC1V 0HB, Tel: +44(0)71-477-8422, JANET: p.mellor@city.ac.uk ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Mon Nov 23 04:38:46 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: Dave Williamson Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's?? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Reply-To: <199211200503.AA03970@loiosh.eff.org> Organization: AT&T BL0512310 X-Original-Message-Id: <9211222144.AA09019@conch> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Sun, 22 Nov 92 16:44:33 EST sdl@linus.mitre.org writes > Perhaps now I can get a more definitive answer to the following: > Some of my pilot friends have accused the DC-10 as having a > particularly bad history of hydraulic problems (which have contributed > to a few crashes). But do the statistics really support the notion > ... I don't have anything statistical (others have covered that quite admirably) but I had a similar experience. Being a pilot myself (just small stuff), I tend to meet a lot of airline pilots. A former instructor of mine introduced me to a friend of his who was currently flying for a major airline. This guy referred to the DC-10 as the "Death-Cruiser 10" and said he wouldn't fly in it under any circumstances, especially not as a pilot. My personal opinion is that flying is still safer than other forms of transportation, DC-10 accidents notwithstanding. While I prefer flying in a B7[456]7 (when I can't fly myself), I have no problem getting into a DC-10 if that is what is at the gate. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- >| David M. Williamson, d.m.williamson@att.com >| Commercial, ASEL, IA --> --> --> | --- ====== --- --- --- --- --- --- >| Proud part owner of Archer N7185F >| -------------------------------------------------------------------------- From kls Tue Nov 24 00:34:06 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: weiss@mott.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: SEASnet, University of California, Los Angeles X-Original-Message-Id: <8731@lee.SEAS.UCLA.EDU> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 24 Nov 92 02:47:07 GMT In article jerry@telecom.ksu.edu (Jerry Anderson) writes: >Is the Boeing 747-300 the largest commercial passenger aircraft >in the world? Is the -300 the latest version, or are there >newer, possibly larger stretched versions of the 747? Well, Boeing no longer makes the -300; I personally saw the last -300 being built in mid-September of 1991. The -300 has been replaced by the -400, which has few fuselage changes. The upper deck is the same size. Basically, the only "major" change is the addition of upper-surface winglets. In my aero classes, we were taught that winglets are supposed to reduce the trailing vortices and downwash from the wings. However, according to my cousin, who used to work for Lockheed's Skunk Works, the winglets have a cost in drag that is roughly equivalent to the gain, and therefore is more a marketing ploy than anything else. Go figure. >I've heard Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Airbus all have plans >in the works for Really Big Planes in the 600-700 passenger, >7500-8000 mile range. Does anyone know if these planes are >really going to get built, or is this the usual "if we can >pre-sell a couple of hundred, maybe we'll really build it?" Airbus is truly working on the plane, and hopes to knock Boeing out of the 747 sales. However, Boeing has a history of being the best aircraft in the world in terms of maintenance; Airbus apparently makes planes that are almost as difficult to repair and inspect as McDonnell-Douglas. McDonnell-Douglas has basically dropped out of that race, to my knowledge, apparently because they require such a large amount of capital. >Does anyone have model numbers, specs (passengers, range), or >projected delivery dates? These numbers come from memory, and >I have no faith in them at all: > Company Model Delivery > ------- ------ -------- > McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 1993 Try 1992. The MD-11 was certified in October of 1991. I saw about a dozen of them at DFW this summer. They are pretty much a DC-10 with upper and lower winglets. > Airbus AE-400 1994 Sounds about right. Well, they were talking about '93, but that likely means 1994. Supposedly, it will compete directly with the 747. > Boeing 777 1995-6 I would guess sooner, simply based upon the information I have heard. I could very well be wrong, though. -- \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | / - Michael weiss@seas.ucla.edu | School of Engineering & Applied Science - - Weiss izzydp5@oac.ucla.edu | University of California, Los Angeles - / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | \ From kls Tue Nov 24 03:54:40 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: gjacobs@qualcomm.com (Gary Jacobs) Subject: Emergency Oxygen Masks Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Summary: How often is testing done and what is failure rate? Organization: Qualcomm, Inc., San Diego, CA X-Original-Message-Id: Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Tue, 24 Nov 1992 07:43:50 GMT Having just been involved in a flight where the oxygen masks were dropped, I'm curious what the test criteria are and how often is it done? I'd also like to know what the failure rate is? On my flight, America West on a Boeing 737, an oil seal supposedly failed on the APU for the air conditioning system. This sent oily smoke in the cabin. I assume the cockpit crew decided that breathing that air wasn't good for the passengers and dropped, or should I say tried to drop, the emergency oxygen masks. I'd say that 1/4 of the overhead doors did not open until they were pried open by a passenger and then a lot of the masks did not seem to supply oxygen even after following the "pull hard to start the flow of oxygen" instructions. I looked at my mask which didn't work and could not tell what the "pull hard" did to start the oxygen. Gary Jacobs gjacobs@qualcomm.com From kls Tue Nov 24 03:54:42 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov24.110151.26562@ohare.Chicago.COM> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Tue, 24 Nov 1992 11:01:51 GMT In article drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) writes: >In article jerry@telecom.ksu.edu (Jerry And >>I've heard Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Airbus all have plans >>in the works for Really Big Planes in the 600-700 passenger, >>7500-8000 mile range. >The Boeing and the Airbus offerings in this market seem to both hover >around 600 seats and 7,000 mile range. Takeoff weights in the million >pound plus range. The anticipated market, as described by John Hayhurst, >Director of New Large Airplane Division, is only a couple hundred airplanes >TOTAL. From my knothole, it looks like a prestige fight. That's an *awful* lot of cash to dump down a hole simply for bragging rights. I suppose that's part of "being sporty" but there's also a real market there -- the Pacific Rim, which is where nearly all the growth is in the airline industry and which requires those kind of range figures. The load potential is there too, if not now then well well within the next 10 to 20 years. One aircraft that could punch a major hole in this market would be the next generation supersonic transport. (HSCT? I can't pick the right acronym out of my bowl of alphabet soup today ...) *If* built, and at least for now that is a very big if, this too would be aimed directly at the Pacific Rim market. The studies I've seen for this bird seem to be aiming at the mainstream market and not just a very tiny high- priced market like the Concorde. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Tue Nov 24 03:54:43 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov24.113158.26665@ohare.Chicago.COM> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Tue, 24 Nov 1992 11:31:58 GMT In article weiss@mott.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes: >Well, Boeing no longer makes the -300; I personally saw the last -300 being >built in mid-September of 1991. The -300 has been replaced by the -400 ... [ Moderator's note: When I started reading this I thought "oh no, yet another answer to the same question ... time to play moderator and turn on the squelch." But there were some interesting points further down. If you think we're beating a dead horse or would somehow like to see the thread split, please send suggestions to me at airliners-admin@chicago.com. ] >In my aero classes, we were taught that winglets are supposed to reduce the >trailing vortices and downwash from the wings. However, according to my >cousin, who used to work for Lockheed's Skunk Works, the winglets have a cost >in drag that is roughly equivalent to the gain, and therefore is more a >marketing ploy than anything else. I've seen this comment before, either on sci.aeronautics or perhaps on rec.aviation. Would anyone care to provide a more scientific discourse on the subject for the benefit of the rest of us? >Airbus is truly working on the plane, and hopes to knock Boeing out of the >747 sales. However, Boeing has a history of being the best aircraft in the >world in terms of maintenance; Airbus apparently makes planes that are almost >as difficult to repair and inspect as McDonnell-Douglas. I've heard some comments about Airbus maintenance being exorbitantly expensive. In particular, one comment I heard was that they are very unforgiving about substitution of equivalent parts and gold-plate the prices of Genuine Airbus Parts. I have not previously encountered negative comments regarding McDonnell-Douglas products in this context, however, and in fact have heard that the DC-10 is rather well-liked because it's somewhat like a big Chevy V-8 -- solid, and easy to fix when it breaks. (Problems with the design of the hydraulics notwithstanding.) Seems to me that Lockheed, the L-1011 in particular but perhaps the Electra in its time as well, tended toward somewhat more finicky products that compensated by giving better performance. Again, any more concrete comments on the subject would be welcomed. >McDonnell-Douglas has basically dropped out of that race, to my knowledge, >apparently because they require such a large amount of capital. With regard to the MD-12, MacDAC seems to remain in the race nearly as much as Boeing and Airbus, though their ability to carry through with an actual aircraft is certainly less certain given their finances. In any case all three are paper planes until the airlines get themselves into better financial shape. > Airbus AE-400 1994 > >Sounds about right. Well, they were talking about '93, but that >likely means 1994. Supposedly, it will compete directly with the 747. That would be the A-340, which is well along in its test program and looks likely to make its scheduled first delivery (to Lufthansa) in the first quarter of 1993. It competes with the 747 in the sense that it is a long-range aircraft, in fact exceeding the range of the 747-400 by a little bit, but it's somewhat smaller, on the order of two-thirds the size. In that sense it competes more closely with the MD-12. >> Boeing 777 1995-6 > >I would guess sooner, simply based upon the information I have >heard. I could very well be wrong, though. It is indeed due the first half of 1995. This seemed an inordinately long gestation, but at launch time Boeing still had its hands full with the 747-400, and was also painfully aware of the delays in the 747-400 program due to an over-ambitious schedule. They simply did not have the resources to commit to an earlier delivery. The extra time has not at all been leisurely, however. Boeing is using many new design techniques with the 777, for example doing all the mockups in computers. (Actually a mockup *was* built of the nose section, but more as a check on the computer models rather than of the fit of the parts.) There is also an aggressive commitment to delivering an aircraft that's ready for service from day one, without a substantial period of teething problems in operation. This is an area of some controversy in that they are striving for ETOPS rating at initial delivery. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Tue Nov 24 03:54:43 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: The Sporty Game -- Boeing 757 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov24.115042.26779@ohare.Chicago.COM> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Tue, 24 Nov 1992 11:50:42 GMT In article Christopher Davis writes: >Karl> == Karl Swartz > Karl> Probably the best general interest discussion of the DC-10 and > Karl> all its problems is in The Sporty Game, by John Newhouse (Alfred > Karl> A. Knopf, New York, 1982). >_The Sporty Game_ tends to show its age in other areas as well; the dire >predictions of market failure for the 747, 757, and 767 have not quite >been borne out by intervening events :) The 757 was doing rather weakly for quite a while, however. The huge orders in the past few years from American, United, and United Parcel have contributed mightily to the 757's success. I recently re-read this book and one thing I found fascinating was the discussion of the 757 and how it was the wrong aircraft -- it should have had about 30 fewer seats, which is what everyone wanted. Everone except British Airways, that is, and Boeing wanted desperately to sell to BA in the hopes of keeping the UK out of Airbus. They won the battle, as it were, but lost the war. In more ways than one, since not only did the UK link up with Airbus (despite BA's purchase of the 757) but Boeing was left without a well-positioned replacement for the 727 ... and Airbus *did* develop one, in the form of the A-320. All of this was particularly interesting as I was reading it right as United announced their A-320 order, rejecting Boeing's offerings as either too big (the 757) or inadequate on a variety of counts (the 737-400) for the intended job of replacing the 727-200. Fascinating to see how decisions made 15 years ago are still so clearly relected in today's market. I'm *still* surprised that Boeing hasn't made much noise (maybe none) about plugging this obvious hole by offering a 757-100 or whatever -- a shortened 757 like the original proposal and a real replacement for the 727-200. Even with United it never seemed to come up, instead all the discussion focussing on a massively stretched and pulled and re- designed 737-600. True, a 757 is more expensive (~ $45 million versus $30 - 35 million) but the changes embodied in the 737-600 would surely have added tremendously to the price. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Tue Nov 24 16:00:40 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Seeking pointers on switch design. Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Original-Message-Id: <9211241115.AA16994@cactus.org> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Tue, 24 Nov 92 05:15:42 CST I'm looking for pointers to articles on the human-factors ramifications of switch design. I've noticed an interesting difference between Airbus and Boeing switch philosophy. Boeing seems to build the "on" state into the switch. It might be a white bar, indicating a closed circuit or open valve on a placarded systems a subdued "on" function description, with an "engage" bar, etc. But the philosophy seems to be: "default" state == off (dark indicator), pilot action to turn it on (white indicator), operational state = on (white indicator) until pilot turns it off again or an abnormal state occurs (colored indicator, annunciator). This doesn't violate the "dark cockpit" philosophy, since only one color (white) is used for selects, and abnormal states are clearly detectable. Airbus (in the A320, and presumably the A340 and A330), on the other hand, seems to use smart-logic to default to an "on" state which is completely dark. The switches, when pressed, then show an *abnormal* state, like turning a fuel pump off. Nearly all of the switches also have a "failure" state-flag, showing an amber or red fault message. There are also systems with "mixed" switch formats. For instance, since a fuel pump state is normally on, a switch, when pressed, turns it off and indicates an off state. But crossfeed valve switches, when pressed, show an "ON," followed by "OPEN," state, which seems more "positive." So the Airbus philosophy seems to be: initialize switch states at boot time (on, no indicator), pilot action to turn it off (illuminated, abnormal state), operational state = dark until pilot triggers a disconnect. Seems to me that Boeing's the correct approach: a thou-shalt-not, drilled into me at an early point, was never to use double-negatives to prompt user actions ("Do you not want to save the file? Y/N") . An action should ideally be expressed in *positive* terms. And the interface should be consistent across all systems and within systems. On the other hand, Airbus' design can be rationalized in that if the computers do *all* routine management, as they do, then bringing the pilots in the loop at initial start-up is an invitation for error: in this model, pilot involve- ment is an *abnormal* event, and signs of that involvement should be highlighted. This raises interesting implications of the pilots being out of the loop TOO long, perhaps never dealing with a system or mentally "reviewing" that system for several flights, as would be the case with more "hands-on" initialization and management. This could be the reason behind Airbus's pre-flight "walk-through," in which each switch illuminates in sequence, requiring the pilot to depress it to extinguish the light. Comments? References? --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Tue Nov 24 16:00:41 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: Boeing 747-300 (PLEASE let this be the end of it! :-)) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx X-Original-Message-Id: <9211241245.AA19191@cactus.org> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Tue, 24 Nov 92 06:45:43 CST Michael Weiss wrote: >Airbus is truly working on the plane, and hopes to knock Boeing out of the >747 sales. Airbus is not working on the plane. It has no launch customers, and has not committed resources to it. It is in a very preliminary concept stage, which is being heavily hyped, as part of the marketing effort. It's a major step: the failure OR success of the airplane can easily damage the consortium, if they figure the market wrong. >However, Boeing has a history of being the best aircraft in the >world in terms of maintenance; Airbus apparently makes planes that are almost >as difficult to repair and inspect as McDonnell-Douglas. I've heard that Airbus maintenance is highly modular, highly automated, and very structured, with no more problems than what one might expect when client airlines switch from one vendor's accounting/maintenance practices to another. This takes time, it takes a lot of training, and it is a standard- ization nightmare: but there's little to suggest one manufacturer's program is better than the other's, on its own merits. >> McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 1993 > >Try 1992. The MD-11 was certified in October of 1991. By the end of 1991, MDC had made in excess of 30 deliveries of the MD-11. First deliveries tend to follow certification VERY quickly. >> Airbus AE-400 1994 > >Sounds about right. Well, they were talking about '93, but that likely means >1994. Supposedly, it will compete directly with the 747. The A340 should receive certification next month, with deliveries in January 1993. The A330 was rolled out last month, and should be certified by mid-1993. These are the only two new active programs Airbus is working on, apart from the A320 derivatives. >> Boeing 777 1995-6 First flight by June 1, 1994, deliveries in 1995, based on the July 1, 1992 Flight International. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Tue Nov 24 16:00:41 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: weiss@curtiss.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's?? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: SEASnet, University of California, Los Angeles X-Original-Message-Id: <8733@lee.SEAS.UCLA.EDU> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 24 Nov 92 17:40:41 GMT In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: >In article sdl@linus.mitre.org writes: >>Some of my pilot friends have accused the DC-10 as having a >>particularly bad history of hydraulic problems (which have >>contributed to a few crashes). >Two, at least. AA 191 at Chicago/O'Hare on May 25, 1979, and UA 232 >at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989. I have a hard time believing that an intact hydraulic system would have prevented AA191 from crashing. Let's face it, a wing-mounted engine falling off produces such a rediculous unbalance that even full aileron wouldn't be able to counter it. -- \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | / - Michael weiss@seas.ucla.edu | School of Engineering & Applied Science - - Weiss izzydp5@oac.ucla.edu | University of California, Los Angeles - / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | \ From kls Tue Nov 24 16:46:33 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: Stephen L Nicoud Subject: Boeing reduces production rate of 757 & 767 Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Original-Message-Id: <9211242332.AA01284@moclips.boeing.com> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Tue, 24 Nov 92 15:32:37 PST 757, 767 PRODUCTION RATE REDUCTIONS ANNOUNCED Boeing Commercial Airplane Group is announcing today reductions in 757 and 767 production rates in 1993. The monthly rate of 757s, which is currently at 8.5 airplanes per month, will go to seven in June 1993, and will be reduced further to five per month in November. The reduction to seven a month had originally been planned to take effect in September. Also in November, the 767 rate will be decreased from the current five per month to four. Early indications are that the 757 and 767 reductions could result in about 2,000 fewer jobs in the Puget Sound area and approximately 500 fewer jobs at the Commercial Airplane Group's Wichita Division. "Our customers' delivery needs are changing as a result of the difficult time many of them are currently having. We are adjusting our rates to meet their needs," said Dean Thornton, president of the Commercial Airplane Group. "We remain optimistic about the long-term. This decision takes into account the cumulative recent requests of a number of our customers for changes in their delivery streams," Thornton added. From kls Tue Nov 24 16:46:36 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's?? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov25.004006.28130@ohare.Chicago.COM> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Wed, 25 Nov 1992 00:40:06 GMT In article weiss@curtiss.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes: >I have a hard time believing that an intact hydraulic system would have >prevented AA191 from crashing. Let's face it, a wing-mounted engine falling >off produces such a rediculous unbalance that even full aileron wouldn't be >able to counter it. I don't see that ailerons have much to do with it -- the biggest effect would be a substantial yaw, which would require rudder input. In any case, start believing. A United 747 (N4713U, now N4724U) operating a HNL-SYD flight on Feb. 23, 1989 lost both engines on the right side due to debris ingestion after a cargo hatch failed. They dumped fuel and limped back to Honolulu, well over an hour's flying time. Having lots of altitude and airspeed to work with is certainly quite helpful, but isn't a requirement. A few years ago a Piedmont 737-200 lost #2 immediately after takeoff from O'Hare. The pilots promptly declared an emergency, turned around, and landed several minutes later on another runway. They didn't even realize that the engine had litterally fallen off until the got off he plane and looked. Getting back to AA 191, what really killed AA 191 was a stall of the left wing after the uncommanded retraction of the flaps on that side. Even this was recoverable had the pilots known that their stall speed was suddenly higher -- alas, McDonnell-Douglas didn't bother with any redundancy for the flap retraction warning and that happened to be powered by the engine that fell off. In simulator tests after the crash, every pilot crashed when confronted with the same scenario. When given this indicator, and thus some indication of what was going on, every pilot managed to maintain control of the aircraft. An engine separation, while certainly not a normal event, should not be a fatal event, and indeed the certification process requires some consideration of an engine separation. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Wed Nov 25 03:16:35 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: bentson@CS.ColoState.EDU (Randolph Bentson) Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's?? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Colorado State University, Computer Science Department X-Original-Message-ID: Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Wed, 25 Nov 1992 04:54:00 GMT In article weiss@curtiss.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes: > >I have a hard time believing that an intact hydraulic system would have >prevented AA191 from crashing. Let's face it, a wing-mounted engine falling >off produces such a rediculous unbalance that even full aileron wouldn't be >able to counter it. The problem was that when the hydraulics failed, leading edge slat retracted on one side and that wing stalled. No indication was given in the cockpit so the flight crew didn't use the appropriate recovery mechanism. Ref: "The DC-10 Case", John H. Feilder & Douglas Birsch, eds. -- Randolph Bentson Colorado State University bentson@CS.ColoState.Edu Computer Science Department 303/491-5792 Ft. Collins, CO 80523 From kls Wed Nov 25 03:16:39 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: kawai@Csli.Stanford.EDU (goh kawai - n6uok) Subject: Re: Emergency Oxygen Masks References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: speech research program, sri international X-Original-Message-Id: <1992Nov25.004045.6594@Csli.Stanford.EDU> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Wed, 25 Nov 1992 00:40:45 GMT Gary Jacobs (gjacobs@qualcomm.com) comments: | I'm curious what the test criteria [of oxygen masks] are and how often | is it done? I'd also like to know what the failure rate is? I was on a flight the other day (B-747) when an oxygen mask dropped by accident in the business class cabin. I was horrified to see that the plastic tubing that connects the mask to the oxygen supply was brownish-colored due to age. I have an aquarium at home, and I know how long it takes for air-tubing to turn brown. While it is quite conceivable that they use a higher grade of tubing in aircraft, that is not awfully reassuring, because low-grade or high-grade, old tubing is old tubing. I shudder to think what condition the rest of the system is in. -goh- ----------------- Speech Research Program, SRI, Menlo Park, CA 94025-3493 USA --- Goh Kawai --- work:(415)859-2231 fax:(415)859-5984 home:(415)323-7214 ----------------- internet: kawai@speech.sri.com radio: n6uok and jk1zyp From kls Wed Nov 25 03:16:42 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu (Robert Dorsett) Subject: NTSB DC-10 excerpts Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Original-Message-Id: <9211250826.AA14686@rascal.ics.utexas.edu> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Wed, 25 Nov 92 02:26:16 CST It's been about two years since I last posted this, so... -------------------- Excerpts from the NTSB accident report on the Chicago O'Hare crash: Synopsis: About 1504 CDT, May 25, 1979, American Airlines Flight 191, a McDonnell-Douglas DC-10-10 aircraft, crashed into an open field just short of a trailer park about 4600' northwest of the departure end of runway 32R at Chicago-O'Hare Internat- ional Airport, Illinois. Flight 191 was taking off from Runway 32R. The weather was clear and the vis- ibility was 15 miles. During the takeoff rotation, the left engine and pylon assembly and about 3 ft of the leading edge of the left wing separated from the aircraft and fell to the runway. Flight 191 continued to climb to about 325' above the ground and then began to roll to the left. The aircraft con- tinued to roll to the left until the wings were past the vertical position, and during the roll, the aircraft's nose pitched down below the horizon. Flight 191 crashed into the open field and the wreckage scattered into an adjacent trailer park. The aircraft was destroyed in the crash and subsequent fire. Two hundred and seventy-one persons on board Flight 191 were killed; two persons on the ground were killed, and two others were injured. An old aircraft hangar, several automobiles, and a mobile home were destroyed. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the asymmetrical stall and the ensuing roll of the air- craft because of the uncommanded retraction of the left wing outboard leading edge slats and the loss of stall warning and slat disagreement indication sys- tems resulting from maintenance-induced damage leading to the separation of the No. 1 engine and pylon assembly at a critical point during takeoff. The sep- aration resulted from damage by improper maintenance procedures which led to failure of the pylon structure. Contributing to the cause of the accident were the vulnerability of the design of the pylon attach points to maintenance damage; the vulnerability of the design of the leading edge slat system to the damage which produced asymmetry; deficiencies in Federal Aviation Administration surveillance and reporting sys- tems which failed to detect and prevent the use of improper maintenance proced- ures; deficiencies in the practices and communications among the operators, the manufacturer, and the FAA which failed to determine and disseminate the particulars during previous maintenance damage incidents; and the intolerance of prescribed operational procedures to this unique emergency. Findings (p. 67) 1. The engine and pylon assembly separated either at or immediately after takeoff. The flightcrew was committed to continue the takeoff. 2. The aft end of the pylon assembly began to separate in the forward flange of the aft bulkhead. 3. The structural separation of the pylon was caused by a complete failure of the forward flange of the aft bulkhead after its residual strength had been critically reduced by the fracture and subsequent service life. 4. The overload fracture and fatigue cracking on the pylon aft bulkhead's upper flange were the only preexisting damage on the bulkhead. The length of the overload fracture and fatigue cracking was about 13 inches. The fracture was caused by an upward movement of the aft end of the pylon which brought the upper flange and its fasteners into contact with the wing clevis. 5. The pylon to wing attach hardware was properly installed at all attachment points. 6. All electrical power to the No. 1 AC generator bus and No. 1 DC bus was lost after the pylon separated. The captain's flight director instrument, the stall warning system, and the slat disagreement warning light systems were rendered inoperative. Power to these buses was never restored. 7. The No. 1 hydraulic system was lost when the pylon separated. Hydraulic systems No. 2 and No. 3 operated at their full capability throughout the flight. Except for spoiler panels No. 2 and No. 4 on each wing, all flight controls were operating. 8. The hydraulic lines and followup cables of the drive actuator for the left wing's outboard leading edge slat were severed by the separation of the pylon and the left wing's outboard slats retracted during climbout. The retraction of the slats caused an asymmetric stall and subsequent loss of control of the aircraft. 9. The flightcrew could not see the wings and engines from the cockpit. Because of the loss of the slat disagreement light and the stall warning system, the flightcrew would not have received an electronic warning of either the slat asymmetry or the stall. The loss of the warning systems created a situation which afforded the flightcrew an inadequate opportunity to recognize and prevent the ensuing stall of the aircraft. 10. The flightcrew flew the aircraft in accordance with the prescribed emer- gency procedure, which called for the climbout to be flown at V2 speed. V2 was 6 KIAS below the stall speed for the left wing. The deceleration to V2 speed caused the aircraft to stall. The start of the left roll was the only warning the pilot had of the onset of the stall. 11. The pylon was damaged during maintenance performed on the accident aircraft at American Airline's Maintenance Facility at Tulsa, Oklahoma, on March 29 and 30, 1979. 12. The design of the aft bulkhead made the flange vulnerable to damage when the pylon was being separated or attached. 13. American Airlines engineering personnel developed an ECO to remove and reinstall the pylon and engine as a single unit. The ECO directed that the combined engine and pylon assembly be supported, lowered, and raised by a forklift. American Airlines engineering personnel did not perform an adequate evaluation of either the capability of the forklift to provide the required precision for the task, or the degree of difficulty involved in placing the lift properly, or the consequences of placing the lift improperly. The CO did not emphasize the precision required to place the forklift properly. 14. The FAA does not approve the carriers' maintenance procedures, and a carrier has the right to change its maintenance procedures without FAA approval. 15. American Airlines personnel removed the aft bulkhead's bolt and bushing before removing the forward bulkhead attach fittings. This permitted the forward bulkhead to act as a pivot. Any advertent or inadvertent loss of forklift support to the engine and pylon assembly would produce an upward movement at the aft bulkhead's upper flange and bring it into contact with the wing clevis. 16. American Airlines maintenance personnel did not report formally to their maintenance engineering staff either their deviation from the removal sequence contained in the ECO or the difficulties they had encountered in accomplishing the ECO's procedures. 17. American Airline's engineering personnel did not perform a thorough evaluation of all aspects of the maintenance procedures before they formulated the ECO. The engineering and supervisory personnel did not monitor the performance of the ECO to ensure either that it was being accomplished properly or if their maintenance personnel were encountering unforeseen difficulties in performing the assigned tasks. 18. The nine situations in which damage was sustained and cracks were found on the upper flange were limited to those operations wherein the engine and pylon assembly was supported by a forklift. 19. On December 19, 1978, and Feb. 22, 1979, Continental Airlines maintenance personnel damaged aft bulkhead upper flanges in a manner similar to the damage noted on the accident aircraft. The carrier classified the cause of the damage as maintenance error. Neither the air carrier nor the manufacturer interpreted the regulation to require that it further investigate or reprot the damages to the FAA. 20. The original certification's fatigue-damage assessment was in conformance with the existing requirements. 21. The design of the stall warning system lacked sufficient redundancy; there was only one stickshaker motor; and further, the design of the system did not provide for crossover information to the left and right stall warning computers from the applicable leading edge slat sensors on the opposite side of the aircraft. 22. The design of the leading edge slat system did not include positive mechanical locking devices to prevent movement of the slats by external loads following a failure of the primary controls. Certification was based upon acceptable flight characteristics with an asymmetrical leading edge slat condition. 23. At the time of DC-10 certification, the structural separation of an engine pylon was not considered. Thus, multiple failures of other systems resulting from this single event was not considered. Additional excerpts: [design requirements for slats] "The motion on the flaps on opposite sides of the plane of symmetry must be synchronized unless the aircraft has safe characteristics with the flaps retracted on one side and extended on the other." Since the left and right inboard slats are controlled by a single valve and actuated by a common drum and the left and right outboard slats receive their command from mechanically linked control valves which are "slaved" to the inboard slats by the followup cable, the synchronization requirement was satisfied. However, since the cable drum actuating mechanisms of the left and right outboard slats were independent of each other, the possibility existed that one outboard slat might fail to respond to a commanded movement. Therefore, the safe flight characteristics of the aircraft with asymmetrical outboard slats were demonstrated by test flight. These flight characteristics were investigated within an airspeed range bounded by the limiting airspeed for the takeoff slat positions--260 kts--and the stall warning speed; the flight test did not investigate these characteristics under takeoff conditions. In addition, a slat disagree warning light system was installed which, when illuminated, indicated that the slat handle and slat position disagree, or the slats are in transit, or the slats have been extended automatically. The program engineer stated that the commanded slat position is held by trapped fluid in the actuating cylinder, and that no consideration was given to an alternate locking mechanism. The slats' hydraulic lines and followup cables were routed as close as possible to primary structure for protection; however, routing them behind the wing's front spar was not considered because of interference with other systems. "The branch chief of the Reliability and Safety Engineering Organization of the Douglas Aircraft Company described the failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) and fault analysis. The witness indicated that the FMEA was a basic working document in which rational failure modes were postulated and analyzed; vendors and subcontractors were requested to perform similar analyses on equipment they supplied to McDonnell-Douglas. Previous design and service experience was incorporated in the initial DC-10-10's FMEA's, and analyses were modified as the design progressed. The FMEA's were synthesized to make fault analyses, which were system-oriented summary documents submitted to the FAA to satisfy 14 CFR 25.1309. The FAA could have requested and could have reviewed the FMEA's. The basic regulations under which the slats were certified did not require accountability for multiple failures. The slat fault analysis submitted to the FAA listed 11 faults or failures, all of which were correctable by the flightcrew. However, one multiple failure--erroneous motion transmitted to the right-hand outboard slats and an engine failure on the appropriate side-- was considered by McDonnell-Douglas in its FMEA. The FMEA noted that the "failure increases the amount of yaw but would be critical only under the most adverse flight or takeoff conditions. The probability of both failures occurring is less than 1 x 10e-10 [a popular number with airframe manufacturers!]." [...] "The December 1, 1978 revision of 14 CFR 25.571 retitled the regulation "Damage-Tolerance and Fatigue Evaluation of Structure." The fail-safe evaluation must now include damage modes due to fatigue, corrosion, and accidental damage. According to the manufacturer, the consideration for accidental damage was limited to damage which can be inflicted during routine maintenance and aircraft servicing." [...] "Because of the designed redundancy in the aircraft's hydraulic and electrical systems, the losses of those systems powered by the No. 1 engine should not have affected the crew's ability to control the aircraft. However, as the pylon separated from the aircraft, the forward bulkhead contacted and severed four other hydraulic lines and two cables which were routed through the wing leading edge forward of the bulkhead. These hydraulic lines were the operating lines from the leading edge slat control valve, which was located inboard of the pylon, and the actuating cylinders, which extend and retract the outboard leading edge slats. Two of the lines were connected to the No. 1 hydraulic system and two were connected to the No. 3 system, thus providing the redundancy to cope with a single hydraulic system failure. The cables which were severed provided feedback of the leading edge slat position so that the control valve would be nulled when slat position agreed with position commanded by the cockpit control. The severing of the hydraulic lines in the leading edge of the left wing could have resulted in the eventual loss of No. 3 hydraulic system because of fluid depletion. However, even at the most rapid rate of leakage possible, the system would have operated throughout the flight. The extended No. 3 spoiler panel on the right wing, which was operated by the No. 3 hydraulic system, confirmed that this hydraulic system was operating. Since two of the three hydraulic systems were operative, the Safety Board concludes that, except for the No. 2 and No. 4 spoiler panels on both wings which were powered by the No. 1 hydraulic systems, all flight controls were operating. Therefore, except for the significant effect that the severing of the No. 3 hydraulic system's lines had on the left leading edge slat system, the fluid leak did not play a role in the accident. During takeoff, as with any normal takeoff, the leading edge slats were extended to provide increased aerodynamic lift on the wings . When the slats are extended and the control valve is nulled, hydraulic fluid is trapped in the actuating cylinder and operating lines. The incompressiblity of this fluid reacts against any external air loads and holds the slats extended. This is the only lock provided by the design. Thus, when the lines were severed and the trapped hydraulic fluid was lost, air loads forced the left outboard slats to retract. While other failures were not critical, the uncommanded movement of these leading edge slats had a profound effect on the aerodynamic performance and controllability of the aircraft. With the left outboard slats retracted and all others extended, the lift of the left wing was reduced and the airspeed at which that wing would stall was increased. The simulator tests showed that even with the loss of the No. 2 and No. 4 spoilers, sufficient lateral control was available from the ailerons and other spoilers to offset the asymmetric lift caused by left slat retraction at airspeeds above that at which the wing would stall. However, the stall speed for the left wing increased to 159 KIAS. [...] The Safety Board is also concerned that the designs of the flight control, hydraulic, and electrical systems in the DC-10 aircraft were such that all were affected by the pylon separation to the extent that the crew was unable to ascertain the measures needed to maintain control of the aircraft. The airworthiness regulations in effect when the DC-10 was certificated were augmented by a Special Condition, the provisions of which had to be met before the aircraft's fully powered control system would be certificated. The Special Condition required that the aircraft be capable of continued flight and of being landed safely after failure of the flight control system, including lift devices. These capabilities must be demonstrated by analysis or test, or both. However, the Special Condition, as it applied to the slat control system, was consistent with the basic airworthiness regulations in effect at the time. The basic airworthiness regulations specified requirements for wing flap asymmetry only and did not include specific consideration of other lift devices. Because the leading edge slat design did not contain any novel or unusual features, it was certificated under the basic regulation. The flap control requirements for symmetry and synchronization were applied to and satisfied by the slat system design. Since a malfunction of the slat actuating system could disrupt the operation of an outboard slat segment, a fault analysis was conducted to explore the probability and effects of both an uncommanded movement of the outboard slats and the failure of the outboard slats to respond to a commanded movement. The fault analysis concluded that the aircraft could be flown safely with this asymmetry. Other aircraft designs include positive mechanical locking devices to prevent movement of slats by external loads following a primary failure. The DC-10 design did not include such a feature nor was it deemed necessary, since compliance with the regulations was based upon analysis of those failure modes which could result in asymmetrical positioning of the leading edge devices and a demonstration that sufficient lateral control was available to compensate for the asymmetrical conditions throughout the aircraft's flight envelope. The flight tests conducted to evaluate the controllability of the aircraft were limited to a minimum airspeed compatible with stall-warning activation predicated upon the slat-retracted configuration. From kls Wed Nov 25 03:16:43 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) Subject: MD-11 milestone dates References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Chicago Software Works X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov25.102758.29314@ohare.Chicago.COM> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Wed, 25 Nov 1992 10:27:58 GMT In article rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes: >Michael Weiss wrote: >>> McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 1993 >>Try 1992. The MD-11 was certified in October of 1991. >By the end of 1991, MDC had made in excess of 30 deliveries of the MD-11. >First deliveries tend to follow certification VERY quickly. Having received several other submissions mentioning earlier service dates I decided to look up the real dates for the MD-11 and hopefully nail the lid on the debate once and for all. date LN reg'n note ---- -- ----- ---- Jan 10 1990 447 N11MD first flight Nov 9 1990 - - type certificate issued (GE CF6-80C2 engines) Nov 29 1990 455 OH-LGA first delivery (PR event, to Finnair) Dec 7 1990 455 OH-LGA actual title transfer (at Las Vegas) Dec 18 1990 - - type certificate issued (P&W PW4460 engines) Dec 20 1990 455 OH-LGA first revenue service (Finnair, Helsinki- Tenerife charter) Dec 21 1990 453 N891DL delivery of Delta's first two MD-11s, leased 454 N892DL from Mitsui (GE engines; Delta's own are PW) Jan 24 1991 456 HL7371 first delivery of PW4460 version (to Korean) Feb 5 1991 454 N892DL first scheduled service (DL 4049 ATL-DFW-MCO) Feb 6 1991 453 N891DL first scheduled int'l (LAX-NRT; arrived LAX previous day operating DL 4039 ATL-DFW-LAX) Jun 27 1991 447 N601FE delivery of first MD-11 (to Federal Express, after refitting by Aerotest in Mojave, CA) Roughly 35 MD-11s had been delivered by the end of 1991; McDonnell- Douglas got off to a rather slow start because nearly every one of the early aircraft were different, including passenger, freight, and combi versions, some with GE engines and others with Pratt and Whitney. The Rolls-Royce version was cancelled after the demise of Air Europe. BTW, note that line number 447 is the first MD-11. 446 was the last of the last of the DC-10 line, a KC-10 if I'm not mistaken. -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Wed Nov 25 03:16:44 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: Karl Swartz Subject: Thanksgiving Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Original-Message-Id: Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Wed, 25 Nov 92 3:14:35 PST Tomorrow (er, it's late, better make that today) is the day before Thanksgiving in the United States, traditionally the busiest air travel day of the year. My home-town airport (perhaps you've heard of it -- Chicago's O'Hare International, namesake of the machine I'm posting this on) usually sets a new passenger volume record every year on this day, though this year may be an exception as the half-price fare war led to several record-shattering days this past summer. (For those of you who may be unfamiliar with this custom, it entails family and friends gathering together on the Thursday before the last Friday in November to consume a turkey and stuffing, yams, cranberry sauce, pumpkin pie, and all sorts of other goodies, followed by three days to sit back, watch football, and digest all that food!) In any case, I'll be doing my part to support the travel industry this holiday, though not at O'Hare and not by air. This means I'll be away from the keyboard until Monday, and airliners posts likely won't go out until then. (I may check in once or twice before then but no promises.) To those of you in the US or celebrating this US holiday, may this be a happy and *safe* holiday for you. To the rest, well, you'll be saved the inevitable weeks of leftover turkey sandwiches. ;-) -- Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com 1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com From kls Wed Nov 25 11:07:26 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's?? References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx X-Original-Message-Id: <9211251258.AA19229@cactus.org> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Wed, 25 Nov 92 06:58:52 CST In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: >In article weiss@curtiss.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes: >>I have a hard time believing that an intact hydraulic system would have >>prevented AA191 from crashing. Let's face it, a wing-mounted engine falling >>off produces such a rediculous unbalance that even full aileron wouldn't be >>able to counter it. > >I don't see that ailerons have much to do with it -- the biggest >effect would be a substantial yaw, which would require rudder input. In the NTSB report on the DC-10 crash, a considerable amount of both yaw and rudder were necessary to regain level flight, in the simulator tests-- 80% right rudder and 70% right-wing-down aileron; roll angles didn't exceed 30 degrees before recovery. Normally, given asymmetric thrust, you bank into the good engine(s): rudder's normally used to augment the ailerons as necessary to control sideslip. >Having lots of altitude and airspeed to work with is certainly quite >helpful, but isn't a requirement. A few years ago a Piedmont 737-200 >lost #2 immediately after takeoff from O'Hare. The pilots promptly >declared an emergency, turned around, and landed several minutes later >on another runway. They didn't even realize that the engine had >litterally fallen off until the got off he plane and looked. There are actually two issues at work, here: one is the *power* lost by the engine. To maintain level flight, the power required for flight must equal the power available. If the power available is less, one will start to descend; if it's a lot less, one will descend faster. The real issue is just power: it has little to do with where the failure was: losing two of three engines on a 727 at MTOW means you'll go down, too. The second issue is the moment produced by the combination of the "dead" engine (with its drag) and the "good" engines. This is generally a minimal issue, assuming the airspeed is there, and the pilot applies correct technique. Most transport aircraft can fly with all engines out on one side, although I do not know if this is an explicit regulatory requirement. As long as the inherent longitudinal stability of the airplane (contributed by the vertical stabilizer, rudder, wings, and fuselage) is sufficient to overcome the yawing moment, the airplane can be controlled. So *correcting* for a lost engine is a near-instantaneous correction, applied by the pilot, needing no altitude reserve. During the El Al discussion on sci.aero, rec.av, and rec.travel.air, there seemed to be considerable confusion between the role each factor took. --- Robert Dorsett rdd@cactus.org ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd From kls Sun Nov 29 14:35:26 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: Bob Coggeshall Subject: 757 highest thrust to weight ratio ? Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Original-Message-Id: <199211281348.AA07134@drewll.cogwheel.com> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Sat, 28 Nov 1992 21:48:00 +0800 I've heard that the 757 has a very high thrust to weight ratio. Just how high is it ? Is it the highest of any commercial jetliner ? I've also heard that there is a boeing-internal video of it during tests doing an [almost?] straight vertical climb. What are the facts here ? Thanks. //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// Bob Coggeshall, President Cogwheel Incorporated - Producers of Low-cost dial-up IP Routers coggs@hongkong.Cogwheel.COM //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// From kls Sun Nov 29 14:35:27 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: weiss@wright.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) Subject: Re: pair (sorry, couldn't resist the pun) References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: SEASnet, University of California, Los Angeles X-Original-Message-Id: <8761@lee.SEAS.UCLA.EDU> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: 29 Nov 92 08:04:20 GMT In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: >In article weiss@mott.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes: >>However, Boeing has a history of being the best aircraft in the >>world in terms of maintenance; Airbus apparently makes planes that are almost >>as difficult to repair and inspect as McDonnell-Douglas. >I have not previously encountered negative comments regarding >McDonnell-Douglas products in this context, however, and in fact have >heard that the DC-10 is rather well-liked because it's somewhat like >a big Chevy V-8 -- solid, and easy to fix when it breaks. (Problems >with the design of the hydraulics notwithstanding.) All of my repair information comes from my girlfriend's brother, who works as a maintenance guy for SkyWest (a commuter airline that operates also as the Delta Connection in Los Angeles, Palm Springs, Phoenix, and Las Vegas primarily). He said that DC-10s are notorious for repairs being all-day operations, whereas Boeing's 737-300 and -400, 747-300 and -400, 757, and 767 have self-diagnostic systems that go so far as to direct the location of the repair instructions down to the page, turning the repairs into a half-day operation instead. Note that I cannot verify this information, but I see no reason to dispute it. >Seems to me that Lockheed, the L-1011 in particular but perhaps the >Electra in its time as well, tended toward somewhat more finicky >products that compensated by giving better performance. Now there's one I should ask my cousin. He was a test pilot for the L-1011 when he was first hired by Lockheed. >With regard to the MD-12, MacDAC seems to remain in the race nearly as >much as Boeing and Airbus, though their ability to carry through with >an actual aircraft is certainly less certain given their finances. In >any case all three are paper planes until the airlines get themselves >into better financial shape. My understanding is that the capital exists within Boeing, and can certainly be "created" within Airbus, but MacDAC has been losing faith quickly from its investors. At least, that's what the LA Times seems to indicate. Rumor had it that if the MD-11 did not get cert back in October '91, MacDAC was going to have to file for bankruptcy. Again, this was LA Times info. -- \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | / - Michael weiss@seas.ucla.edu | School of Engineering & Applied Science - - Weiss izzydp5@oac.ucla.edu | University of California, Los Angeles - / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | \ From kls Sun Nov 29 14:35:28 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: michael@is3000.bmr.gov.au (System Support) Subject: Boeing Book Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Australian Geological Survey Organization X-Original-Message-Id: <9211291359.AA08442@is3000.UUCP> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Sun, 29 Nov 92 13:59:40 AUS Maybe someone can help me. I'm trying to get hold of a new book about Boeing entitled something like "The Boeing Story". Does anyone have any ideas about such a book, author? Any help would be much appreciated. Does Boeing (Seattle) have an email address? Thanking You in appreciation, Michael michael@is3000.bmr.gov.au -- From kls Sun Nov 29 14:35:28 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: fxm4993@hertz.njit.edu (Farhan Muhammad) Subject: Request for the informations on Concorde. Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, N.J. X-Original-Message-ID: <1992Nov29.192511.29500@njitgw.njit.edu> Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Date: Sun, 29 Nov 1992 19:25:11 GMT Hello Everybody. Recently, i have come to know from an article that the Concorde doesn't have the flaps. Can anyone brief me on how the plane flies, specially land without the help of flaps. P.S. can anyone inform me on the take-of and landing procedures of Concorde. My thanks are offered. Fahan Muhammad Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ. muhammaf@erau.db.erau.edu From kls Tue Dec 1 00:13:23 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: gregory@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Greg Wright) Subject: Re: The Sporty Game -- Boeing 757 X-Submission-Date: Wed, 25 Nov 92 13:25:45 PST References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Boeing Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Submission-Message-Id: <9211252125.AA23119@bcstec.ca.boeing.com> Date: 01 Dec 92 00:13:23 PST In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: > >I'm *still* surprised that Boeing hasn't made much noise (maybe none) >about plugging this obvious hole by offering a 757-100 or whatever -- >a shortened 757 like the original proposal and a real replacement for >the 727-200. Even with United it never seemed to come up, instead all >the discussion focussing on a massively stretched and pulled and re- >designed 737-600. True, a 757 is more expensive (~ $45 million versus >$30 - 35 million) but the changes embodied in the 737-600 would surely >have added tremendously to the price. > >-- >Karl Swartz |INet kls@ditka.chicago.com >1-415/854-3409 |UUCP uunet!decwrl!ditka!kls > |Snail 2144 Sand Hill Rd., Menlo Park CA 94025, USA > Send sci.aeronautics.airliners submissions to airliners@chicago.com I think that you will find that every attempt at a shortened version of one of our planes has had limited success. Take the 747SP for example. Airlines tend not to like the sorted versions very much. In $/seat or $/mile these versions are too expensive to run. There is a real problem having too much engine or wing with them. We find it is better to stretch if anything.... Greg -- ________Greg Wright____________ "I struggle to be brief | gregory@bcstec.ca.boeing.com | and become obscure." | gregory@halcyon.com | |____uunet!bcstec!gregory_______| NOT A BOEING SPOKESPERSON. From kls Tue Dec 1 00:13:24 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners,rec.travel.air Path: news From: cid@athena.mit.edu (Derek H Cedillo) Subject: A320 loses wheels and skids 200 feet X-Submission-Date: Mon, 30 Nov 1992 03:58:24 GMT References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Nov30.035824.22954@athena.mit.edu> Date: 01 Dec 92 00:13:24 PST A Mexicana A320 Lost its nose gear on takeoff at LAX (flt #901 @3:25PM) The aircraft was fairly new, what I was wondering, was what it takes exactly to lose a gear, especially on take off. Landing, you have a lot more stress and what not. My main concern is that with it being a relatively new aircraft, long term stress and maintainence problems shouldnt be much of a factor, thus implying either a tragic design flaw or machining flaw/one time error. I realize that ther rest of the A320's problems dont stem from things like this but mainly from control problems. Does anyone have specific info on what it would/did take to have this gear fail? Thanks Derek ------------------------------------------------------------------- "He lived a life of going-to-do, and died with nothing done" -J. Albery In other words---JUST DO IT! From kls Tue Dec 1 00:13:24 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: slenk@hal.EMBA.UVM.EDU (Carl A Slenk) Subject: Boeing Book X-Submission-Date: Mon, 30 Nov 1992 19:25:43 GMT References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: University of Vermont, EMBA Computer Facility Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Submission-Message-Id: <1992Nov30.192543.16611@uvm.edu> Date: 01 Dec 92 00:13:24 PST A new book out in January of 93 looks interesting: Wide-Body: the Triumph of the 747 by Clive Irving Pub: William Morrow &co -- Carl A. Slenk | "A computer lets you make more mistakes faster slenk@hal.emba.uvm.ed | then any other invention with the possible University of Vermont | exceptions of handguns and Tequilla" - My opinions;get your own | Mitch Ratcliffe From kls Tue Dec 1 00:13:25 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: raveling@Unify.com (Paul Raveling) Subject: Re: pair (sorry, couldn't resist the pun) X-Submission-Date: Mon, 30 Nov 92 20:21:32 GMT References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Unify Corporation (Sacramento) Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Submission-Message-Id: Date: 01 Dec 92 00:13:25 PST In article , weiss@wright.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes: > > In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: > >In article weiss@mott.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes: > >>However, Boeing has a history of being the best aircraft in the > >>world in terms of maintenance; Airbus apparently makes planes that are almost > >>as difficult to repair and inspect as McDonnell-Douglas. > >I have not previously encountered negative comments regarding > >McDonnell-Douglas products in this context, however, and in fact have > >heard that the DC-10 is rather well-liked because it's somewhat like > >a big Chevy V-8 -- solid, and easy to fix when it breaks. (Problems > >with the design of the hydraulics notwithstanding.) My dad always said that DC-10's were much easier to maintain than the Boeings that he also worked on at Western Airlines. My impression from him was that the DC-10's greatest advantage for maintenance was better access to components or areas needing maintenance. To put it another way, the hell-hole count was much lower on the DC-10. He also cited a lot of things that were simply more durable on the DC-10. This is basically an echo of your report about being solid and easy to fix. Background: My dad worked in Western's LAX shop until he retired about the time Western merged into Delta. The Boeings in question were 707's, 720's, 727's, and 737's. Farther back (1950's) he also worked for Boeing's Renton plant when they were first manufacturing 707's and KC-135's. He still did occasional minor consulting jobs for Boeing until retirement, typically to update quick-reference maintenance manuals. He also had contacts at United's LAX shop who passed on info about 747's & 767's. ------------------ Paul Raveling Raveling@Unify.com From kls Tue Dec 1 00:13:26 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: Christopher Davis Subject: MD-11 milestone dates X-Submission-Date: Mon, 30 Nov 1992 15:34:58 -0500 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Submission-Message-Id: <199211302034.AA07008@loiosh.eff.org> Date: 01 Dec 92 00:13:26 PST KS> == Karl Swartz KS> Having received several other submissions mentioning earlier service KS> dates I decided to look up the real dates for the MD-11 and hopefully KS> nail the lid on the debate once and for all. KS> date LN reg'n note KS> ---- -- ----- ---- KS> Dec 21 1990 453 N891DL delivery of Delta's first two MD-11s, leased KS> 454 N892DL from Mitsui (GE engines; Delta's own are PW) Interesting note on these two; I was on a DL flight from CVG-BOS last night (Thanksgiving travel :) and was looking in the seat pocket (trying to find a DL postcard I didn't already have, actually) and noted their "supplemental" emergency information card, which covers the aisle lighting (red lights at exits, white elsewhere) now standard. The card listed all of DL's jet types, with an interesting note next to MD-11: "(except ships 891 and 892)". After looking in JP, we realized that these were the "odd couple" and that explained it. (Unrelated notes: 757 BOS-CVG, 727 CVG-CLE, 727 CLE-CVG, 757 CVG-BOS, and the outdoor viewing deck at CLE was closed (sigh) but at least the glassed-in area was open...) From kls Tue Dec 1 00:13:26 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: Christopher Davis Subject: Re: Boeing Book X-Submission-Date: Mon, 30 Nov 1992 15:41:12 -0500 References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Submission-Message-Id: <199211302041.AA07012@loiosh.eff.org> Date: 01 Dec 92 00:13:26 PST Michael> == System Support Michael> Maybe someone can help me. I'm trying to get hold of a new Michael> book about Boeing entitled something like "The Boeing Story". Michael> Does anyone have any ideas about such a book, author? Any help Michael> would be much appreciated. This might be the Robert Serling _Legend & Legacy_, which I hope to find the time to do a book review on, eventually. *Very* good book. (I don't have an ISBN handy, the book's at home.) Michael> Does Boeing (Seattle) have an email address? Probably not an official one, if that's what you're asking. There are a number of divisions of Boeing, and they're all under the boeing.com domain. From kls Tue Dec 1 02:10:47 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) Subject: Re: Seeking pointers on switch design. X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 1992 02:17:17 GMT References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Boeing Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Submission-Message-Id: Date: 01 Dec 92 02:10:47 PST In article rdd@cactus.org (Robert Dorsett) writes: >I'm looking for pointers to articles on the human-factors ramifications of >switch design. I've noticed an interesting difference between Airbus and >Boeing switch philosophy. > [Much interesting material deleted] > >On the other hand, Airbus' design can be rationalized in that if the computers >do *all* routine management, as they do, then bringing the pilots in the loop >at initial start-up is an invitation for error: in this model, pilot involve- >ment is an *abnormal* event, and signs of that involvement should be >highlighted. This raises interesting implications of the pilots being out of >the loop TOO long, perhaps never dealing with a system or mentally "reviewing" >that system for several flights, as would be the case with more "hands-on" >initialization and management. This could be the reason behind Airbus's >pre-flight "walk-through," in which each switch illuminates in sequence, >requiring the pilot to depress it to extinguish the light. > >Comments? References? I'd just like to address one small part of your message, the part dealing with pilots being out of the loop too long. I've read not to long ago that there is research being performed on a tweak of the flight management systems paradigm. Instead of the FMCS just flying the programmed course, the new thought is to have it tell the pilot the next step and have the pilot initiate the maneuver. This keeps the flight crew mentally engaged, one hopes. Apparently there is a history of incidents where the pilot was too far behind the airplane. I just love this industry! :-) -- Terry drinkard@bcstec.boeing.com "Anyone who thinks they can hold the company responsible for what I say has more lawyers than sense." From kls Tue Dec 1 02:10:49 1992 Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners Path: news From: drinkard@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Terrell D. Drinkard) Subject: Re: hydraulic problems with DC-10's?? X-Submission-Date: Tue, 1 Dec 1992 02:25:46 GMT References: Message-ID: Approved: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM Organization: Boeing Sender: kls@ohare.Chicago.COM X-Submission-Message-Id: Date: 01 Dec 92 02:10:49 PST In article weiss@curtiss.SEAS.UCLA.EDU (Michael Weiss) writes: > >In article kls@ohare.Chicago.COM (Karl Swartz) writes: >>In article sdl@linus.mitre.org writes: >>>Some of my pilot friends have accused the DC-10 as having a >>>particularly bad history of hydraulic problems (which have >>>contributed to a few crashes). >>Two, at least. AA 191 at Chicago/O'Hare on May 25, 1979, and UA 232 >>at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989. > >I have a hard time believing that an intact hydraulic system would have >prevented AA191 from crashing. Let's face it, a wing-mounted engine falling >off produces such a rediculous unbalance that even full aileron wouldn't be >able to counter it. Not true. An engine departing the airplane is a planned for event, in terms of stability and control. An aileron would have no problem countering just the imbalance of thrust (and it would actually be mostly rudder), in fact, without the added drag of a windmilling engine, the problem is a bit simplified. Flight AA 191 lost the slats on the left hand wing (if memory serves) because of Douglas' failure to include mechanical lockouts on the slat actuators. They were not required to certify the airplane. But then, why build a 'just barely good enough' airplane? The #1 engine departed the wing, taking the hydraulic lines that run along the front spar with it. This cause a major loss of pressure in the slat actuators which were then pushed back into the wing by dynamic pressure. The assymetrical loss of the leading edge high lift devices was a major contributing factor in this crash. Interestingly enough, the