

From the Radio Free Michigan archives



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     The  following article is from the March/April 1988  edition 

of the British publication "The Handgunner" beginning on page  6.  

While it was written as an review of British gun laws just prior

to passage of Britain's recently passed gun ban, it provides an

excellent account of the strategies and motivations of the gun

banning crowd.  As you read, note the many similarities in tactics

strategy, timing and argument used by the British anti-gunners to

those used by HCI and others in the U.S. today.  The original

article ended with a chronological overview of all British gun

law through the last century and would definitely be worth send-

ing the three dollars for a back issue.  The letters column and

other articles also contain valuable information for the citizen

who believes in our heritage of armed free men.

The Handgunner is available from:  



     SM  Distribution  Ltd.

     16/18 Trinity  Gardens

     London  SW9. 01-274  8611



    Back  issues  are available for $3 U.S.

*****************************************************************



              Firearms Legislation in Great Britain

                       by Jan A. Stevenson





    Most  people of retirement age, though they may  not  realize 

it, were born at a time when there was no firearms legislation to 

speak of in this country.  Nor had there ever been, for the first 

Firearms Act of any substance was that of 1920.  The 1920 Act was 

a comprehensive one and gave Britain an extensive system of  con-

trols  that  have rarely been exceeded in a  democratic  society.  

Subsequent  enactments have put more flesh on the bones, but  the 

structure  of  controls that the government of  the  day  devised 

serves us still.



    From the point of view of social history, as recent  research 

has  made clear, the 1920 Act is a particularly  important  docu-

ment.  It marks a profound shift--indeed a reversal--in the Brit-

ish state's attitude toward its citizens.  In 1900 the Prime Min-

ister said that he would "laud the day when there was a rifle  in 

every  cottage in England."  The Lord Mayor hosted a  meeting  at 

Mansion House, attended by, among others, the Duke of  Westminis-

ter, the Archbishop of York and the Lord Mayor of Liverpool, with 

the purpose of founding a, "Society of Working Men's Rifle Clubs, 

for facilitating rifle shooting, more especially in the  evening, 

with small bore rifles and inexpensive ammunition, as an ordinary 

branch of recreation by working men's and working boys' clubs and 

institutions."



    The  Duke of Norfolk undertook to chair the  new  Association 

while Lord Roberts, then Commander-in-Chief, had agreed to accept 

the presidency on his retirement from the Army.



    According the The Times:

    "...the  scheme  would  be a co-operative one,  that  is  the 

gentlemen  of the country would contribute to the  funds,  whilst 

the  working  men would be expected to join the  clubs  and  make 

themselves efficient in the matter of rifle shooting."



    This  was  very different from the purpose of the  1920  Act, 

which was precisely to ensure that working men would not be  able 

to lay hands on a rifle or make themselves proficient in its use.  

It  was not deemed politic, however, to say so, and the bill  was 

put through as a crime prevention measure.  Its progress  through 

parliament  had been carefully prepared, and it encountered  very 

little opposition.



    Police Superintendent Colin Greenwood who, as a Cropwood Fel-

low  at  the Institute of Criminology, University  of  Cambridge, 

during  1970-71, was the first to conduct serious, scholarly  re-

search  in this field, recalled some years later how  baffled  he 

had been by the motivation of the 1920 Act.



    "The  question troubled me for some time because I was  naive 

enough to accept the assurances of the day that their legislation 

was aimed at the armed criminal...During the period 1911 to 1913, 

firearms  were involved in an average of 45 crimes of  all  types 

per year.  During the period 1915 to 1917, the average had fallen 

to 15 cases per year.  Would to God that we could have such  fig-

ures today.  Why, then, was legislation introduced?...It was  not 

until  I read the diaries of the then Cabinet Secretary that  the 

truth emerged." [Speech; Rhodes House, Oxford, June 1983.]



    The  truth, as Colin Greenwood belatedly discovered,  and  as 

recently  released Cabinet papers have underlined, was  that  the 

Government  was  extremely  concerned by  the  possibility  of  a 

Bolshevik   style  revolution  in  Britain.   The   police   were 

insufficient  to  deal with the anticipated troubles;  the  Army, 

after  demobilization,  of conscripts, would be  insufficient  as 

well.   According  to the Chief of the  Imperial  General  Staff, 

there would soon be only 38 Regular Army battalions in Britain.



    "On  the  assumption  that an adequate  police  force  is  in 

existence,  it is considered essential to maintain  the  infantry 

garrisons  in Great Britain at not less than 40,000 men in  order 

to  give  a  minimum strength of 30,000  effective  bayonets  for 

employment in an emergency." [PRO CAB 24/96 XCH 62903]



    The  Chief of the I.G.S. was unable to guarantee this  beyond 

March of 1920 and added that, "Further, an adequate police  force 

does  no  apparently  exist."  He warned that if  the  Army  were 

called upon at an early stage of civil disturbances, "it will  be 

dispersed,  and  thus  the  last reserve  in  the  hands  of  the 

Government will be dissipated."



    Sir Eric Geddes, Minister of Transport, complained that there 

were only eight battalions in the north, and he feared,

.PM

"...a  revolutionary outbreak in Glasgow, Liverpool or London  in 

the  early spring, when a definite attempt may be made  to  seize 

the reins of Government...It is not inconceivable that a dramatic 

and  successful  coup d'etat in some large center  of  population 

might  win the support of the unthinking mass of labour..."  [PRO 

CAB 25/20]



    The  Home Secretary reminded the Cabinet that the  Bolsheviks 

had  staged  a revolution in Winnipeg, and now that  the  wartime 

blockade  was dismantled, their emissaries could be  expected  in 

Britain,  doubtless bearing vast quantities of forged  five-pound 

notes  such  as  had been discovered in Odessa,  when  the  White 

Russian Army had taken the city.



    Geddes proposed: "...a meeting of Mayors of provincial cities 

(to)  ascertain  from them how far they are  prepared  to  create 

skeleton  organizations  locally for dealing with  civil  distur-

bances  when they occur, such skeleton organizations to be  of  a 

secret nature." [PRO CAB 25/20]



    A committee chaired by Sir Nevil Macready, Commission of Met-

ropolitan   Police,  recommended  that  each   regimental   depot 

throughout the country should hold 1,000 stand of arms and appro-

priate  quantities  of ammunition as "the best method  of  making 

them available to loyalists in the event of an emergency."  Bonar 

Law had urged the month before that, "weapons ought to be  avail-

able for distribution to friends of the Government."



The Prime  Minister  had been told in Cabinet that,  "A  bill  is 

needed to license persons to bear arms.  This has been useful  in 

Ireland because the Authorities know whom was possessed of arms."  

The bill was soon forthcoming.  It was introduced into the  House 

of Lords on the 19th of April and sent to the Commons on the  6th 

of May.



    The  Home Secretary, Mr. Edward Shortt, gave no hint  of  the 

matters  that were so tormenting the Cabinet.  The bill,  he  as-

sured the House, was, "...designed to maintain greater control so 

that,  as far as possible, criminals or weak minded persons,  and 

those  who should not have firearms may be prevented from  having 

these dangerous and lethal firearms.  As far as possible, we have 

provided that legitimate sport should not be in any way hampered, 

and  so that any person who has good reason for possessing  fire-

arms,  or to whom there is no objection, may be entitled to  have 

them;  but we hope, by means of this bill, to  prevent  criminals 

and persons of that description from being able to have revolvers 

and to use them."



    These  words sound remarkably similar to those  recently  ut-

tered by today's Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd.  Mr. Shortt's  re-

assuring  tone, as he described to the House his concern to  pro-

tect the public from armed crime whilst safeguarding the  legiti-

mate interests of shooting sportsmen, was no doubt in contrast to 

the atmosphere in the Cabinet Room in Downing Street where he and 

his  colleagues anxiously discussed the possibility  of  strafing 

the  working class from the air whilst fielding  30,000  bayonets 

against them on the ground.



    What  happened to Lord Salisbury's hope, expressed  only  two 

decades  earlier, of having a rifle in every cottage?  What  hap-

pened to the absolute trust on the part of the ruling classes, as 

exemplified in the founding of the Society of Working Men's Rifle 

Clubs,  in the patriotism and decency of the working class?   The 

view  then was that if Britain should have need to raise  a  mass 

army of national defense, the working class would form the infan-

try,  and that the defense of the realm would depend on their  a-

bility to use their individual weapons with the expertise born of 

years of practice.  That view, as it turned out, was to be vindi-

cated  within fifteen years in the trenches of  Northern  France.  

And  finally, what made the Government so determined to  truncate 

one  of the essential liberties of freeborn Englishmen that  they 

would legislate that liberty to extinction?



    Clearly, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the formation 

of the "Third International" with the object of exporting  insur-

rection,  had provided the panic element.  But it would be  over-

simplistic  to suggest this as sufficient explanation, for  there 

had  been several bills during the pre-war period that  had  pre-

saged  the  1920 Act.  During the second reading  debate  in  the 

House,  the Member for Hull, Lt. Commander  Kenworthy,  expressed 

great  concern: "In the past, one of the most  jealously  guarded 

rights  of the English was that of carrying arms...It has been  a 

well  known object of Central Government of this country  to  de-

prive people of their weapons."



    The  bill itself was based on the secret report of a  "purely 

departmental" committee chaired by Sir Ernley Blackwell, KCB, who 

had been charged on the 6th December, 1917, to consider the  "re-

strictions which should be imposed upon possession,  manufacture, 

sale,  import and export of firearms in the United Kingdom  after 

the  war."  Blackwell was Assistant Under Secretary of State  for 

the  Home  Department,  and his  committee  recognized  two  main 

sources   of  postwar  danger:  the  "savage  or   semi-civilized 

tribesmen  in  outlying  parts of the British  Empire"  and  "the 

anarchist or 'intellectual' malcontent of the great cities  whose 

weapon is the bomb and the automatic pistol.  There is some force 

in  the  view  that  the latter will in  future  prove  the  more 

dangerous of the two."



    We  might  tentatively  suggest that  the  Bolshevik  spectre 

served  to focus the anxieties aroused by the prewar  anarchists.  

The anarchists, however, were regarded for the most part as  for-

eign  malcontents rather than as a direct threat to the  domestic 

body politic:  Communism, on the other hand, risked infecting the 

lower classes across a broad spectrum.



    One  of the documents that Blackwell's  committee  considered 

was the draft pistols Bill of 1911, with which Blackwell  himself 

had been closely involved, but that had never been put before the 

House.   It  had, for the first time, incorporated  a  system  of 

certificates  to  be  administered by the police,  and  had  been 

intended to stiffen the Pistols Act, 1903, which had succeeded in 

its  passage through Parliament only by virtue of being  anodyne.  

There  had been previous attempts to legislate in 1887 and  1893, 

but  these  had been soundly rejected on the  grounds  that  they 

represented an unconstitutional infringement of basic rights.



    Of   that,  there  should  be  little  doubt.   Sir   William 

Blackstone's   Commentaries,   first  published  in   1765,   had 

meticulously    described   the   development,   substance    and 

significance of "...the rights, or as they are frequently termed, 

the  liberties of Englishmen...":  "And we have seen  that  these 

rights consist, primarily, in the free enjoyment of personal sec-

urity, of personal liberty and of private property...And  lastly, 

to  vindicate these rights, when actually violated and  attacked, 

the subjects of England are entitled, in the first place, to  the 

regular  administration and free course of justice in the  courts 

of law; next to the right of petitioning the King and  Parliament 

for the redress of grievances; and lastly, to the right of having 

and using arms for self preservation and defense."



    The  right to keep arms no doubt developed as a corollary  of 

the natural law right of self defense, and by Anglo-Saxon times a 

corresponding  obligation was clearly defined.   All  able-bodied 

freemen were expected to take part in the "hue and cry" to  bring 

criminals  to justice, and to serve in the army in time  of  war.  

For  both of these purposes, they were expected to maintain  arms 

according  to their rank and station.  A twice yearly  inspection 

insured that the arms concerned were kept in good order and ready 

for use.



    The  Normans  retained this system, and  indeed  refined  it.  

Henry  II's Assize of Arms of 1181 detailed the types of  weapons 

which  persons of various rank were expected to have on  hand,  a 

question  that was updated in 1285 by the Statute of  Westminster 

[13 Edw I c6].  The greater one's wealth, the greater one's  con-

tribution,  but even the poor were under obligation: "...and  all 

others  that may shall have bows and arrows."  



    Indeed, firearms were at first regarded by the Crown as  noi-

some,  inefficient  things that might tempt  people  to  neglect, 

"...the  good and laudable exercise of the longbow  which  always 

heretofore hath been the surety, safeguard and continual  defense 

of this Realm of England." [33 Hen VIII c6]



    By the end of the 16th century, the musket had displaced  the 

bow as the primary infantry weapon, and by Blackstone's time, the 

right  to  bear  arms,  and specifically  firearms,  was  a  well 

recognized element of the Constitution, existing quite separately 

from the obligational aspect.



    This was clearly enunciated during the debate on the  Seizure 

of  Arms Bill of 1820, in response to a fear of  insurrection  in 

the industrializing North.  The Luddite violence of 1811 and 1812 

had required 12,000 troops to put down, and a resurgence had  led 

to  the "Peterloo Massacre" of 1819 in which eleven  people  were 

killed  and  hundreds injured as the Yeomanry dispersed  a  crowd 

estimated  at  some  eighty thousand.  There  was  much  talk  of 

revolution and reports, no doubt exaggerated, of secret stores of 

arms and men drilling or training with them.



    The  Seizure  of Arms Act was to authorize  justices  of  the 

peace  to  issue warrants for the seizure and detention  of  arms 

that  might  be used by revolutionaries.   Parliament  recognized 

that  it was on delicate ground and clearly had no wish to  abro-

gate a right.  The Act applied only to the two cities and  eleven 

counties  in  which there was a real fear of  unrest,  and  would 

lapse  after two years.  Moreover, firearms (unlike pikes)  could 

only  be seized if it could be demonstrated that they  were  kept 

for a purposed dangerous to the peace.



    Despite  the carefully circumscribed terms of the  bill,  Mr. 

T.W.  Anson  contended, during the debate on the  14th  December, 

1819, that, "The principles on which it (the bill) is founded and 

the  temper in which it is framed appear to me to be so  much  at 

variance  with the free spirit of our venerated constitution  and 

so  contrary  to the undoubted right which the subjects  of  this 

country  have ever possessed -- the right of retaining  arms  for 

the defense of themselves, their families and properties --  that 

I cannot look upon it without loudly expressing my disapprobation 

and regret."



    After  a lengthy debate in which Mr. Anson found strong  sup-

port, Mr. George Canning, later Prime Minister, summed up for the 

Government:   "I am perfectly willing to admit the right  of  the 

subject  to hold arms laid down by th Honorable and Learned  Gen-

tleman (Mr. Anson), having stated it on the authority of Mr. Jus-

tice Blackstone.  The doctrine so laid down, I am willing to  ad-

mit,  is no other than the doctrine of the British  Constitution.  

The  Bill  of Rights, correctly quoted  and  properly  construed, 

brings  me  to  the  construction of the  Bill  which,  in  fact, 

recognizes  the right of the subject to have arms, but  qualifies 

that  right  in  such  a manner as  the  necessity  of  the  case 

requires."



    It was generally accepted that Mr. Canning had made his case, 

and that by tailoring th bill to meet a specific and tightly cir-

cumscribed  problem,  the extent to which he  had  infringed  the 

rights  of the subject was acceptable and met  Blackstone's  pre-

scription of, "...restraints so gentle and moderate, as will  ap-

pear  on further inquiry, that no man of sense or  probity  would 

wish to see them slackened."



    Subsequent legislative proposals were less clearly in  accord 

with  this principle, and it was to be nearly a century before  a 

measure restricting firearms ownership or use was again  enacted.  

The  possible exception that one might cite was the  Gun  License 

Act  of 1870, which required anyone who wished to carry or use  a 

gun outside the curtilege of a dwelling house, to purchase a  ten 

shilling license at the post office.  This, however was  strictly 

a revenue measure; it remained in force until 1967.



    Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act, 1824, made it an offense to be 

in possession of an offensive weapon with intent to commit a fel-

ony.  But providing he was free of felonious intent and paid  his 

ten  shillings  to  the post office, the  Englishman's  right  to 

acquire, possess and carry firearms was uninhibited by law  until 

the twentieth century.



    There  had been several measures proposed toward the  end  of 

the 19th century, but all fell, generally on grounds of unconsti-

tutionality.   The  Pistols Bill, 1895, made it  to  a  division, 

where  it failed by 183 votes to 75.  Mr. C. H.  Hopwood,  Member 

for  South  East Middleton, would appear to  have  reflected  the 

feeling of the HOuse when he suggested that, "To say that because 

there  were some persons who would make violent use  of  pistols, 

therefore the right of purchase or possession by every Englishman 

should be taken away, is monstrous."



    A much diluted bill, however, was to succeed eight years  la-

ter.  The Pistols Act, 1903, provided that before one could  pur-

chase a pistol or revolver at retail, one had either to produce a 

gun  license  or game license, available at the post  office,  or 

give reasonable proof that one was a householder intending to use 

the  pistol in or within the curtilege of his own house, or  pre-

sent  a letter, countersigned by a justice of the peace or a  po-

lice officer of the rank of inspector or above, that one was  de-

parting abroad for a period of six months or more.  There was al-

so a bar on retail sales to persons under the age of 18;  private 

sales were outside the scope of the Act.  The only effect of  the 

Act  was to oblige retail customers who were not householders  to 

pay a ten shilling tax at the post office.  The burden of the law 

was minimal and therefore tolerable.



    The purpose of the bill, according to Mr. Hulme, its sponsor, 

was  not to prevent crime but hopefully to eliminate some of  the 

accidents, particularly involving young people, that one heard of 

from time to time.



    Mr. Hulme's intentions notwithstanding, the 1903 Act was soon 

criticized for not accomplishing what it had not been intended to 

accomplish, and a much stiffened version was ready for  introduc-

tion in 1911.  Soundings may have indicated that it would encoun-

ter  the same sort of resistance that had scuttled the  1893  and 

1895  bills, however, since it was never brought  before  Parlia-

ment.



    This  persistent legislative activity from 1893  onward,  for 

all of its lack of success, suggests the emergence of a  feeling, 

in administrative circles, that the Constitution was outmoded  in 

this  respect, and that some beneficial effect would accrue  from 

restricting the legitimate private ownership of firearms.



    The  effect anticipated is not always easy to deduce for,  as 

Greenwood  belatedly discovered, legislative proposals  sometimes 

sail under false colours.  This could be the said to have partic-

ularly been the case of the Firearms Act, 1920, the Criminal Jus-

tice  Act, 1967, (which introduce the shotgun controls) and  per-

haps the current bill as well.



    The Firearms Act, 1920, established the framework of controls 

that  has characterized the British system ever since.  This  was 

strictly and administrative confection: the Blackwell  Committee, 

upon  whose recommendations the Act was based, met in secret  and 

their  report  was  never published.  The  chairman,  Sir  Ernley 

Blackwell,  was a senior Home Office official, while the  secret-

ary,  who was also a member of the committee, was Mr.  F.J.  Dry-

hurst,  recently Commissioner of the Prison Service.  Other  mem-

bers represented the Metropolitan Police, the County and  Borough 

Police Forces, the board of Customs, Board of Trade, the War  Of-

fice and the Irish Office.



    The committee proceeded on the assumption that controls  were 

desirable and that they would be effective.  The Commissioner  of 

Police  for  the Metropolis had reported that  during  the  three 

years  1911-1913 there had been 123 cases in which  firearms  had 

either been used in crime or had been found in the possession  of 

persons who had come into the hands of the police.  For the  cor-

responding period, 1915-1917, there had been 47 cases.  Blackwell 

ascribed  this decline, from an average of 41 cases per  year  to 

15.6  cases per year, entirely to the beneficial effects  of  the 

wartime  Defense  of  the Realm  Regulations,  which  required  a 

license   for  the  retail  purchase  of  rifles,  pistols,   and 

ammunition.   Blackwell  anticipated that  when  the  Regulations 

expired, instances of armed crime "may be expected to rise to  or 

above their former level."  With hindsight, and armed crime  rate 

in   the  Metropolis  of  47  cases  per  year  sounds   Utopian.  

Blackwell's  contention, "That the control of firearms should  be 

made  far  more stringent than it is now is  a  proposition  that 

hardly  anyone could be found to question," [Blackwell,  page  1] 

might best be taken in the context of the secrecy with which  the 

Committee  undertook its deliberation and its  exclusively  civil 

service and police composition.



    Blackwell submitted his report on the 16th of November, 1918.  

On  the  same day, he wrote to Sir Maurice Bonham Carter  at  the 

Ministry of Reconstruction, who had been responsible, along  with 

Sir Edward Troup, for setting the committee up.



    Of the report, Blackwell wrote in a covering letter, "It will 

be  better not to publish it.  There is a good deal in  the  Arms 

Traffic Report that could not be published and a regards our  Re-

port,  any prolonged discussion with the 'trade' is to be  avoid-

ed." [PRO REC1/342/55946]  "You will see," he assured Bonham Car-

ter,  "that we have arrived at framing a fairly stringent  system 

of control."



    Stringent  it was.  Indeed, the certification procedure  that 

Blackwell's  committee designed has been recognized as  about  as 

stringent  as can be effected short of an  outright  prohibition.  

The distinctive features are the wide-ranging discretion accorded 

to  chief  constables and the burden laid upon the  applicant  to 

"satisfy" the chief constable both as to his personal suitability 

and as to his legitimate requirement for the firearms or  ammuni-

tion applied for.



    Complaints of overzealousness were almost immediately  forth-

coming.   The first appeal against a chief  constable's  decision 

was  heard at Middleton Police Court the 20th of December,  1929; 

the Act had come into effect the 1st of the month previous.   The 

Rev. Henry Evans, vicar of Tonge, appealed against the refusal of 

the  chief constable to issue him a certificate for a  Winchester 

rifle which he had owned for many years for sporting purposes and 

for the control of vermin in his poultry yard, as he had  repeat-

edly  explained to police officers on the occasions of their  re-

cent visits.



    When making out the application form, the Rev. Evans had  in-

dicated that his reason for requiring a certificate was so as  to 

comply with the law.  The chief constable refused to accept this, 

and the Rev. Evans refused to fill out another form, noting  that 

there was no requirement in the law for him to have made out  the 

first one.



    The  court found in Rev. Evans' favour.  The Home Office,  in 

an  internal note, complained that, "The police chose a  case  in 

which they were very likely to lose, and covered by H.O. instruc-

tions  to issue certificates freely to reputable persons  already 

in possession." [PRO HO45/11024/408571]



    The instructions referred to had been promulgated the 24th of 

November  and were supplemental to extensive notes  for  guidance 

issued to chief constables on the 5th of October.  The fact  that 

the Home Secretary found it necessary, within weeks of the  Act's 

taking effect, to bring the constabularies' attention to, "...the 

following observations, which may assist Chief Constables in  en-

forcing the Act without unnecessary interference with persons who 

were properly in possession of firearms at the time of the  pass-

ing of the Act, and are not likely to abuse permission to  retain 

them,"  [HO Circ. 406,571/76]  is probably indicative of  a  sub-

stantial volume of complaints.



    The chief constables were less than appreciative of the  Home 

Secretary's assistance in these matters.  Their Districts 1,2,& 3 

Conference forwarded a resolution to the Home Office  expressing, 

"...regret  that the Home Office has seen fit by  their  circular 

408,571/76 of the 24th November, 1920, to modify the previous in-

structions  issued  to Chief Constables in Home  Office  circular 

408, 571/33 of 5th October, 1920, as such action had placed Chief 

Constables in a difficult position." [PRO HO45/11024-62971]



    They  asked that the avenue of appeal to the courts be  abol-

ished, and that complaints be referred to the Secretary of  State 

for adjudication.



    By 1934, the Act, and the system of controls over rifles  and 

pistols  which it incorporated, had "run in," and the  Government 

felt that it was time for a review.  The Home Secretary appointed 

a Departmental Committee under the chairmanship of Sir  Archibold 

Bodkin,  a  recently retired Directory  of  Public  Prosecutions, 

"...to  consider the various types of firearms and similar  weap-

ons... and to report whether, in the interests of public  safety, 

any amendment of the law is necessary or desirable in respect  of 

such weapons and ammunition." [HMSO Cmd. 4758.1934]



    Bodkin's  committee  was  somewhat more  broadly  based  than 

Blackwell's (it included three Members of Parliament) and invited 

submissions.  It heard oral evidence from 38 witnesses represent-

ing  21 organizations, and received written  communications  from 

ten  departments and organizations.  The report (Cmd.  4758)  was 

published in December of 1934 and reprinted in 1968.



    The Bodkin Report is interesting in many respects, not  least 

in its use of statistical evidence.  The Committee had  requested 

an  elaborate report from each chief officer of police  in  Great 

Britain  concerning, "...cases known to the police in which  cer-

tain types of weapons had, during the three years ended 28th Feb-

ruary, 1934, been "a) used by or found in the possession of  per-

sons  engaged in crime (including cases of suicide)  or  avoiding 

arrests, (or) b) the cause of accidents involving personal injur-

ies." [Bodkin, page 2]



    The  information thus gathered was tabulated and broken  down 

so that details such as the age of the user, the calibre or gauge 

of  the weapon, the type of cartridge, and the degree  of  injury 

were immediately accessible.  These tables cover seven pages  and 

are extraordinarily well set out and useful.  The survey covered: 

shotguns,  sawn-off shotguns, smooth-bore pistols, toy  or  dummy 

pistols  converted to fire, toy or dummy pistols  not  converted, 

air  pistols,  and air guns or rifles -- in  other  words,  those 

types of firearm that were not covered by the Firearms Act, 1920.



    The committee's decision to seek no data regarding the  types 

of firearm controlled by the 1920 Act meant both that the effect-

iveness  of that Act could not be evaluated and that no case  for 

deregulation could be supported by quantitive evidence.  This was 

the more unfortunate in that they were quite clear that deregula-

tion was within their terms of reference [Bodkin, page 3].



    The Committee's use of evidence (or lack thereof) opens  them 

to criticism on several points.  They professed much sympathy for 

the gun trade, which had been decimated by the 1920 Act but whose 

remaining  members had "borne their losses with  resignation  and 

have loyally cooperated with authorities." [Bodkin, page 10]



    Moreover, "It seems quite clear," they report, "that in  1920 

Parliament intended to abstain, as far as possible, from discour-

aging  the formation of rifle clubs and target practice  general-

ly." [Bodkin, page 15].  They were earnestly pressed by the trade 

to  deregulate .22 rifles, but declined to do so on  the  perhaps 

significant grounds that, "...it would be a retrograde step after 

14 years of restriction if all control over such weapons were  a-

bolished." [Bodkin, page 16]



    According  to the evidence collected, ordinary  shotguns  had 

been  used in 94 crimes over the three years of the study.   Shot 

pistols had been used in 25 and sawn-off shotguns in eight.  Bod-

kin  recommended  placing the latter two types  of  weapon  under 

firearm certificate control, but favored leaving normal  shotguns 

outside the Act.  They may have been quite correct in  suggesting 

that shotguns so outnumbered shot pistols that a roughly 4:1  ra-

tio  of use in crime was not disproportionate.  But they made  no 

attempt to quantify the number of either type in circulation, nor 

did they address their minds to the question of what was achieved 

by restricting sawn-off shotguns when both shotguns and  hacksaws 

were unrestricted.



    The  Bodkin Committee collected a great deal  of  information 

and did an impressive amount of work, but their line of  argument 

is  not always persuasive.  One often suspects that the  evidence 

is  decorative and that the report actually reflects an  adminis-

trative class view of what a well-ordered universe would be like.  

Their conclusion, that the system of controls established by  the 

Firearms Act, 1920, "...lying as it does largely in the hands  of 

responsible  officers of police, has, in our opinion,  been  well 

administered  and  forms an efficient system of  controlling  the 

sale  of  firearms and ammunition," [Bodkin page 9]  ignored  the 

question  of  what the system accomplished.  The members  of  the 

committee no doubt assumed that the controls were of some  public 

benefit,  but they did not pose the question and sought  no  evi-

dence that would have permitted an answer.



    The Bodkin Committee suggested a number of changes of  detail 

in the 1920 Act, but none of structure.  Perhaps their most nota-

ble proposals were that shotguns with barrels less than 20 inches 

in  length  be subject to firearm certificate control,  and  that 

machine  guns be removed from firearm certificate control and  be 

reclassified as prohibited weapons.  The reclassification of  ma-

chine guns was at the suggestion of the British Field Sports  So-

ciety.



    The Bodkin committee recommendations were incorporated in the 

Firearms Act, 1936, which turned out to be longer than the act it 

amended.  The following year, the 1920 and 1936 Acts, along  with 

the  intervening Firearms and Imitation Firearms  (Criminal  Use) 

Act,  1933,  and the Firearms Act, 1934 (regulating the  sale  to 

persons under seventeen of firearms and ammunition) were consoli-

dated  in the Firearms Act, 1937, which was to remain in  effect, 

virtually unamended, for thirty-one years.



    The Firearms Act, 1937, carried Britain through the trauma of 

the Second World War, across the flat and tranquil decade of  the 

1950's, and into an era of spiraling crime and quantum  increases 

in criminal violence.  The 1937 Act, perhaps, was no more respon-

sible for the latter phenomena than it was for the period of  re-

markable repose that preceded it.



    In  the absence of directly comparable statistics,  all  that 

can  be said with confidence is that the 1950's marked  the  last 

time,  and  perhaps the only time, that armed crime had  been  as 

rare as it had during the Belle Epoque when there was no restric-

tive legislation at all.



    However,  few  people retained a clear memory of  the  period 

prior to the First World War, and across the intervening decades, 

the feeling had taken root that the low level of armed crime must 

be  due  to the rigour of statutory restrictions.   When  violent 

crime  began its vertiginous rise in the mid-1960's,  the  under-

standable  feeling of many was that more restrictive  legislation 

was  needed.  The police were less prone to such and  instinctive 

reaction,  for chief constables realized that the degree of  con-

trol which they exercised over the legitimate ownership of rifles 

and  pistols  left little to be desired.  Shotguns  remained  un-

controlled, but were comparatively rarely used in crime.



    The question, nonetheless, was repeatedly posed as to whether 

any  benefit would be derived from drawing them into the  system.   

Invariable, the answer was that would not.  Sir Frank Soskice, as 

Home Secretary, gave the matter close consideration and told  the 

House,  on 11 February, 1965, while announcing the provisions  of 

the  forthcoming Firearms Act, 1965, that, "The  Government  have 

considered carefully the possibility of extending to shotguns the 

firearm  certificate  procedure,  but have  decided  against  it.  

There  are  probably at least 50,000 shotguns in  legitimate  use 

throughout  the country and the burden which certification  would 

put  on the police would not be justified by the  benefits  which 

would result."



    Sir  Frank was replaced at the Home Office toward the end  of 

the  year,  and on the 3rd of March, 1966, Roy Jenkins,  the  new 

Home  Secretary, announced that he was reconsidering the  matter.  

He  was, he said, "actively considering new legislation in  rela-

tion to shotguns."  By the 23rd of June, the review had been com-

pleted, and Mr. Jenkins reported that, "The type of shotgun which 

is freely available and which can be used without special  exemp-

tion was considerably restricted under the Firearms Act.  I  must 

pay some regard to the burden of inspection which would be put on 

the police.  The police do not consider that it would be right to 

make an extension at this time."



    In  other words, the matter had been looked into  repeatedly, 

and the conclusion was that it was simply not worth doing.   How-

ever,  only seven weeks later, an incident occurred that  was  to 

lead Mr. Jenkins to reverse his position entirely.



    At  3:15 P.M. the 12th of August, a Metropolitan  Police  "Q" 

car turned into Baybrook Street, Hammersmith.  Foxtrot 11  pulled 

to  the side, and two officers, DS Head and DC Wombell, left  the 

vehicle to approach a parked Vanguard estate car containing three 

men.   As  they drew near, Harry Roberts shot both of  them  dead 

with a .38 Enfield revolver.  John Duddy leapt out and ran to the 

Q car, where he killed the driver, PC Fox, with three shots  from 

a .380 Colt pistol.  Britain's greatest manhunt was on.



    John  Duddy and an accomplice, John Witney, the owner of  the 

Estate car, who had been present at the time, were soon arrested.  

But  it was three months before Roberts, a Malayan  veteran,  was 

finally tracked down and captured near Bishop's Stortford,  Hert-

fordshire.  He had gone to ground in Epping Forest and worked his 

way north on foot.



    Meanwhile, the case dominated the news absolutely; the gratu-

itous brutality of the crime aroused widespread revulsion and  on 

the  6th of September, a memorial service for the slain  officers 

drew a thousand-strong crowd to Westminister Abbey, carrying ban-

ners  calling for the restoration of capital punishment  in  such 

cases.



    Hanging  had only been finally abolished in November of  1965 

and  Mr. Jenkins, whose feelings on the matter were  well  known, 

was under heavy pressure from press and public alike, to reintro-

duce  it.  On the 12th of September, less than a week  after  the 

demonstration  at  Westminster Abbey, he announced that  he  was, 

"...endeavouring  to draw up plans to end the  unrestricted  pur-

chase of shotguns.  They can be purchased far too easily, by mail 

order or other means, and there is evidence that the criminal use 

of  shotguns is increasing rapidly, still more rapidly than  that 

of other weapons." [Daily Telegraph 13.9.66]



    The  "evidence"  Mr. Jenkins referred to was the  records  of 

"indictable  offenses involving firearms," a  disparate  category 

consisting mostly of damaged property, poaching, threats and  as-

saults  and so forth, rather than the sort of "armed crime"  that 

most people would think of.  However, this body of data, as  well 

as  more relevant statistics, had been available to Mr.  Jenkins, 

as indeed it had been to Sir Frank Soskice, and no doubt had been 

carefully studied before each reached his conclusion that  propo-

sals to further restrict shotguns were not justified by the  evi-

dence.



    If  one  discounts the possibility that Mr.  Jenkins  thought 

that restricting shotgun ownership was a relevant legislative re-

sponse  to and incident in which police officers were  shot  with 

pistols, then an explanation of why the Home Secretary completely 

reversed his policy is still needed.



The evidence suggests that Mr. Jenkins introduced legislation  a-

gainst shotguns in hope of deflecting the pressure for a reintro-

duction of capital punishment.  If so, he was successful,  albeit 

at  the cost of approximately half a million man hours of  police 

time, per year, over the past twenty years.



    Rather  than  introducing a Firearms  (Amendment)  Bill  that 

might  have  attracted focused opposition, Mr. Jenkins  used  the 

forthcoming  Criminal Justice Bill, 1967, as the vehicle for  his 

proposed measures.  This was an immensely significant and contro-

versial  bill  which, among other things, did away with  the  re-

quirement  for a full hearing of evidence at  committal  proceed-

ings, instituted a parole system, abolished the requirement for a 

unanimous  verdict  in criminal trials,  placed  restrictions  on 

newspaper reporting of committal hearings and introduced suspend-

ed prison sentences.  Part V of the bill, which introduced licen-

ses  for shotguns, was well camouflaged in a thicket  of  porten-

tious  and far reaching reforms to the criminal  justice  system.  

Opposition to Part V, therefore, was fragmented and diffuse.



    The next year, the Firearms Act, 1968, consolidated the  1937 

Act and Part V of the Criminal Justice Act, along with two inter-

vening  measures, the Air Guns and Shot Guns, etc., Act  of  1962 

and the Firearms Act, 1965.  The former had originated as a  pri-

vate member's bill, introduced Mr. Brian Harrison, and  regulated 

the circumstances under which young people between the ages of 14 

and  21 might lawfully purchase, use or have in their  possession 

airguns, shotguns and firearms, as well as ammunition and pellets 

for them.  The latter act was more interesting.



    The  Firearms Act, 1965, was designed to strengthen the  hand 

of  the police against criminals, or suspected criminals, and  as 

such was supported by most of the shooting organizations,  though 

some  of  its provisions, notably a clause  enabling  chief  con-

stables  to  attach conditions to the  registration  of  firearms 

dealers, have led to problems not then anticipated.



    Other clauses created the offense of armed trespass,  regula-

ted  the carrying of firearms and ammunition in a  public  place, 

gave  the police wider powers of search and arrest  without  war-

rant,  penalized the carrying of a firearm with intent to  commit 

an  indictable offense, increased the minimum length  of  shotgun 

barrel from 20 inches to 24 inches and generally increased penal-

ties overall.



    The  most notable feature of the 1965 Act, however,  was  the 

haste  with  which it was carried through Parliament.   The  Home 

Secretary  did not intimate that he had it in mind  to  legislate 

until the 21st of January.  Proposals were announced on the  11th 

February;  the  bill was introduced on the 28th of  February  and 

given a second reading only two days later, on the 2nd of  March.  

Third  Reading was on the 12th of May and Royal Assent was  given 

the 5th of August.



    Significantly,  the Murder (Abolition of the  Death  Penalty) 

Bill was already at the committee stage before the Firearms  Bill 

was introduced, yet did not become law until three months  later.  

The haste with which the Firearms Bill had been patched  together 

was  reflected  in  the great number of  amendments  required  to 

eliminate anomalies and unintended effects.



    The  Government  were clearly anxious that the  abolition  of 

hanging  might herald a new willingness on the part of  criminals 

to  use violence of all forms and firearms in particular.   Their 

anxiety  was  not  misplaced.  And midway  through  the  Firearms 

Bill's passage, Roy Jenkins took office as Home Secretary.  It is 

possible that this precedent conditioned his actions eight months 

later after the Shepherd's Bush murders, as the incident in  Bay-

brook Street became known.



    The  Shepherd's  Bush affair may also have contributed  to  a 

hardening of attitude on the part of chief constables.   Certain-

ly,  in retrospect, 1967 seems to mark the beginning of an  overt 

hostility  toward the shooting sports on the part of chief  offi-

cers  that had not been manifest before.  Police Review  magazine 

described  it this way: "There is an easily  identifiable  police 

attitude towards the possession of guns by members of the public.  

Every  possible difficulty should be put in their way.  No  docu-

mentation  can be too rigid, no security requirements too  arbit-

rary,  which prevents guns coming into the hands  of  criminals." 

[Police Review 8.10.82]



    People  who  wished to comply with the law  found  themselves 

subject to bureaucratic harassment as chief constables pursued an 

often acknowledged policy of "reducing the number of firearms  in 

the hands of the public to the absolute minimum."  Over the  next 

fifteen  years, more than a quarter of rifle and pistol  certifi-

cate  holders had been eliminated.  In 1968, there  were  216,281 

firearm  certificate holders in England and Wales; by 1983,  that 

figure  was down to 159,804, a reduction of 56,477, or 26%.   The 

policies  that achieved this substantial result involved a  great 

deal of ultra vires activity and generated resentment and animos-

ity among those affected.



    In  1973, the Government decided to legislate again, and  is-

sued  a  Green Paper, The Control of Firearms  in  Great  Britain 

(Cmd. 5297), which was to achieve some notoriety.  The Green  Pa-

per  was  based on the report of a working party chaired  by  Sir 

John McKay, then H.M. Chief Inspector of Constabulary for England 

and Wales.  The rest of the committee, which consisted exclusive-

ly of members of the police, the Home Office and the Scottish Of-

fice,  have not been identified;  the report has never  been  re-

leased.  One can only judge it through the Green Paper.



    The McKay Committee gathered some interesting statistics, but 

the Green Paper used them in a manner so casual and  self-serving 

that  the argument, rather than being bolstered by the  evidence, 

was  discredited.   Professor Richard Harding,  who  studied  the 

Green  Paper with great care, described it as,  "...statistically 

defective...scientifically quite useless; the data are  presented 

in  a way which precludes objective evaluation by any one  else." 

[1979 Crim LR 772]



    Nor  was the Green Paper well served by its tone,  which  was 

sanctimonious  and  authoritarian.  Its premise was  simply  that 

armed  crime  was increasing, therefore  more  restrictions  were 

needed.  Bodkin was cited as an authority for his proposition:

    "A Departmental Committee set up in 1934 found that the  1920 

Act  had reduced the likelihood...of criminals obtaining  posses-

sion of the more dangerous firearms (rifles and pistols)." [Green 

Paper, page 3]



    In fact, the Bodkin Committee had "found" no such thing,  but 

had  simply  asserted it, having  avoided,  perhaps  consciously, 

gathering any evidence that might have permitted testing the  hy-

pothesis.



    The Green Paper met a hostile reception in Parliament and  in 

the press, and was soon withdrawn by the Government.  Some of its 

proposals, however, were adopted as "force policy" by chief  con-

stables, and were applied as if they were law.



    Shortly after the Green Paper was withdrawn, the Home  Office 

began  increasing the fees for grant and renewal of  firearm  and 

shotgun certificates in a manner that many regarded as  punitive, 

though  this was denied by ministers.  There had  been  inflation 

adjusting increases in 1969 and 1971; the increases begun in 1973 

were  therefore on top of an already  inflation-adjusted  figure.  

Over the ensuing give years, the fees for grant and renewal of  a 

firearms  certificate were raised by 714% and 800%  respectively; 

the increases for grant and renewal of a shotgun certificate were 

1,200% and 800%.  The Home Office conducted several "costing  ex-

ercises," each of which in turn was thoroughly discredited.



    The twenty years following have been characterized by  legis-

lative  stability, offset by an increased willingness to use  ex-

tra-legal means for imposing a preferred policy line.  The latter 

part of this period is also distinguished by more overt hostility 

toward private firearms ownership on the part of chief  officers, 

and  by a far more active participation in pressure  politics  by 

the police.



    The Association of Chief Police Officers determined in Decem-

ber,  1982, to push resolutely to have shotguns placed under  the 

same controls as rifles and pistols.  With the assistance of  the 

Superintendents  Conference and the Police Federation, they  have 

since undertaken three "campaigns" characterized by a carrot  and 

stick  approach.  An hysterical press campaign would be  followed 

by an invitation to the Home Secretary to legislate in the manner 

desired.  The most recent campaign has used the Hungerford incid-

ent  as a platform and has proved imminently successful.  As  the 

Home Secretary has several times stated, Hungerford had  provided 

the opportunity to "move forward," and the police were among  the 

foremost "urgers forward" in the matter.



    The  Firearms (Amendment) Bill indeed represents a move  for-

ward in the sense that legislation in this field, in Great  Brit-

ain, represents a linear progression from liberty to prohibition.  

As  we have demonstrated, the position up to the outbreak of  the 

First  World War was that the right to keep arms was one  of  the 

elementary  liberties of freeborn Englishmen, a fundamental  part 

of  the Constitution.  This right has been progressively  circum-

scribed,  limited,  eroded, discounted, and  finally  repudiated.  

The  effect of the present bill will be finally to eradicate  it.  

It  subsists, at present, in relation to shotguns, provided  that 

one is of good character.  The effect of the present bill is that 

no matter how good one's character, one will not be permitted  to 

possess a shotgun unless one can demonstrate an  administratively 

approved "good reason" for so doing.



    But  if Mr. Hurd meant to imply that "moving  forward"  meant 

enhancing the social good by addressing effective legislation  to 

a defined problem, he needs to make his case.  Perhaps his is the 

right policy to pursue, but that has yet to be demonstrated.  In-

deed, one of the remarkable things about firearms legislation  in 

this country is that, not only have its benefits never been  dem-

onstrated,  but that the government of the day,  throughout,  has 

been careful to avoid looking objectively at the question.  There 

has been a series of committees, operating in various degrees  of 

secrecy, assuring us and themselves that the policy being pursued 

was the correct one, while somehow neglecting to demonstrate it.



    Blackwell, in 1918, baldly asserted that "hardly anyone could 

be found to question" the proposition that "the control of  fire-

arms should be made far more stringent than it is now."   Bodkin, 

in  1934, said that the Firearms Act, 1920, "forms  an  efficient

system  of controlling the sale of firearms and ammunition,"  but 

did  not  question the assertion and avoided  gathering  evidence 

that would have allowed it to be tested.  The Green Paper of 1973 

merely accepted Bodkin's assumption that controls work, and  said 

that circumstances called for more of them.



    With  the  1987 White Paper, the Government  appear  to  have 

moved  beyond  the feeling that an increase in  restrictions  re-

quires justification.  Controls seem to be regarded as an end  in 

themselves.   As one senior civil servant recently put it,  "Con-

trols are good."



    The Firearms (Amendment) Bill now before Parliament  consists 

of an enumeration of measures which the officials find congenial.  

Both they and the ministers are quite open in saying that no  re-

search was undertaken and that they could provide no evidence  of 

probable benefit from and of the proposals in the Bill.



    In fact, all but four of the proposals in the 1987 Bill  were 

lifted from the 1973 Green Paper.  Greenwood was perhaps unchari-

table  but not inaccurate when he described Mr. Hurd's  proposals 

as  "emptying Whitehall's rubbish bin into Parliament."   Parlia-

ment rejected the Green Paper in 1973 for its "police state"  ap-

proach  and its alleged irrelevance to the problems it  purported 

to address.



    If  it is to be accepted into law fifteen years  later,  then 

prudence  would dictate that each of its provisions  be  analyzed 

objectively.  If this is not done, the likelihood of Parliament's 

enacting sound and equitable law is remote.  We shall indeed have 

moved  a  long  way from Blackstone's  prescription  of,  "...re-

straints  in themselves so gentle and moderate...that no  man  of 

sense or probity would wish to see them slackened."



    There have been two further enactments since 1968 which  must 

be mentioned for the sake of completeness.  The Criminal  Justice 

Act, 1972, increased the penalties for criminal misuse stipulated 

in  the 1968 Act.  The penalty for possessing a firearm with  in-

tent to endanger life or using a firearm to resist arrest was in-

creased from fourteen years to life imprisonment, while that  for 

carrying  a firearm with intent to commit an indictable  offense, 

or  while  committing certain specified offenses,  was  increased 

from ten and seven years respectively, to fourteen years.



    The Firearms Act, 1982, was a Home Office measure put forward 

as a private member's bill with bipartisan support.  It was spon-

sored  Mr. Eldon Griffiths (later Sir Eldon),  the  Parliamentary 

representative  of the Police Federation, with the  objective  of 

enacting  the proposal in paragraph 121 of the 1973 Green  Paper, 

banning realistic replica or toy firearms.  The problems of defi-

nition, however, proved insuperable and the bill, when published, 

related instead to replica firearms which were capable of conver-

sion to fire a shot.  Mr. Griffiths contended that his bill would 

help  to stem, "the rising tide of crime and terrorism."  He  was 

no doubt referring to the unpublished draft, for no one could re-

call  a crime, much less and act of terrorism, committed  with  a 

converted replica.



    The law would be better served, and would command greater re-

spect,  if  it could be shown to address a problem.  One  of  the 

most conspicuous features of firearms legislation in Britain  has 

been a persistent refusal to undertake any objective analysis  of 

its utility or consequences in terms of social benefit or  effect 

on specified mischiefs, either prospectively or retrospectively.



    The  danger is twofold.  In the first place, if a law  cannot 

be  demonstrably justified, those who have thus  far  voluntarily 

complied with it may cease to do so, and will moreover find their 

respect for the law in general diminished.  This is a result that 

wise  government should avoid.  In the second place, if a law  is 

irrelevant, resources committed to enforcing it are at best wast-

ed and at worst counterproductive.



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